Bruce v. Hancock
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
Cite as 2010 Ark. App. 171
ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS
DIVISION I
CA08-739
No.
BOBBIE BRUCE, RONNIE L. RICE,
AND BOYD BROTHERS
TRANSPORTATION COMPANY
APPELLANTS
V.
FLOYD HANCOCK, MARLENE
HANCOCK, PATRICIA RUNYAN,
AND WESLEY RUNYAN
APPELLEES
Opinion Delivered
February 17, 2010
APPEAL FROM THE POINSETT
COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT,
[NO. CV2004-248]
HONORABLE JOHN N.
FOGLEMAN, JUDGE
AFFIRMED
WAYMOND M. BROWN, Judge
This case arises from a multi-vehicle accident in Greene County, Arkansas. The four
appellees, who occupied one vehicle, sued two other motorists, appellants Bobbie Bruce and
Ronnie Rice, for negligence, alleging that Bruce, Rice, and Rice’s employer, appellant Boyd
Brothers Transportation Co., were responsible for appellees’ damages. Following a trial, the
jury found no negligence on the part of Boyd Brothers and Rice and assigned 100% of the
fault to Bruce. However, the jury awarded no damages to appellees. Appellees moved for a
new trial on grounds that the verdict was too small and clearly against the preponderance of
the evidence. The circuit court granted a new trial and appellants appeal from that order. We
affirm.
Cite as 2010 Ark. App. 171
On December 31, 2003, appellee Floyd Hancock was driving a Ford SUV with three
passengers—his wife, appellee Marlene Hancock; his sister, appellee Patricia Runyan; and his
nephew, appellee Wesley Runyan. The SUV was third in a line of northbound cars crossing
the Cache River bridge on a two-lane highway. Just beyond the bridge, the first car in line
stopped to turn left, awaiting the passage of oncoming traffic. The second car also stopped as
did appellees’ SUV. The next vehicle in line, although there is some dispute as to this, was
a red van occupied by a Mr. and Mrs. Jarrett, and it apparently came to a stop as well. Behind
the stopped vehicles were a blue van driven by appellant Bobbie Bruce, and an eighteenwheel log truck driven by appellant Ronnie Rice for Boyd Brothers Transportation Co. The
Bruce and Rice vehicles did not stop in time and crashed into the line of cars.
The only detailed descriptions of the accident came from Bruce and Rice. Bruce
testified that she never saw the Jarretts’ van and that she was behind appellees’ SUV at all
pertinent times. She said that, when she was approximately two car lengths from appellees,
she noticed that their vehicle had stopped, although she did not see any tail lights. Bruce
stated that she slammed on her brakes and was immediately hit by Rice, who was tailgating
her. She explained that Rice’s truck hit her once, causing her to collide with appellees’ SUV,
then hit her again and knocked her into the bridge railing.
Rice gave a different account of the accident. He said that his vision was partially
obscured by a line of trees as he rounded a curve heading for the bridge. According to him,
he was approximately 100 feet away from the line of cars when he saw the Bruce vehicle
-2-
Cite as 2010 Ark. App. 171
crash into the rear of the Jarretts’ van, which was stopped behind appellees’ SUV. Rice
testified that he hit his brakes and, once the oncoming lane was clear, steered his truck there
in an attempt to avoid the accident. In doing so, Rice said, he clipped the rear of Bruce’s van
with his right front fender, causing Bruce’s van to spin and the Jarretts’ van to become
airborne and go over the bridge railing. Rice denied tailgating Bruce and said that he would
not merely have clipped the back corner of her van if he had been following her that closely.
He blamed Bruce for causing the accident.
Appellees were unaware of what was happening behind them. They testified that they
felt one or two slight bumps, followed by a much larger impact. Trooper Charles Rowe, who
investigated the accident, testified that conditions were clear and dry and that appellees’
vehicle sustained significant damage in the rear. Rowe provided photographs of the scene,
which showed that Bruce’s vehicle had come to rest with its back end against the back of
appellees’ SUV; that the Jarretts’ van was in the ravine beside the bridge railing; and that there
was damage to the front right fender of Rice’s truck.1
Immediately following the accident, Marlene Hancock’s brother, Keith Blassingain,
drove all of the appellees to the emergency room. Hospital personnel examined appellees and
released them, but appellees later claimed that they developed various injuries. As a result,
appellees brought this lawsuit against appellants. The parties tried the case to a jury in
November 2007.
1
Neither side presented testimony from an accident reconstructionist or from the Jarretts.
-3-
Cite as 2010 Ark. App. 171
At trial, witnesses testified to the events surrounding the accident, as set forth above.
The parties also devoted considerable time to appellees’ claims for damages. The subject arose
first during opening statements, where the Hancocks’ counsel asked the jury to award at least
$250,000 and the Runyans’ counsel requested a lesser amount.2 The attorney for Rice and
Boyd Brothers did not dismiss the likelihood of a damage award, stating that the Hancocks
were “likely entitled to compensation, based on the damages that they can prove were caused
by this accident” and that the Runyans were “obviously without fault” and “clearly entitled
to compensation, once you determine who is responsible.”
During the presentation of evidence, Trooper Rowe testified that, according to his
report, none of the appellees professed injury at the scene. Additionally, Ronnie Rice testified
that he spoke to appellees at the scene and they indicated that they were fine. However, Keith
Blassingain testified that, when he drove appellees to the emergency room, Floyd Hancock
acted as though he was in “a lot of pain” and that Marlene Hancock was “very nervous and
upset.”
Floyd testified that his lower back was burning and stinging when he arrived at the
emergency room but that the doctors released him and told him that he was just sore. A day
or two later, he said, he had back pain, swelling, trouble walking, and trouble getting out of
bed. He returned to the emergency room, complaining of low back pain and tingling in his
left thigh, and came home with crutches and Ibuprofen. Thereafter, Floyd stated, he suffered
2
Property damage to the Hancock SUV was stipulated as $13,631.25.
-4-
Cite as 2010 Ark. App. 171
from back problems so severe that he could not keep up with his lawn care business or his
rental properties, could not participate in his customary leisure activities, and often cried from
the pain. His testimony was corroborated by Marlene and by a neighbor, Lisa Davies. Floyd
subsequently underwent back surgery in March 2004 on the recommendation of Dr. Robert
Abraham. Dr. Abraham testified that Floyd had a herniated disc, which most likely was caused
by the accident. Floyd presented a claim for medical bills in the amount of $22,737.23.
Floyd acknowledged that fourteen months prior to the accident, he presented to
another medical-care provider with low back pain and trouble walking, and that six months
after the accident, he was in another car wreck. However, he stated that the prior back pain
was treated, causing him no further problems, and that the latter accident caused pain that was
different from what he experienced in the present accident. Marlene essentially corroborated
Floyd’s testimony. Dr. Abraham, who had been unaware of Floyd’s prior back complaints,
agreed that the records of those complaints reflected many of the same symptoms for which
he treated Floyd after the accident. However, the doctor still opined that the accident was the
likely cause of Floyd’s difficulties.
Marlene Hancock testified that she had chest tightness and shoulder pain after the
accident and thought she was having a heart attack. She said that her blood pressure was
elevated at the emergency room, which the records bore out, but that she was released.
Marlene said that she later began experiencing pain in her right shoulder, for which she
received massage therapy and chiropractic care. At trial, she testified that her right shoulder
-5-
Cite as 2010 Ark. App. 171
still caused her pain, and she presented a claim for $6122.42 in medical bills and 82 hours in
lost wages. Consistent with her claim, her January 2004 medical records showed complaints
of right shoulder pain. However, other medical records, from later in 2004, referenced her
left shoulder as the problem area.
Patricia Runyan testified that she had a mild tightness in her shoulders after the
accident, for which she obtained muscle relaxers and Ibuprofen. She submitted a claim for
$548.02 in medical bills and $473.29 in lost wages. Wesley Runyan testified that he injured
his right hip in the crash and that he started hurting a few days after the accident. He said that
he underwent physical therapy, then had a shot and felt better. Wesley testified that he missed
time from work and had incurred approximately $5800 in medical bills.
During closing arguments, counsel for Bobbie Bruce stated, “There is no doubt that
the Hancocks and the Runyans were injured. You can check that one off your list. You don’t
need to figure out if they sustained damages. They have.” Counsel for Rice and Boyd
Brothers disputed appellees’ entitlement to the full amount of damages claimed but indicated
that appellees might have sustained at least some injuries as a result of the accident.
After closing arguments and instructions, the court submitted the case to the jury on
verdict interrogatories. Interrogatory #1 asked jurors if they found, from a preponderance of
the evidence, that “there was negligence upon the part of Bobbie Bruce which was a
proximate cause of any damages.” The jurors answered “Yes.” Interrogatory #2 asked jurors
if they found, from a preponderance of the evidence, that “there was negligence upon the
-6-
Cite as 2010 Ark. App. 171
part of Ronnie Rice, as employee of Boyd Brothers Transportation, which was a proximate
cause of any damages.” The jurors answered “No.” In Interrogatory #3, the jurors allotted
100% of the responsibility for the accident to Bruce. The last four interrogatories asked the
jurors to “state the amount of damages which you find from a preponderance of the evidence
were sustained by [each individual appellee] as the result of the occurrence.” On each
interrogatory, the jurors answered zero dollars.
Following entry of judgment, appellees moved for a new trial, asserting that the
amount of recovery was inadequate and that the verdict was clearly contrary to the
preponderance of the evidence. Appellees argued that they undisputedly suffered at least some
damages from the accident and that the jury’s finding that Bruce was solely at fault, while
exonerating Rice, was at odds with the facts. The circuit court agreed and ordered a new trial
“on both liability and damages.” Appellants brought this appeal.
The Arkansas Rules of Civil Procedure permit a circuit judge to order a new trial if
there is an error in the assessment of the amount of recovery or if the jury’s verdict is clearly
contrary to the preponderance of the evidence. Ark. R. Civ. P. 59(a)(5) and (6). When we
review an order granting a new trial, our inquiry is whether the circuit court abused its
discretion. Razorback Cab v. Martin, 313 Ark. 445, 856 S.W.2d 2 (1993). The abuse of
discretion must be “clear” or “manifest.” Young v. Honeycutt, 324 Ark. 120, 919 S.W.2d 216
(1996). A showing of abuse is more difficult when a new trial has been granted because the
party opposing the motion will have another opportunity to prevail. Id. Abuse of discretion
-7-
Cite as 2010 Ark. App. 171
means a discretion improvidently exercised, i.e., exercised thoughtlessly or without due
consideration. Id.
Appellants argue that the circuit court should not have disturbed the jury’s verdict and
that the court essentially substituted its view of the evidence for the jury’s. We note at the
outset that appellants rely heavily on precedents involving the denial of a motion for a new
trial. E.g., Dovers v. Stephenson Oil Co., 354 Ark. 695, 128 S.W.3d 805 (2003); Depew v.
Jackson, 330 Ark. 733, 957 S.W.2d 177 (1997). Those cases employ a different standard of
review, focusing on the substantiality of the evidence in support of the jury’s verdict rather
than on the circuit court’s exercise of discretion; as such, those cases do not provide authority
in an appeal involving the grant of a new trial. See Hogan v. Holliday, 72 Ark. App. 67, 31
S.W.3d 875 (2000).
Having clarified our standard of review, we first address appellant Bruce’s argument
that a new trial was not warranted because the jury could have found that appellees did not
meet their burden of proving damages. It is true that the party asserting entitlement to
damages has the burden of proving the claim. See generally Gen. Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 76 Ark.
App. 375, 65 S.W.3d 892 (2002). However, appellees did not fail to meet that burden of
proving damages, even if only a modest amount. If nothing else, their trip to the emergency
room immediately following the accident was worthy of recompense by the responsible party
or parties in this case. Moreover, appellees’ entitlement to some damages appeared to be a
given considering appellants’ virtual concession in opening statements and closing arguments
-8-
Cite as 2010 Ark. App. 171
that appellees incurred some damages in the accident. Bruce’s counsel even went so far as to
tell jurors that it was not necessary for them to deliberate the established fact of appellees’
injuries. A circuit court may consider concessions made in opening statements or closing
arguments in deciding whether to grant a new trial. See generally Machost v. Simkins, 86 Ark.
App. 47, 158 S.W.3d 726 (2004).
Bruce contends further that appellants successfully impeached appellees’ damage
testimony. Bruce cites Marlene’s conflicting complaints of shoulder pain, Floyd’s pre-existing
back problems and subsequent car accident, and Trooper Rowe’s statement that appellees did
not claim injury at the scene. However, a plaintiff’s lack of apparent injury at the scene does
not prohibit a circuit court from setting aside a zero-dollar verdict, especially where the
plaintiff sought medical evaluation and treatment soon after the accident. See Hogan, supra.
Furthermore, while appellants might have discredited some of appellees’ damage claims, they
did not discredit appellees’ entitlement to any damages. The contested issue at trial was the
extent of appellees’ injuries rather than whether they had been injured at all. Under these
circumstances, we cannot say that the circuit court manifestly abused its discretion in granting
a new trial based on the lack of a damage award to appellees.
Bruce also argues that the jury may have determined that appellees were not injured
by her negligence. However, regardless of the jury’s thinking on this point, the fact remains
that the jury found that appellees sustained no damages as the result of the accident. As we
have explained, the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in determining that an award of
-9-
Cite as 2010 Ark. App. 171
zero damages was an erroneous assessment under the circumstances of this case. See Tirado v.
O’Hara, 70 Ark. App. 152, 15 S.W.3d 715 (2000) (affirming the grant of a new trial based on
a fundamental error in the jury’s assessment of the plaintiff’s damages).
Appellants Rice and Boyd Brothers argue that the circuit court should have upheld the
jury’s verdict finding them not guilty of negligence. They cite Razorback Cab, supra, in which
our supreme court reversed the grant of a new trial in a negligence case. Razorback Cab
involved a plaintiff-bicyclist who was hit by a cab early one morning on a city street while
it was still dark. There was evidence that the cyclist was wearing dark clothing, that his bicycle
had no lights or visible rear reflectors, and that he simply could not be seen. In the cyclist’s
suit against the cab company, the jury rendered a defendant’s verdict. The circuit court
granted a new trial, stating that there was no evidence that the cab driver could not see the
bicycle. Our supreme court reversed and held that the circuit court manifestly abused its
discretion in substituting its view of the evidence for the jury’s. Razorback Cab is
distinguishable from the present case. The circuit court’s exercise of discretion there was
tainted by an utter disregard of the evidence, which could aptly be characterized as
thoughtless or improvident. In the present case, the circuit court did not act thoughtlessly or
improvidently. The court was faced with a situation in which two drivers failed to stop their
vehicles in time to avoid the stationary cars in front of them. The court determined, after
measured consideration, that the particular manner in which the jury rendered its
verdict—apportioning all fault to one defendant while exonerating the other, followed by an
-10-
Cite as 2010 Ark. App. 171
award of zero damages to plaintiffs who were not at fault—was clearly against the
preponderance of the evidence. Given this set of circumstances, we cannot say that the circuit
court abused its discretion in deciding to order a new trial. We therefore affirm the new trial
order as to all parties. We hasten to add that our holding should not be taken as a comment
on appellants’ negligence for purposes of re-trial. Our holding is that the abuse-of-discretion
standard of review compels our affirmance in this case. See Honeycutt, supra; Richardson v.
Flanery, 316 Ark. 310, 871 S.W.2d 589 (1994).
Rice and Boyd Brothers also argue that appellees were not aggrieved by the jury’s
verdict because appellees prevailed in their case against Bruce. We decline to hold that a zerodollar verdict against one defendant alone constitutes “prevailing,” such that a plaintiff is
deprived of standing to seek a new trial.
Based on the foregoing, we affirm the circuit court’s grant of a new trial.
Affirmed.
HART and GLADWIN, JJ., agree.
-11-
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.