Newton v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs.
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Cite as 2009 Ark. App. 120 (unpublished)
ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS
DIVISION I
No. CA08-1180
Opinion Delivered F EBRUARY 25, 2009
LaDONNA NEWTON
APPELLANT
V.
ARKANSAS DEP’T OF HUMAN
SERVICES
APPELLEE
APPEAL FROM THE CARROLL
COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT,
[NO. JV 2006-57]
HONORABLE ALAN D. EPLEY,
JUDGE
AFFIRMED
ROBERT J. GLADWIN, Judge
Appellant LaDonna Newton brings this appeal from the order of the Carroll County
Circuit Court terminating her parental rights to her three children, L.L., A.L., and D.N.1 She
argues that there is insufficient evidence to support the circuit court’s findings, both as to
grounds for termination and as to whether the termination is in the children’s best interests.
We disagree, and accordingly, we affirm.
When this case began on November 3, 2006, there was already a history of
involvement of the Arkansas Department of Human Services (DHS) with this family,
concerning allegations of inadequate supervision and drug use by Newton. According to the
1
Brian Langston is the father of the children. His parental rights were also terminated
in the same proceedings. However, he does not appeal.
Cite as 2009 Ark. App. 120 (unpublished)
affidavit filed in support of DHS’s petition for emergency custody, Newton was hospitalized
in late October 2006 because of her methamphetamine use. On October 30, 2006, she left the
hospital against medical advice, only to return later that day with fresh needle marks. At the
time, the children were being cared for by their father, and he did not know Newton’s
whereabouts.
An adjudication hearing was held on December 6, 2006, which Newton failed to
attend. The circuit court found that the children were dependent-neglected. The court
approved a goal of reunification and ordered Newton to complete twelve hours of parenting
classes, submit to a substance-abuse assessment, enter treatment for her substance-abuse
problem, obtain and maintain stable employment and housing, and submit to random drug
screens.
On April 6, 2007, Newton pled guilty in the Boone County Circuit Court to several
offenses committed in April, May, and October 2006 involving forgery, theft of property, and
hot checks. She was sentenced to two years’ imprisonment in the Arkansas Department of
Correction, followed by an eight-year suspended imposition of sentence on the forgery
charges. She was also ordered to make restitution to her victims.
At a November 1, 2007 permanency-planning hearing, the circuit court changed the
goal of the case plan to termination of Newton’s parental rights, based upon a finding that
return of the children to Newton was not in their best interests. The court found that Newton
had not complied with the court’s orders or the case plan in that she had been arrested and
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Cite as 2009 Ark. App. 120 (unpublished)
incarcerated, did not have stable employment or housing, and had not visited the children on
a regular basis.
On December 7, 2007, Newton pled guilty to a hot-check charge in Washington
County Circuit Court. Imposition of her sentence was suspended for sixty months. She was
also ordered to pay restitution and court costs once she was released from incarceration on
the Boone County charges.
On April 17, 2008, DHS filed its petition seeking the termination of Newton’s
parental rights alleging the single ground that the children had been adjudicated dependentneglected and remained out of their parents’ home for more than twelve months without the
conditions that caused the removal being corrected.
At the May 2008 hearing on the termination petition, LaDonna Newton testified as
a witness for DHS that she was expected to be paroled to a halfway house on July 1, 2008,
where she would have to remain for thirty days. She acknowledged that she was unemployed
and could not recall the last job she had. She also said that she had not paid any child support.
Newton said that she complied with parts of the adjudication order by completing twelve
hours of parenting classes through the department of correction. She acknowledged that she
had not completed the DHS drug and alcohol assessment nor did she complete all of the
visits with her children. However, she asserted that she had kept in contact with DHS while
incarcerated. She also added that she had completed a nine-month drug rehabilitation
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Cite as 2009 Ark. App. 120 (unpublished)
program through the department of correction. Newton said that, upon her release, she
planned to attend NA meetings. She also insisted that she could have a job within one week
of her being released.
On cross-examination, Newton said that she had investigated the possibility of being
paroled to two rehabilitation facilities that allow children, but that she was denied. She said
that she took every class that the department of correction offered while she was incarcerated
in the Pine Bluff unit.
Dawn Ward, a licensed certified social worker and the children’s therapist, testified
that L.L. was diagnosed with reactive-attachment disorder and anxiety disorder. She said that
he exhibits anxiety, nervousness, and restlessness; that he worries a great deal; and that he
acts as a parent to his siblings. Ward described L.L. as cautious of people. She also said that
L.L. is somewhat anxious during visits with his mother, adding that he makes up excuses for
not wanting to visit. According to Ward, A.L. had similar diagnoses as L.L., with her
anxieties including being afraid of the dark and of monsters. Ward also said that A.L. has
aggressive outbursts or tantrums, which are typical of a child with such anxieties. D.N. was
also diagnosed with anxiety disorder. However, separation-anxiety disorder and reactiveattachment disorder had not been completely ruled out as additional possible diagnoses for
him. Ward said that the prognosis for all three children was very good, adding that they were
doing well with their foster parents.
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Cite as 2009 Ark. App. 120 (unpublished)
Manuelita Breedlove, a health and service aide, testified that she conducted three drug
tests on Newton, with the September and November 2006 tests being positive for
amphetamines, marijuana, and methamphetamines. The third test was conducted in
November 2007, after Newton’s incarceration, and was negative. She also supervised visits
between Newton and her children. Breedlove noted that the children’s reaction to the visits
with Newton had changed over time from being glad to see their mother and asking when
they were going to get to come home with her to being ready to move ahead with their lives.
She added that L.L. and A.L. have both told her that they do not want to live with their
mother and want to be adopted. She was not sure that D.N. knew Newton as his mother, due
to his young age at the time he entered foster care. According to Breedlove, the children were
doing well in foster care and were better behaved than when they entered care.
Ruthann Murphy, the DHS caseworker currently assigned to the case, testified as to
the history of the case. She recommended that Newton’s parental rights be terminated, based
on the length of time the children had been in foster care and the amount of time it would
take Newton to show that she was capable of caring for the children. She added that it would
be a minimum of six to eight months, possibly a year, before Newton could regain custody
once released from prison. Murphy asserted that the children were adoptable. She also said
that the children were happy and well adjusted. In discussing the children’s diagnosis of
attachment disorder, Murphy stated that the children were probably attached to their foster
parents. She expressed concern that, if Newton were released, she and the children would be
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Cite as 2009 Ark. App. 120 (unpublished)
returning to the home where they were living when the children were removed. Murphy
described the house as filthy at the time of removal. She added that Newton had never held
a steady job or had her own home.
Dana Byrd , the DHS caseworker on the case prior to becoming the county supervisor,
testified that Newton was uncooperative with efforts to have a drug assessment and other
services offered by DHS. She said Newton was offered parenting classes in her home. Byrd
was unaware of Newton ever paying child support. Getting Newton into a drug treatment
program would have started with an assessment, which was never accomplished.
John Reichenberg, the CASA volunteer assigned to the case, recommended the
termination of Newton’s parental rights. He stated that it would take a minimum of six
months for Newton to be in a position to regain custody of the children. He described the
children as happy with their foster parents, adding that they are extremely attached to the
foster parents. He also said that the children like to visit with Newton but do not want to live
with her.
Therapist Dawn Ward was recalled to testify about the symptoms of the children’s
attachment disorder. She said that the symptoms have decreased because of therapy and the
supportive environment provided by the foster parents. According to Ward, the children
would significantly regress if they were removed from their foster parents. She indicated a
willingness to work with the children, even if the goal were changed to reunification with
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Cite as 2009 Ark. App. 120 (unpublished)
Newton.
Newton was called to testify on her own behalf and said that she expected to be
released by July 1, 2008. Her plan was to be paroled to Henry Faddis’s home because she has
no other place to go. According to Newton, she had been drug-free since March 2007 and
wanted to remain that way by attending NA meetings. She explained that she did not
cooperate with Murphy on the drug assessment, believing that if she entered a residential
treatment facility, she would not regain custody of her children. She also said that she had
a timetable for getting her children back and stated that she knew of several companies that
hired felons. Newton did not believe that the children would be harmed if they were returned
to her. She added that, given a chance, she could provide a stable home for them, which she
could have, as well as a job and transportation, within two months of her release. Newton
indicated a willingness to continue working with the children’s therapist.
At the conclusion of the hearing, the circuit court ruled from the bench and granted
the petition. The court found that DHS had proven multiple grounds for termination,
including that the children had been adjudicated dependent-neglected and remained out of
the home for more than twelve months without the conditions leading to the removal being
corrected; that the children had lived outside the home for more than twelve months and the
parent had failed to provide significant material support; and that Newton had been sentenced
in a criminal proceeding to a period of time that would constitute a substantial period of the
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Cite as 2009 Ark. App. 120 (unpublished)
children’s lives. The court’s written order was entered on July 17, 2008. This appeal
followed.
We review termination of parental rights cases de novo. Yarborough v. Arkansas
Dep’t of Human Servs., 96 Ark. App. 247, 240 S.W.3d 626 (2006). The grounds for
termination of parental rights must be proven by clear and convincing evidence. Id. When
the burden of proving a disputed fact is by clear and convincing evidence, the question on
appeal is whether the circuit court’s finding that the disputed fact was proven by clear and
convincing evidence is clearly erroneous, giving due regard to the opportunity of the circuit
court to judge the credibility of the witnesses. Id. A finding is clearly erroneous when,
although there is evidence to support it, the reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with
a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made. Id. Termination of parental
rights is an extreme remedy and in derogation of the natural rights of the parents. Kight v.
Arkansas Dep’t of Human Servs., 94 Ark. App. 400, 231 S.W.3d 103 (2006).
Newton argues one point on appeal—that there is insufficient evidence to support the
termination of her parental rights, both as to grounds and as to the termination being in the
children’s best interests.
The two-step process for terminating parental rights requires the court to find that the
parent is unfit and that termination is in the best interest of the child. J.T. v. Arkansas Dep’t
of Human Servs., 329 Ark. 243, 947 S.W.2d 761 (1997). The court should consider factors
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Cite as 2009 Ark. App. 120 (unpublished)
such as the likelihood of adoption and the potential harm to the health and safety of a child
if subjected to continuing contact with the parent. See Ark. Code Ann. § 9-27-341(b)(3)(A)(i)
and (ii) (Repl. 2008). A heavy burden is placed on the party seeking termination. Jones v.
Arkansas Dep’t of Human Servs., 361 Ark. 164, 205 S.W.3d 778 (2005). Nevertheless,
parental rights will not be enforced to the detriment of the health and well-being of the child.
Id.
First, Newton does not challenge the circuit court’s finding that the children were
suitable for adoption. Therefore, the issue becomes whether the court erred in finding that
the children would be subject to potential harm if returned to Newton’s care and custody.
According to section 9-27-341, the court was only required to consider the potential harm to
the health and safety of a child that might result from continued contact with the parent.
Carroll v. Arkansas Dep’t of Human Servs., 85 Ark. App. 255, 148 S.W.3d 780 (2004). The
court was not required to find that actual harm would result or to affirmatively identify a
potential harm. Furthermore, the supreme court has directed that the harm analysis be
conducted in broad terms, including the harm the child suffers from the lack of stability in
a permanent home. See Bearden v. Arkansas Dep’t of Human Servs., 344 Ark. 317, 42
S.W.3d 397 (2001). A parent’s failure to secure stable employment and housing and her
indifference to remedying these conditions are all contrary to the children’s health, safety,
and well-being and support termination of her parental rights. Trout v. Arkansas Dep’t of
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Cite as 2009 Ark. App. 120 (unpublished)
Human Servs., 359 Ark. 283, 197 S.W.3d 486 (2004); Carroll, supra. Moreover, the
children were no longer bonded with Newton, suggesting that there may be some difficulty
with re-establishing relationships between Newton and the children in the event the children
were returned to her. This would undermine the permanency that the children had gained
while Newton was incarcerated. Finally, the court’s potential-harm inquiry is but one of
many factors that a circuit court must consider in a best-interest analysis. Bearden, supra. We
cannot say that the circuit court’s finding that the termination of Newton’s parental rights is
in the children’s best interests is clearly erroneous.
This brings us to the second step of the analysis: whether grounds for termination exist
and were proven. This case can be affirmed on the basis of the ground alleged in DHS’s
petition, namely, that the children had been out of the home for more than twelve months,
and despite meaningful efforts by DHS to rehabilitate the home and correct the conditions
leading to removal, those conditions were not remedied by the parent. It is undisputed that
the children had been out of Newton’s care for nineteen months at the time of the termination
hearing. Therefore, the question becomes whether Newton had remedied the conditions that
cause the removal of the children. In her brief, she acknowledged that she had not done so
or complied with the court’s orders because she had not found either a home or a job.
Moreover, the argument that she had taken advantage of services and overcome her drug
addiction while incarcerated ignores the circuit court’s finding that, prior to her incarceration,
Newton failed to make use of the services offered by DHS in order to rehabilitate herself and
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Cite as 2009 Ark. App. 120 (unpublished)
reunify her family. She also acknowledged that she did not complete a psychological
evaluation, although it is disputed whether she was ordered to do so. Therefore, we cannot
say that the circuit court was clearly erroneous in finding that this ground had been proven.
Because only one ground for termination is necessary, Hall v. Arkansas Department
of Human Services, 101 Ark. App. 417, 278 S.W.3d 609 (2008); Albright v. Arkansas
Department of Human Services, 97 Ark. App. 277, 248 S.W.3d 498 (2007), we need not
address Newton’s arguments concerning the other grounds found by the circuit court.
Affirmed.
V AUGHT, C.J., and K INARD, J., agree.
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