Dugan v. Am. Nat'l Prop. & Cas. Co.
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Cite as 2009 Ark. App. 123 (unpublished)
ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS
DIVISION I
No. CA 08-676
Opinion Delivered FEBRUARY 25, 2009
NICHOLAS DUGAN and DEANNA
DUGAN
APPELLANTS
V.
AMERICAN NATIONAL PROPERTY &
CASUALTY CO.
APPELLEE
APPEAL FROM THE SEBASTIAN
COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT,
GREENWOOD DISTRICT
[NO. CIV-2007-267-G]
HONORABLE J. MICHAEL
FITZHUGH, JUDGE
REVERSED AND REMANDED
JOHN B. ROBBINS, Judge
This appeal arises out of the grant of summary judgment to an insurance company
(appellee American National Property and Casualty Company, hereinafter “American”)
regarding a policy of automobile insurance covering autos owned by appellants Nicholas and
Deanna Dugan. The Dugans sought to file a claim regarding a car accident occurring on May
14, 2007. American denied that any coverage was in force on that date because the policy
had been cancelled for non-payment effective May 12, 2007. The Dugans filed a declaratory
action, arguing that coverage was in effect at the time of the accident because they had paid
the overdue amount plus additional premium by check to their local agent on May 10. The
Dugans contended further that a representative of American’s underwriting committee stated
Cite as 2009 Ark. App. 123 (unpublished)
that the Dugans’s insurance was effective as of May 14 as long as payment had been made.
American filed a motion for summary judgment.
The trial judge found that the Dugans had failed to demonstrate that Stokes could or
did extend coverage, and therefore, he entered summary judgment in American’s favor. This
appeal followed. Viewing the evidence and all inferences in the light most favorable to the
Dugans, as we must, we reverse and remand because American was not entitled to judgment
as a matter of law at this juncture.
Declaratory judgment is typically used to determine the obligations of the insurer
under a policy of insurance. See Martin v. Equitable Life Assurance Society, 344 Ark. 177,
40 S.W.3d 733 (2001); Ark. Code Ann. § 16-111-106 (Repl. 2006). Summary judgment
should only be granted when it is clear that there are no genuine issues of material fact to be
litigated, and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Castaneda v.
Progressive Classic Ins. Co., 357 Ark. 345, 166 S.W.3d 556 (2004).
In reviewing
summary-judgment cases, we determine whether the trial court’s grant of summary judgment
was appropriate based on whether the evidence presented by the moving party left a material
question of fact unanswered. Norris v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 341 Ark. 360, 16
S.W.3d 242 (2000). The moving party always bears the burden of sustaining a motion for
summary judgment. Flentje v. First Nat’l Bank of Wynne, 340 Ark. 563, 11 S.W.3d 531
(2000); Youngman v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 334 Ark. 73, 971 S.W.2d 248 (1998).
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Cite as 2009 Ark. App. 123 (unpublished)
All doubts and inferences from the evidence are to be drawn in the light most favorable to
the party resisting the motion. Spencer v. Regions Bank, 73 Ark. App. 55, 40 S.W.3d 319
(2001).
Contracts of insurance should receive a practical, reasonable, and fair interpretation
consonant with the apparent object and intent of the parties in light of their general object and
purpose. Sweeden v. Farmers Ins. Group, 71 Ark. App. 381, 30 S.W.3d 783 (2000). Here,
the policy term was May 1, 2007 to November 1, 2007. The Dugans stated in their complaint
that they had paid premiums for this and the earlier policies for four years by automatic draft
from their checking account. The Dugans also stated that at times their bank account was
insufficient to cover the monthly draft, that American sent them cancellation notices, and that
each time they would deliver payment directly to their agent Gallen Stokes at his local office,
which would result in the policy remaining in effect. The Dugans claimed that Stokes was
a general or soliciting agent who had actual or apparent authority to accept premium
payments and to bind American. The Dugans pointed to the facts that Stokes’s office had
an American National Property and Casualty Company sign posted outside; that the
declarations page issued by American specifically states that “If you need to make any
change to your policy or have any questions, contact your Agent: Gallen Stokes;” and that
the cancellation notices referred them to their agent Gallen Stokes.
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Cite as 2009 Ark. App. 123 (unpublished)
The Dugans claimed that they received the last notice on May 10, that it informed
them that they owed back-due premium of $128 to pay through the end of coverage on May
12, and that for any further service they should contact their agent Gallen Stokes. Deanna
Dugan stated that she personally delivered a check in the amount of $228 to Stokes. The
Dugans stated that it was only after they notified American of the auto accident of May 14
that American refunded the excess premium.
American responded by filing a motion for summary judgment, attaching the affidavit
of its agent Stokes and asserting that Stokes was merely a soliciting agent with no authority
to bind coverage. Stokes swore that he was a multi-line agent for American, that he accepted
Mrs. Dugan’s check on May 10 but told her that he did not believe the policy would be
reinstated.
The Dugans resisted the summary-judgment motion, attaching an affidavit from each
of the Dugans. The primary affiant was Deanna Dugan, who disagreed with Stokes’s version
of what happened in his office. Deanna swore that on three prior occasions, their bank draft
was insufficient and in each instance they contacted Stokes, paid him directly, and the policy
was continued in force. Deanna swore that she informed Stokes that the May 10 cancellation
notice read that the policy would not be considered for reinstatement after cancellation on
May 12, but that Stokes told her to pay the $128 due plus an additional $100 to cover them
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Cite as 2009 Ark. App. 123 (unpublished)
through May, and that if he learned before May 12 that the policy would not be continued,
he would inform her.
Deanna attached the cancelled check for $228. Deanna said that she understood that
this resolved any issue about acceptance of premium by American. Deanna attached the
receipt of payment and refund of $100 excess from American, printed by American on May
31, 2007. Deanna also attached a modification to the bank-draft agreement, which she said
they would not have executed on May 10 if coverage were ending on May 12. Deanna said
that Stokes never told her that he believed the policy would not be reinstated, that she abided
his instruction to pay extra premium on May 10, and that he indicated that modifying the
draft agreement date would keep coverage in force. Deanna also swore that after the May
14 accident, she was contacted by a member of the underwriting committee of American,
Sean Viets, who told her that her coverage was in force and effect as long as the payment had
been made and “not to worry.”
American responded in defense, by stating that it was the Dugans’s burden to show
that Stokes had authority to extend or bind American, that she did not, that its agent
agreement showed that Stokes was only vested with soliciting agent authority, and that the
transcription of a phone call with underwriting demonstrated that Sean Viets did not make
assurances of coverage.
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Cite as 2009 Ark. App. 123 (unpublished)
American relied on Dodds v. Hanover Insurance Co., 317 Ark. 563, 880 S.W.2d 311
(1994).
Therein, the supreme court set forth the general rules on insurance agency,
specifically that a general agent is ordinarily authorized to accept risks, to agree upon the
terms of insurance contracts, to issue and renew policies, and to change or modify the terms
of existing contracts. See id. On the other hand, a soliciting agent is ordinarily authorized
to sell insurance, to receive applications and forward them to the company or its general
agent, to deliver policies when issued and to collect premiums. Holland v. Interstate Fire
Ins. Co., 229 Ark. 491, 316 S.W.2d 707 (1958). A soliciting agent has no authority to agree
upon the terms of the policies or to change or waive those terms, nor can his knowledge be
imputed to the company he represents. Id. See also Continental Ins. Cos. v. Stanley, 263
Ark. 638, 569 S.W.2d 653 (1978). The trial court found that reasoning persuasive and
entered judgment for American finding that appellants failed to present evidence that Stokes
was a general agent with authority, actual or apparent, to extend coverage. On this point we
agree.
However, appellants make an additional and convincing argument that summary
judgment was granted in error. The standard of review requires us to view all the relevant
materials and all inferences deducible from the evidence in the light most favorable to the
non-movants. Therefore, for purposes of our review, we must take as fact those assertions
made by Deanna Dugan in her affidavit, along with the allegations in the complaint and the
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Cite as 2009 Ark. App. 123 (unpublished)
inferences to be drawn from the documents provided to the trial court. The purpose of
summary judgment is not to try the issues but to determine if there are issues to be tried.
Wolner v. Bogaev, 290 Ark. 299, 718 S.W.2d 942 (1986); Turner v. N.W. Ark. Neurosurgery
Clinic, P.A., 84 Ark. App. 83, 133 S.W.3d 417 (2003).
Whether appellants can prevail when the time comes to weigh this evidence is another
matter. The only issue before us is whether, when we view all the evidence and inferences
in favor of the Dugans, there is some issue of material fact as to whether American bound
itself to reinstate insurance coverage. Deanna Dugan’s affidavit provided evidence to
support that allegation by her contention that Sean Viets made that verbal commitment. That
evidence would permit the fact-finder to conclude that coverage was extended. We believe
that the posture of this case precluded the trial court’s grant of summary judgment.
Reversed and remanded.
M ARSHALL and B ROWN, JJ., agree.
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