Elliott v. State
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Cite as 2010 Ark. App. 185
ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS
DIVISION III
No. CACR 09-750
Opinion Delivered
PHILLIP COLEY ELLIOTT
APPELLANT
February 24, 2010
APPEAL FROM THE GARLAND COUNTY
CIRCUIT COURT,
[NO. CR 2007-602-I]
V.
HONORABLE JOHN HOMER WRIGHT,
JUDGE
STATE OF ARKANSAS
APPELLEE
AFFIRMED
M. MICHAEL KINARD, Judge
A Garland County jury found Phillip Coley Elliott guilty of sexual assault in the
second degree, and he was sentenced to five years’ probation, with certain special
conditions imposed. Elliott argues on appeal that the trial court erred in denying his
motion for a directed verdict because the evidence was insufficient to support a guilty
verdict. We disagree and affirm.
Appellant was charged with sexual assault in the second degree for violating
Arkansas Code Annotated section 5-14-125(a)(3) on August 5, 2007. At the trial, which
took place on March 10 and 11, 2009, the victim testified that she was currently eleven
years old. She stated that on August 5, 2007, appellant and his daughter were over at her
house.
Her father and appellant had been drinking together.
Late that afternoon,
Cite as 2010 Ark. App. 185
everybody at the house decided to take a nap, and she and appellant’s daughter went to
her room. The victim was watching television when appellant came in her room and lay
down on her bed, at which point she moved to the floor. She stated that appellant put his
foot over the bed and touched her “private spot” for about ten minutes. He then got up to
leave the room and told her not to tell anyone. The victim went to her parents’ room and
told them what had happened.
The victim’s mother testified that her daughter—in
tears—woke her up from a nap that day to tell her that appellant had touched her in her
“bad spot.” Also testifying were Sergeant Joel Ware, who investigated the sexual-assault
report for the sheriff’s office; Doug Shuffield, a child-abuse investigator with the
Arkansas State Police Crime Against Children Division; and Tracey Sanchez, a forensic
interviewer with the Cooper-Anthony Mercy Advocacy Center. A letter of apology that
appellant wrote to the victim during his interview with police was introduced into
evidence. In the letter, appellant apologizes to the victim “for any hurt” he has caused her
and says, “My actions were not even in my right mind. If they were, I would not even
have been in your room in the first place.”
A motion for directed verdict is treated as a challenge to the sufficiency of the
evidence. Phavixay v. State, 2009 Ark. 452, ___ S.W.3d ___. In reviewing a challenge
to the sufficiency of the evidence, the appellate court determines whether the verdict is
supported by substantial evidence, direct or circumstantial. Id. Substantial evidence is
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Cite as 2010 Ark. App. 185
evidence forceful enough to compel a conclusion one way or the other beyond suspicion
or conjecture. Id. This court views the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict,
and only evidence supporting the verdict will be considered. Id.
In this case, appellant challenges the sufficiency of the State’s evidence with
regard to the proof of sexual gratification. Appellant’s argument was properly preserved
with a specific motion for directed verdict at the close of the State’s evidence and renewal
at the close of all evidence.
A person commits sexual assault in the second degree if he, being eighteen years
of age or older, engages in sexual contact with someone who is less than fourteen years of
age and not the person’s spouse. Ark. Code Ann. § 5-14-125(a)(3) (Supp. 2009). Sexual
contact includes any act of sexual gratification involving the touching, directly or through
clothing, of the sex organs. Ark. Code Ann. § 5-14-101(10) (Supp. 2009). “Sexual
gratification” is not defined in the statute, but our supreme court has construed the words
in accordance with their reasonable and commonly accepted meanings. Farmer v. State,
341 Ark. 220, 223, 15 S.W.3d 674, 676–77 (2000) (citing Strickland v. State, 322 Ark.
312, 909 S.W.2d 318 (1995); Warren v. State, 314 Ark. 192, 862 S.W.2d 222 (1993);
McGalliard v. State, 306 Ark. 181, 813 S.W.2d 768 (1991)). The supreme court has
consistently held that it is not necessary for the State to provide direct proof that an act is
done for sexual gratification if it can be assumed that the desire for sexual gratification is
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Cite as 2010 Ark. App. 185
a plausible reason for the act.
Farmer, supra (citing Strickland, 322 Ark. 312, 909
S.W.2d 318; Warren, 314 Ark. 192, 862 S.W.2d 222; McGalliard, 306 Ark. 181, 813
S.W.2d 768; Williams v. State, 298 Ark. 317, 766 S.W.2d 931 (1989) (per curiam)).
Acknowledging the above law, appellant argues that the circumstantial evidence
that the touching was for sexual gratification failed to rule out every other reasonable
hypothesis than that of his guilt. See Stivers v. State, 64 Ark. App. 113, 978 S.W.2d 749
(1998). He argues that the requirement that every other reasonable hypothesis be ruled
out for circumstantial evidence to be sufficient is contrary to the “plausibility” rule set out
in supreme court case law regarding proof of sexual gratification. However, the law as it
stands is that the State need not provide direct evidence of the touching being for the
purpose of sexual gratification if it can be assumed that the desire for sexual gratification
is a plausible reason for the act. Here, it is at least plausible that appellant’s act of
touching the victim’s vaginal area with his foot, after which he ordered her not to tell
anyone and later wrote a letter of apology, was done for the purpose of sexual
gratification.
Despite his arguments to the contrary, appellant’s testimony that he did not recall
touching the victim or saying anything to her (and later testimony that he did not touch
the victim) is of no consequence on appeal. The jury is not required to believe the
testimony of any witness—certainly not the self-serving testimony of the accused. E.g.,
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Cite as 2010 Ark. App. 185
Brown v. State, 374 Ark. 341, 288 S.W.3d 226 (2008). Thus, appellant’s argument that
“it is certainly reasonable to conclude that Appellant’s conduct was not for sexual
gratification, but rather, incidental contact that Appellant was not aware of until after the
occurrence” fails. The victim testified that the contact occurred, and appellant’s desire
for sexual gratification is certainly a plausible reason for his action.
Affirmed.
V AUGHT, C.J., and G RUBER, J., agree.
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