Pacheco v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs.
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NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION
ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS
DIVISION IV
CA08-1188
No.
Opinion Delivered
May 20, 2009
JESSICA PACHECO
APPELLANT
V.
ARKANSAS DEPARTMENT OF
HUMAN SERVICES
APPELLEE
APPEAL FROM THE POPE
COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT,
[NO. JV2007-159]
HONORABLE KEN D. COKER JR.,
JUDGE
AFFIRMED
M. MICHAEL KINARD, Judge
Appellant Jessica Pacheco appeals from an order terminating her parental rights in C.P.
(born August 31, 2005). Appellant argues that the evidence was insufficient to warrant
termination. We affirm.
On May 8, 2007, the Arkansas Department of Human Services (DHS) petitioned the
Pope County Circuit Court for emergency custody of C.P. According to a DHS affidavit,
appellant visited a hospital emergency room on May 5, 2007, to obtain treatment for injuries
she received in a domestic dispute with her boyfriend, James Cantrell. Appellant was
accompanied by her daughter, twenty-month-old C.P. During the course of the hospital visit,
the staff noticed bruises and broken blood vessels on C.P.’s torso and head. Appellant admitted
that Cantrell had squeezed C.P. around the waist to induce a bowel movement and had
thrown the child to the floor when she began to cry. Appellant also reported that, after C.P.
had a bowel movement, Cantrell changed the child’s diaper, smeared the diaper’s contents in
the child’s face, and hit the child on the back of the head. Additionally, appellant related an
incident from March 2007 in which Cantrell wrapped C.P. in a blanket and tied a belt around
her so that she would stop crying and go to sleep. The affidavit noted that DHS and the Pope
County Sheriff’s office spoke with appellant in April 2007 to determine if she or C.P. needed
assistance but that appellant denied any abuse by Cantrell.
DHS obtained emergency custody of C.P., and the circuit court adjudicated the child
dependent-neglected. The adjudication order established a goal of reunification and directed
appellant to submit to a psychological evaluation and follow recommendations, to participate
in parenting classes, to obtain and maintain suitable housing and employment, and to have no
contact with James Cantrell. A November 2007 review order continued the goal of
reunification.
On June 30, 2008, the court found that returning C.P. to appellant would be contrary
to the child’s welfare, and the court changed the goal of the case to termination of parental
rights. At the termination hearing, appellant testified that she did not leave Cantrell when he
began abusing C.P. because she was afraid of Cantrell and depended on him for economic
support. Appellant acknowledged that she went to the hospital in May 2007 to seek treatment
for her own injuries rather than C.P.’s injuries. She further stated that, after the May 2007
incident, she returned to a former romantic partner, Ms. Jessie Jewell, and had no further
contact with Cantrell.
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Appellant testified that she obeyed court orders by attending parenting classes, visiting
C.P., acquiring an apartment, and obtaining a job. Appellant said that she worked twentyeight to thirty hours a week at Wal-Mart and that her paycheck left her with, at most,
approximately $100 at the end of the month. Appellant also stated that she walked to work
because she had no driver’s license, due to a delinquent traffic fine. However, appellant said
that Ms. Jewell or Ms. Jewell’s father occasionally drove her to work. Appellant said that she
planned to obtain a second job if the court returned C.P. to her and that, if the job was too
far from home, she would seek out a ride. Appellant also testified that she underwent a
psychological evaluation in November 2007 but that she had attended only one or two
sessions with different counselors.
DHS caseworker Angel Simson testified that she was concerned about appellant’s
parenting abilities. Simson said that, during visitations, appellant responded to two-year-old
C.P.’s behavior by acting like a child herself and that the visits sometimes ended in an uproar.
Simson likewise expressed concern about appellant’s financial situation, saying that appellant
sometimes arrived at visitations without diapers or food because appellant could not afford
them. Simson further said that appellant depended on others for financial assistance and that
appellant’s only support system—particularly when it came to transportation—consisted of
Jewell and Jewell’s father.
Simson related a statement by appellant that appellant began her relationship with
Cantrell in order to escape an unhealthy relationship with Ms. Jewell, who had emotional and
anger issues due to childhood abuse. According to Simson, appellant likewise attributed
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Cantrell’s violent behavior to his abusive childhood, and appellant made excuses for Cantrell
based on that history. Simson further stated that Ms. Jewell’s father had nine founded reports
of severe physical abuse, which included a beating with a metal pipe and slamming a child’s
head in a door. Simson said that appellant lived at Mr. Jewell’s house for a year during the case
and that Mr. Jewell had driven appellant to a few visitation appointments. Additionally,
Simson testified that, contrary to appellant’s claim that Ms. Jewell did not live with her, the
caseworker invariably found them at appellant’s apartment or at Mr. Jewell’s house. Another
member of the Jewell family testified that appellant was at the Jewell house nearly every day,
in contrast to appellant’s testimony that she was not at the Jewell house very often.
Psychological examiner Lewis Campbell testified that he diagnosed appellant as having
a personality disorder with narcissistic and histrionic features. Campbell stated that it was
typical for an adult with that type of disorder to be blind to her child’s needs as long as the
adult’s own needs were being met. According to Campbell, appellant’s disorder required at
least six months of psychotherapy and, without treatment, the scenario of a romantic partner’s
violence against C.P. could reoccur.
Jessie Jewell testified that she had helped appellant raise C.P. since the child was two
months old. Jewell’s medical records showed that she had a history of serious mental
problems, including hallucinations, extreme anger, and attempted suicide, which Jewell told
her counselors that she tried “about every three years.” Jewell said that, although appellant had
her own apartment, the two were essentially living together.
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CASA volunteer Cheryl Altemus testified that she recommended a continuation of
reunification efforts rather than termination of appellant’s parental rights, as long as appellant
avoided contact with Mr. Jewell. Altemus cited appellant’s move toward self-sufficiency in
obtaining a job and a suitable apartment.
After the hearing, the circuit court entered an order terminating appellant’s parental
rights. The court found that termination was in C.P.’s best interest and that DHS proved
grounds for termination. The court relied primarily on evidence that appellant had received
little, if any, psychological treatment and that appellant was economically and emotionally
dependent on the Jewells, who had a number of troubling problems that were potentially
harmful to C.P.
An order forever terminating parental rights must be based upon a finding by clear and
convincing evidence that termination is in the child’s best interest and that at least one
statutory ground for termination exists. Ark. Code Ann. § 9-27-341(b)(3)(A) and (B) (Repl.
2008). When assessing the child’s best interest, the circuit court must consider 1) the
likelihood that the child will be adopted if the termination petition is granted; and 2) the
potential harm, specifically addressing the effect on the health and safety of the child, caused
by returning the child to the parent’s custody. Ark. Code Ann. § 9-27-341(b)(3)(A). On
appeal, our inquiry is whether the circuit court’s termination decision was clearly erroneous.
See Belue v. Ark. Dep’t of Human Servs., 104 Ark. App. 139, ___ S.W.3d ___ (2008).
Appellant argues first that the circuit court erred in finding that termination was in
C.P.’s best interest. Appellant does not challenge the likelihood of C.P.’s adoptability but
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contends that DHS failed to prove potential harm in returning C.P. to her. The potentialharm inquiry is but one of many factors the circuit court must consider in its best-interest
analysis. Lee v. Ark. Dep’t of Human Servs., 102 Ark. App. 337, ___ S.W.3d ___ (2008). The
court is not required to find actual harm or to affirmatively identify a potential harm. See id.
Rather, the harm analysis should be conducted in broad terms. Id.
As appellant correctly points out, she made progress during the case by obtaining a job,
renting an apartment, and having no known contact with James Cantrell. We also note that,
while appellant’s income is meager and she must rely on others for transportation, those
factors do not necessarily warrant termination of parental rights. See, e.g., Strickland v. Ark.
Dep’t of Human Servs., 103 Ark. App. 193, ___ S.W.3d ___ (2008). However, in the present
case, we cannot say that the circuit court clearly erred in finding that termination was in
C.P.’s best interest. Appellant willingly allowed herself and her child to endure horrific
treatment in the name of economic security. Appellant testified that she did not leave James
Cantrell, who badly abused C.P., because she was afraid of Cantrell and economically
dependent on him—so much so that she declined to report Cantrell’s actions to helpful
authorities and, on the day that she took C.P. to the hospital, sought treatment for her own
injuries rather than the child’s. In these circumstances, appellant’s insufficient income and her
dependence on others constitute not just economic issues but safety issues with potentially
harmful consequences. This is especially true where the persons on whom appellant solely
relies for support and companionship have their own issues that portend harm to C.P.
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Certainly no child should be regularly exposed to Mr. Jewell and his numerous, founded
reports of abuse, nor to Ms. Jewell’s anger, hallucinations, and regular suicide attempts.
Of equal if not greater importance is appellant’s lack of serious effort in obtaining
psychological counseling. Appellant testified that, during the case, she saw two counselors for
one or two sessions each. According to appellant’s psychological examiner, a patient with
appellant’s personality disorder would require at least six months of therapy to overcome the
disorder. The examiner also stated that, in the absence of therapy, appellant could find herself
and her child in another abusive relationship. Yet, after receiving her psychological assessment,
appellant attended only a handful of counseling sessions. The failure to consistently attend
counseling sessions to address the issues resulting in the child’s removal is a factor that
demonstrates parental indifference and will support termination of a parent’s rights. See Hall
v. Ark. Dep’t of Human Servs., 101 Ark. App. 417, 278 S.W.3d 609 (2008).
For these reasons, we conclude that the circuit court did not clearly err in finding that
termination was in C.P.’s best interest. The same proof supports the court’s finding that DHS
proved the following ground for termination:
That other factors or issues arose subsequent to the filing of the original petition for
dependency-neglect that demonstrate that return of the juvenile to the custody of the
parent is contrary to the juvenile’s health, safety, or welfare and that, despite the offer
of appropriate family services, the parent has manifested the incapacity or indifference
to remedy the subsequent issues or factors or rehabilitate the parent’s circumstances
that prevent return of the juvenile to the custody of the parent.
Ark. Code Ann. § 9-27-341(b)(3)(B)(vii)(a). Accordingly, we affirm the circuit court’s
termination order.
Affirmed.
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V AUGHT, C.J., and B ROWN, J., agree.
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