Williams v. Williams
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CITE AS 2009 ARK. APP. 484 (UNPUBLISHED)
ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS
NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION
JUDGE DAVID M. GLOVER
DIVISION III
CA08-1321
June 17, 2009
APPEAL FROM THE UNION
COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT
[DR-04-202-6-1]
JEFFREY A. WILLIAMS
APPELLANT
V.
HONORABLE DAVID F. GUTHRIE,
JUDGE
LISA WILLIAMS
APPELLEE
AFFIRMED
Appellant, Jeffrey Williams, appeals from the circuit court’s denial of his petition
for change of custody and the increase of his monthly child-support payments from the
ordered $420 a month to $625 a month. He contends 1) that the trial court abused its
discretion in modifying the existing child-support order because no proper motion had
been filed by appellee, Lisa Williams, and 2) that the trial court clearly erred in finding
that there had been no material change of circumstances. We affirm.
Background
Lisa and Jeffrey were divorced by decree entered on May 5, 2005. They were
awarded joint custody of their minor child, W.W., with Lisa having primary physical
custody of the child, and Jeffrey paying $420 in monthly child support. Later, Jeffrey
began voluntarily increasing his child-support payments as he received raises.
On February 20, 2008, Jeffrey filed a petition for change of custody, alleging that
there had been a material change of circumstances. In the prayer of his petition, Jeffrey
also sought “a reasonable sum of child support to be paid by [Lisa].” At the time he filed
the petition, he was paying $625 a month in child support. Lisa answered the petition with
a denial, and in her prayer, she sought in pertinent part: “current sum of child support
[being paid] by [Jeffrey].” Following the hearing, the trial court denied the request for
change of custody and ordered Jeffrey to pay the amount of child support that he had been
paying voluntarily — $625 a month, which was an increase from the previously ordered
amount of $420 a month.
Child Support
For his first point of appeal, Jeffrey contends that the trial court erred in ordering
the increase in child-support payments because Lisa had not filed a proper motion seeking
that modification. We disagree. In making his argument, Jeffrey relies upon Arkansas
Code Annotated section 9-14-234(b) and (c) (Repl. 2008) and Martin v. Martin, 79 Ark.
App. 309, 87 S.W.3d 817 (2002). Subsection 9-14-234(b) and (c) provide:
9-14-234. Arrearages - Finality of judgment.
(b) Any decree, judgment, or order that contains a provision for the payment of
money for the support and care of any child or children through the registry of the
court or the Arkansas child support clearinghouse shall be final judgment subject to
writ of garnishment or execution as to any installment or payment of money that
has accrued until the time either party moves through proper motion filed with the
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court and served on the other party to set aside, alter, or modify the decree,
judgment, or order.
(c)(1) The court may not set aside, alter, or modify any decree, judgment, or
order that has accrued unpaid support prior to the filing of the motion.
(2) However, the court may offset against future support to be paid those
amounts accruing during time periods other than reasonable visitation in which the
noncustodial parent had physical custody of the child with the knowledge and
consent of the custodial parent.
(Emphasis added.) Jeffrey cites Martin for the proposition that an existing child-support
order remains intact until such time as a proper motion is filed. Neither of the above-cited
authorities provide support for Jeffrey’s position in this case.
In Martin, the pending petition was for contempt for failure to pay support, and the
parties acknowledged at the outset of the hearing that no petition had been filed seeking
modification of the decree. In addition, section 9-14-234 clearly applies to arrearages in
child-support payments. Here, there was no unpaid child support that would justify a
contempt proceeding or invoke the provisions of section 9-14-234.
The petition filed by Jeffrey sought modification of child custody and also
contained a prayer for child support should custody be awarded to him.
In her answer,
Lisa prayed for physical custody of the child to remain with her and for the child-support
amount to remain at the current sum (i.e., the sum being voluntarily paid by Jeffrey, which
was an increase from the original ordered amount). The issue of the appropriate amount of
child support was thereby “properly” before the court, even though Lisa did not file a
separate motion seeking an increase.
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Material Change of Circumstances
Jeffrey relied upon three allegations of changed circumstances in seeking a change
of custody: 1) that Lisa failed to provide and maintain a suitable and safe environment for
W.W., in particular by moving several times within the three years since the divorce; 2)
that during an incident on February 5, 2008, Lisa and a co-worker engaged in behavior
that risked harm to W.W., in that they were both passed out while W.W. was in Lisa’s
care; and 3) that W.W. had numerous absences and tardies from school. In addition, at the
hearing, he added a fourth allegation concerning W.W.’s deteriorating dental health.
Following the hearing, the trial court concluded that Jeffrey had not demonstrated a
material change of circumstances justifying a change of custody. Specifically, the trial
court found that the February 5, 2008 incident was an isolated occurrence that did not
endanger the child’s health or safety; that the dental problems were being addressed in a
proper manner; that while the absences/tardies were too high, the child had still performed
at a satisfactory level; and that Lisa had stabilized her employment situation, thereby
improving her financial situation and her schedule, allowing her to better provide for her
child.
In Stehle v. Zimmerebner, 375 Ark. 446, ____, ____ S.W.3d ____, ____ (2009), our
supreme court explained at great length our appellate review of equity cases:
We have summarized our standard of review for equity cases, and specifically
child custody cases, with regard to de novo review and the clearly erroneous
standard:
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We review chancery cases de novo, but will only reverse if the
chancellor’s findings were clearly erroneous or clearly against the
preponderance of the evidence. A finding is clearly erroneous when the
reviewing court, on the entire evidence, is left with the definite and firm
conviction that a mistake has been committed. We give due deference to the
chancellor’s superior position to determine the credibility of the witnesses
and the weight to be given their testimony. In cases involving child custody,
great deference is given to the findings of the chancellor. This court has held
that there is no other case in which the superior position, ability, and
opportunity of the chancellor to observe the parties carries a greater weight
than one involving the custody of minor children. The best interest of the
child is the polestar in every child custody case; all other considerations are
secondary.
See Ford v. Ford, 347 Ark. 485, 491, 65 S.W.3d 432, 436 (2002) (citations
omitted).
We take this opportunity to clarify further our standard of review for child
custody cases, as well as other equity cases, and to dispel any confusion that may
exist concerning de novo review and our clearly erroneous standard.
Equity cases are reviewed de novo. See ConAgra, Inc. v. Tyson Foods, Inc.,
342 Ark. 672, 30 S.W.3d 725 (2000). This means the whole case is open for
review. Id. This does not mean, however, and we emphasize this point, that findings
of fact by the circuit judge in equity cases are simply dismissed. They are not. The
clearly erroneous standard, cited above and set out in our rules of civil procedure,
governs if the circuit judge has made findings of fact. As Rule 52(a) states:
Findings of fact, whether based on oral or documentary evidence, shall not
be set aside unless clearly erroneous (clearly against the preponderance of
the evidence), and due regard shall be given to the opportunity of the circuit
court to judge the credibility of witnesses.
Ark. R. Civ. P. 52(a) (2008).
In determining whether the circuit judge clearly erred in a finding, the appellate
court may look to the whole record to reach that decision. See ConAgra, 342 Ark. at
674, 30 S.W.3d at 727 (on de novo review of record, court held chancery court
clearly erred in finding information at issue qualified as a trade secret); Ferguson v.
Green, 266 Ark. 556, 587 S.W.2d 18 (1979) (chancery court reached erroneous
conclusion based on de novo review of entire record). But, to reiterate, to reverse a
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finding of fact by a circuit judge, that judge must have clearly erred in making that
finding of fact, which means the reviewing court, based on the entire evidence, is
left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made. Ford, 347
Ark. at 491, 655 S.W.3d at 436.
To summarize, de novo review does not mean that the findings of fact of the
circuit judge are dismissed out of hand and that the appellate court becomes the
surrogate trial judge. What it does mean is that a complete review of the evidence
and record may take place as part of the appellate review to determine whether the
trial court clearly erred in either making a finding of fact or in failing to do so.
Following our review of the record in this case, we are not left with a definite and
firm conviction that the trial court made a mistake regarding any of its factual findings.
Affirmed.
G LADWIN and G RUBER, JJ., agree.
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