Bowling v. Wal-Mart Assoc. Claims Mgmt., Inc.
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ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS
DIVISION I
No. CA 08-1444
DONNA BOWLING
Opinion Delivered May 27, 2009
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM THE ARKANSAS
WORKERS’ COMPENSATION
COMMISSION [NO. F507020]
V.
WAL-MART ASSOCIATES CLAIMS
MANAGEMENT, INC.
APPELLEE
AFFIRMED
COURTNEY HUDSON HENRY, Judge
Appellant Donna Bowling appeals the decision of the Arkansas Workers’
Compensation Commission denying her claim requesting an MRI as recommended by her
new treating physician. For reversal, appellant asserts that substantial evidence does not
support the Commission’s finding that this diagnostic study was not reasonably necessary for
the treatment of her compensable injury. We affirm.
Appellant began her employment at Wal-Mart in October 2004. While working in
the delicatessen on July 1, 2005, she sustained an injury when a forty-pound box of frozen
chicken fell from a shelf onto her right shoulder. Appellant did not seek immediate treatment,
but she went to the emergency room the next day because the pain in her shoulder had not
subsided. X-rays of appellant’s right shoulder revealed no acute pathology, and she was
diagnosed with a contusion of the right shoulder. The doctor at the emergency room released
appellant to return to work with a three-pound lifting restriction and cautioned her to refrain
from raising her arm above the shoulder. On July 5, 2005, a nurse practitioner evaluated
appellant’s right shoulder and assessed her condition as a contusion. The nurse practitioner
prescribed medication and released her to work with a ten-pound weight restriction and no
pushing, pulling, or overhead reaching.
Appellee subsequently controverted the compensability of appellant’s right-shoulder
injury. Appellant then sought treatment from her family physician, who ordered an MRI
scan. The MRI of appellant’s right shoulder revealed degenerative changes of the AC joint
but detected no rotator-cuff tear. Appellant’s physician referred her to Dr. Raye Mitchell,
an orthopedic surgeon. In a clinic note dated July 27, 2005, Dr. Mitchell interpreted the
MRI as showing significant AC arthrosis and impingement. He also diagnosed appellant with
rotator-cuff tendonitis but did not believe that her rotator cuff was torn. Dr. Mitchell
administered an injection and prescribed physical therapy.
Appellant returned to Dr. Mitchell on August 31, 2005. In a clinic note of that date,
Dr. Mitchell wrote that appellant might have rotator-cuff pathology that was not revealed on
the MRI.
He diagnosed right subacromial impingement and AC arthropathy and
recommended distal clavicle resection surgery. Dr. Mitchell performed this surgery on
September 12, 2005. During the procedure, he inspected appellant’s rotator cuff and found
that it was abraded but not torn. On October 27, 2005, Dr. Mitchell reported that appellant
was progressing well, that her pain had resolved, and that she exhibited full range of motion
in her shoulder. He released her to return to work at regular duty.
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On January 4, 2006, an administrative law judge issued an opinion finding that
appellant sustained a work-related injury to her right shoulder. Specifically, the law judge
found that Dr. Mitchell’s observation of an abraded rotator cuff constituted an objective
finding sufficient to support the compensability of the injury. Accordingly, the law judge
held appellee responsible for the payment of appellant’s medical expenses, including the
surgery, and temporary total benefits from the date of the surgery until October 27, 2005,
when Dr. Mitchell released appellant to return to work. Appellee did not pursue an appeal
of the law judge’s decision.
Appellant saw Dr. Mitchell again on April 19, 2006, with complaints of difficulty
working above her shoulder. Dr. Mitchell noted that appellant had full range of motion in
her right shoulder. Based on his observation during surgery that the rotator cuff was intact,
he opined that her symptoms were related to the deltoid muscle and not the cuff. Dr.
Mitchell assigned a four-percent impairment rating which he attributed to appellant’s preexisting degenerative condition of the AC joint and not the injury caused by the box of
chicken falling on her shoulder.
Appellant subsequently requested, and the Commission granted, a one-time change
of physician to Dr. Christopher Arnold. Dr. Arnold examined appellant on August 17, 2006,
and formed the impression of right-shoulder weakness following the previous surgery. He
recommended an MRI out of concern that she might have experienced more injury to the
rotator cuff and that it might now be torn. Appellee refused to pay for the MRI, and
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appellant submitted a claim arguing that she was entitled to the MRI to determine whether
she had a tear in her rotator cuff.
After a hearing on appellant’s claim, the law judge found that the MRI was not
reasonable and necessary for the treatment of appellant’s compensable injury. The law judge
considered the evidence that appellant’s pre-surgery MRI revealed no rotator-cuff tear and
that Dr. Mitchell observed no tear during the surgery. The law judge also noted that Dr.
Arnold’s medical report indicated that appellant may have suffered another injury to her
rotator cuff that could have resulted in a tear. Based on these factual findings, the law judge
concluded that any tear that might exist was not causally related to appellant’s original
compensable injury. Appellant appealed that decision, and the Commission affirmed and
adopted the law judge’s decision.
Appellant now appeals the Commission’s decision to this court. She contends that
substantial evidence does not support the Commission’s determination that the MRI was not
reasonable and necessary for the treatment of her compensable injury.
Our workers’ compensation law states that an employer shall provide medical services
that are reasonably necessary in connection with the injury received by the employee. Ark.
Code Ann. § 11-9-508(a) (Supp. 2007); Curtis v. Big Lots, ___ Ark. App. ___, ___ S.W.3d
___ (Apr. 15, 2009). The employee has the burden of proving by a preponderance of the
evidence that medical treatment is reasonable and necessary. Stone v. Dollar Gen. Stores, 91
Ark. App. 260, 209 S.W.3d 445 (2005). What constitutes reasonable and necessary medical
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treatment is a question of fact to be determined by the Commission. Bohannon v. Wal-Mart
Stores, Inc., 102 Ark. App. 37, 279 S.W.3d 502 (2008).
In appeals involving claims for workers’ compensation, this court views the evidence
and all reasonable inferences deducible therefrom in the light most favorable to the
Commission’s decision and affirms the decision if it is supported by substantial evidence.
Kimbell v. Ass’n of Rehab Indus. & Bus. Companion Prop. & Cas., 366 Ark. 297, 235 S.W.3d
499 (2006). Substantial evidence is evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as adequate
to support a conclusion. Dorris v. Townsends of Ark., Inc., 93 Ark. App. 208, 218 S.W.3d 351
(2005). Where the Commission denies a claim because of the claimant’s failure to meet her
burden of proof, the substantial-evidence standard of review requires that we affirm if the
Commission’s decision displays a substantial basis for the denial of relief. Kimbell, supra.
As in Goyne v. Crabtree Contracting Co., Inc., ___ Ark. ___, ___ S.W.3d ___ (Mar. 18,
2009), the controlling issue in this case is whether the recommended testing was reasonable
and necessary for the treatment of appellant’s compensable injury. When the evidence is
viewed in the appropriate light, we conclude that the Commission’s decision is supported by
substantial evidence. Dr. Arnold recommended the MRI at issue to determine whether
appellant had a tear in her rotator cuff one year after appellant’s work-related injury. The
record, however, reflects that appellant did not sustain a rotator-cuff tear when the box of
chicken fell onto her shoulder, as both the previous MRI and Dr. Mitchell’s observation
during surgery confirmed the absence of a rotator-cuff tear. The record contains no evidence
linking any possible tear to the compensable injury, and Dr. Arnold’s office note suggests that,
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if there was a tear, it was caused by a subsequent event. Consequently, the Commission’s
decision displays a substantial basis for the conclusion that an MRI was not reasonable and
necessary for the treatment of the compensable injury.
Affirmed.
P ITTMAN and M ARSHALL, JJ., agree.
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