Cent. Ark. Found. Homes, LLC v. Choate
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NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION
ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS
DIVISION III
No. CA08-1382
CENTRAL ARKANSAS
FOUNDATION HOMES, LLC
APPELLANT
Opinion Delivered MAY 20, 2009
V.
APPEAL FROM THE FAULKNER
COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT,
[NO. CV-06-638]
REBECCA CHOATE
HONORABLE DAVID LEE
REYNOLDS, JUDGE
APPELLEE
DISMISSED
RITA W. GRUBER, Judge
Appellant Central Arkansas Foundation Homes, LLC, brings this appeal from the
circuit court’s order rescinding a contract for appellant to construct a home for appellee
Rebecca Choate on acreage that she owned. Appellant raises three points, first contending
that the circuit court abused its discretion in setting aside a previous judgment against
appellee.1 Alternatively, it contends that the court erred in failing to enter judgment for
appellant on the grounds of quantum meruit and that the judgment in appellee’s favor was
clearly erroneous. We are without jurisdiction to entertain this appeal, however, because it
1
Appellant refers to this order as a default judgment, but we note that it was not based on
appellee’s failure to appear or defend: she had answered a counterclaim filed by appellant, and the
judgment was based upon evidence presented at a trial. A judgment rendered after the defendant
has answered and after a trial at which she failed to appear is not a default judgment under Ark.
R. Civ. P. Rule 55. Smith v. Ark. State Highway Comm’n, 21 Ark. App. 49, 728 S.W.2d 202
(1987).
After appellee retained new counsel, the judgment was set aside and a new trial was held.
This appeal arises from the order issued after the new trial.
is not clear to us that all claims were resolved by the trial court’s order. The appeal is
dismissed.
The relevant facts are these. On July 31, 2006, through her attorney, appellee filed
a lis pendens and a complaint against appellant for rescission of the parties’ contract for
appellant to construct a “turn-key” house for her on two acres of a six-acre tract of land she
owned. The allegations in her complaint included the following: the house faced the wrong
direction; “under somewhat nebulous circumstances,” appellant had her sign a quitclaim deed
to the two acres, transferring ownership to appellant and conveying an easement across her
adjacent four-acre tract; costs and labor above the contract price had been incurred due to
appellant’s poor workmanship; there were material and substantial defects in the house; and
appellant failed to substantially perform and breached the contract wilfully and purposely,
resulting in substantial damages to appellee.
Appellant filed an answer and counterclaim on November 28, 2006, alleging that the
house was properly constructed, and praying that appellee’s complaint be dismissed and
judgment entered in appellant’s favor. In its counterclaim, in addition to requesting dismissal
of appellee’s complaint, appellant asked the court to require appellee to perform her
contractual obligations to close the sale and loan and pay off the debt owed to appellant or,
alternatively, to order forfeiture of the property to appellant. Appellant also requested, should
rescission of the contract be granted, that judgment be entered against appellee in quantum
meruit for “the value of the improvements made upon the property.” Appellee answered
appellant’s counterclaim, affirmatively stating that appellant’s breach of contract released her
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CA08-1382
of any contractual obligation, and asserting numerous defenses and affirmative defenses.
The circuit court held a trial, and judgment was entered in appellee’s favor. By written
order of June 6, 2008, the court rescinded the contract, finding that the house as constructed
was not in substantial compliance with the parties’ agreement. After finding that appellee had
been required to execute a quitclaim deed to two acres of her property and to execute a
document with One Bank of Arkansas to guarantee a loan taken out by appellant for
construction of the house, the court held appellant responsible for the payment of mortgage
debt and ordered appellant to hold appellee harmless for the guarantee obligation to the bank.2
Appellant was ordered to remove the house from appellee’s property and restore the property
to its original state, and was ordered to execute a quitclaim deed transferring the property back
to her free and clear of any obligation or mortgage lien placed thereon by appellant.
The finality of a circuit court’s judgment is governed by Ark. R. Civ. P. 54(b)(1):
When more than one claim for relief is presented in an action, whether as a claim,
counterclaim, cross-claim, or third party claim, or when multiple parties are involved,
the court may direct the entry of a final judgment as to one or more but fewer
than all of the claims or parties only upon an express determination, supported
by specific factual findings, that there is no just reason for delay and upon an
express direction for the entry of judgment.
(Emphasis added.) In the event that a circuit court makes the findings contemplated by the
rule, it shall execute a Rule 54(b) certificate, which shall appear immediately after the court’s
signature on the judgment and shall set forth the factual findings upon which the
determination to enter judgment as final is based. Id. In the absence of such a certificate, any
2
We note, however, that One Bank is not named as a party in the circuit court’s
order.
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order that adjudicates fewer than all of the claims shall not terminate the action as to any of
the claims. Ark. R. Civ. P. 54(b)(2).
The purpose of Rule 54(b) is to prevent piecemeal litigation. D’Arbonne Constr. Co.
v. Foster, 348 Ark. 375, 72 S.W.3d 862 (2002); McKibben v. Mullis, 79 Ark. App. 382, 90
S.W.3d 442 (2002). The possibility of piecemeal litigation remains if an order disposes of less
than all of the claims against all of the parties and there are remaining issues to be litigated.
Cf. id. at 385, 90 S.W.3d at 444 (stating it was clear that the dismissal of a claim for lack of
standing concluded all claims against all parties because the original complaint was a nullity).
The circuit court’s order in the present case does not address the alternative prayer in
appellant’s counterclaim for judgment in quantum meruit, and it is not apparent to us that this
counterclaim has been disposed of.
Nor does the order contain a Rule 54(b) certificate.
Thus the order has not terminated the actions below and is not a final, appealable order.
Because the existence of a final, appealable order is necessary to the exercise of our
jurisdiction, we must dismiss this appeal.
Dismissed.
K INARD and B ROWN, JJ., agree.
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CA08-1382
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