Ceballos v. State
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NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION
ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS
DIVISION IV
No. CACR08-1290
Opinion Delivered
May 27, 2009
APPEAL FROM THE CLEVELAND
COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT
[NO. CR2008-07-5, CR2008-10-5]
MIGUEL ANGEL CEBALLOS, JR.
APPELLANT
V.
HONORABLE LARRY CHANDLER,
JUDGE
STATE OF ARKANSAS
APPELLEE
AFFIRMED
LARRY D. VAUGHT, Chief Judge
Miguel Ceballos Jr. was convicted by a Cleveland County jury of two counts of
residential burglary and two counts of theft of property. He was sentenced to a total of
twenty-four years’ imprisonment. On appeal, Ceballos challenges the sufficiency of the
evidence supporting the conviction of the first count of residential burglary. We affirm.
On the morning of January 4, 2008, John Reed left his home to work on his farm.
When he returned around noon, he noticed that his front door was open. Once inside, Reed
realized that seven of his guns had been stolen. The Cleveland County Sheriff’s Department,
led by Captain Gary Young, investigated the burglary. After receiving an anonymous tip,
Captain Young met with Ceballos. During the interview, Ceballos gave consent to search his
apartment. One of Reed’s guns was found inside the dwelling. Ceballos was arrested, and
while in custody, he voluntarily gave officers a statement.
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According to Ceballos’s statement, he was told by Reed’s stepson that Reed grew
marijuana in his home. On January 4, 2008, Ceballos called Doug Wells and asked if he
wanted to “go get some weed.” Wells agreed and invited Bryce Roberts. Roberts drove the
three to Reed’s home. While Roberts waited in the vehicle, Ceballos pushed through the
front door, and he and Wells entered the house looking for marijuana. They found some
marijuana plants and saw guns “laying everywhere.” Ceballos said that Wells took a gun, and
they left. Ceballos stated that after he was dropped off at home, he called another friend,
Dustin Birge, and told him about the marijuana at Reed’s house. Birge picked up Ceballos,
and they went back to Reed’s house. Both entered the home and “looked for marijuana,” but
did not find any. They did find six guns, which they took. The testimony at trial of Roberts
and Birge mirrored the information Ceballos provided in his statement.
Counsel for Ceballos moved for a directed verdict at the close of the State’s case and
renewed the motion after the defense rested. Counsel argued that the State failed to present
sufficient evidence to support a conviction for both counts of residential burglary because
evidence of Ceballos’s intent to commit theft was lacking. The motions were denied, and
Ceballos was convicted of all four counts.
On appeal, Ceballos only challenges the count-one residential-burglary conviction.1
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Ceballos does not challenge the convictions for the second count of residential
burglary and the two counts of theft of property. Specifically, regarding the second count
of residential burglary, Ceballos concedes that “the record contains some evidence that, at
the time of his second illegal entry into Reed’s residence, Ceballos intended to take
firearms contained therein. . . . A firearm, unlike marijuana, can obviously have a rightful
owner to whom it could be returned pursuant to section 5-5-101(a) [the forfeiture statute]
and therefore does not qualify as contraband falling within the scope [of] section 5-5101(c).” Accordingly, Ceballos does not challenge his conviction for residential burglary as
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He argues that the trial court erred in denying his motions for directed verdict, contending
that the evidence is insufficient on the requisite element of intent. Specifically, he argues that
because Ceballos’s intent was to steal only marijuana, which is contraband under the forfeiture
statutes 2 and can have no rightful owner, it cannot be construed as “property of another
person” subject to the theft statute.
The standard of review in cases challenging the sufficiency of the evidence is well
established. We treat a motion for a directed verdict as a challenge to the sufficiency of the
evidence. Branscum v. State, 345 Ark. 21, 43 S.W.3d 148 (2001). This court has repeatedly
held that in reviewing a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, we view the evidence
in a light most favorable to the State and consider only the evidence that supports the verdict.
Stone v. State, 348 Ark. 661, 74 S.W.3d 591 (2002). We affirm a conviction if substantial
evidence exists to support it. Id. Substantial evidence is that which is of sufficient force and
character that it will, with reasonable certainty, compel a conclusion one way or the other,
without resorting to speculation or conjecture. Haynes v. State, 346 Ark. 388, 58 S.W.3d 336
(2001).
The offense of residential burglary requires proof that the defendant entered or
remained unlawfully in a residential occupiable structure of another person and that he did
so with the purpose of committing an offense punishable by imprisonment. Ark. Code Ann.
§ 5-39-201 (Repl. 2006). A person acts purposely when it is his conscious object to engage
charged in Count II of the amended information.”
2
Ark. Code Ann. § 5-5-101–404 (Repl. 2006) (governing the disposition of
contraband and seized property).
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in conduct of that nature or to cause such a result. Ark. Code Ann. § 5-2-202(1) (Repl.
2006).
The State charged Ceballos with residential burglary, alleging that the “offense
punishable by imprisonment” was theft of property. A person commits theft of property if he
knowingly takes the property of another person with the purpose of depriving the owner of
the property. Ark. Code Ann. § 5-36-103(a)(1) (Supp. 2007).
Ceballos argues that the first count of residential burglary cannot stand because, when
he entered Reed’s home the first time, he only intended to steal marijuana, which is an illegal
contraband that cannot be construed as “property of another person” and lacks a rightful
owner. For support, he cites the forfeiture statutes, which provide, in pertinent part, that
“[a]ny seized property shall be returned to the rightful owner or possessor of the seized
property except contraband owned by a defendant.” Ark. Code Ann. § 5-5-101(a). He
further argues that under the forfeiture statutes, “[c]ontraband shall be destroyed.” Ark. Code
Ann. § 5-5-101(c)(1).
These statutes fail to support Ceballos’s argument as they do not provide that
contraband cannot be owned. To the contrary, section 5-5-101(a) discusses the disposition
of seized contraband in the context of ownership. This section expressly states that seized
contraband owned by a defendant shall not be returned. Therefore, this statute recognizes that
contraband can be owned. Further, the theft statutes define “property” as tangible personal
property that represents or embodies anything of value. Ark. Code Ann. § 5-36-101(7) (Repl.
2006). “Property of another person” is defined as any property in which any person other
than the actor has a possessory or proprietary interest. Ark. Code Ann. § 5-36-101(8)(A)
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(Repl. 2006). Clearly, marijuana has value and is subject to possession; therefore, it falls
within the definitions of “property” and “property of another person” contained in the theft
statutes. Because there was overwhelming evidence of Ceballos’s intent to steal marijuana
from Reed’s home, the trial court did not err in denying Ceballos’s motion for directed
verdict on count one residential burglary.
Finally, to the extent that Ceballos argues that his intent should be determined solely
by his initial plan to only steal marijuana, we disagree. Intent may be inferred from
circumstantial evidence. Rudd v. State, 308 Ark. 401, 825 S.W.2d 565 (1992). Moreover, facts
establishing intent while inside a home should also be considered. See Adkins v. State, 63 Ark.
App. 203, 979 S.W.2d 903 (1998) (affirming conviction for residential burglary where
defendant unlawfully entered home and walked toward homeowner’s stereo equipment before
he was chased out by the owner). Ceballos’s intent may be inferred from all of the
surrounding circumstances, which included his intent before he entered the home and his
intent after he unlawfully remained there. Those circumstances include the fact that he
forcibly entered Reed’s home, remained there unlawfully, and while inside took marijuana
a gun from the home.
In sum, sufficient evidence of Ceballos’s intent under the theft statute was presented
by the State, supporting the conviction for count one residential burglary. Accordingly, the
trial court did not err in denying his motions for directed verdict.
Affirmed.
R OBBINS and B AKER, JJ., agree.
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