Price v. State
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NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION
ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS
DIVISION I
No. CACR08-1459
Opinion Delivered
May 20, 2009
THOMAS PRICE
APPELLANT
V.
APPEAL FROM THE JEFFERSON
COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT
[NO. CR-03-469-1; CR03-1126-1;
CR04-447-1]
HONORABLE BERLIN C. JONES,
JUDGE
STATE OF ARKANSAS
APPELLEE
AFFIRMED
JOHN MAUZY PITTMAN, Judge
Appellant was charged with violating the conditions of his probation for three felony
offenses by violating a no-contact order, by committing domestic battery, by failing to submit
monthly probation report forms, and by failing to pay fines and costs as ordered. After a
hearing, the trial court found that appellant had violated the conditions of his probation and
sentenced him to a prison term of sixteen years. Appellant argues on appeal that the trial
court erred in admitting evidence regarding his financial status subsequent to the date of the
violation report, asserting that it was a denial of due process to do so because he received no
notice that his failure to pay fines and costs after the date of the violation report would be in
issue. We affirm.
Defendants in revocation proceedings are not entitled to the full panoply of rights that
attend a criminal prosecution. Fundamental fairness, with an opportunity to be heard, is all
that a probationer is entitled to demand. Lockett v. State, 271 Ark. 860, 611 S.W.2d 500
(1981). In Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778 (1973), the United States Supreme Court held
that due process requires that a probationer be afforded a revocation hearing under the same
conditions held applicable to a parolee in Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972).
The Arkansas procedures for probation-revocation hearings, set out in Arkansas Code
Annotated § 5-4-310(b) (Repl. 2006), are designed to comply with the Gagnon decision. See
Robinson v. State, 14 Ark. App. 38, 684 S.W.2d 824 (1985). Subsection 5-4-310(b)(3) (Repl.
2006) requires that the defendant be given prior notice of the time and place of the revocation
hearing, the purpose of the hearing, and the condition of probation he is alleged to have
violated. At such a hearing, the court may permit introduction of any relevant evidence of
the alleged violation, regardless of its admissibility under the rules governing admission of
evidence in a criminal trial. Ark. Code Ann. § 5-4-310(b).
Here, it appears that appellant was adequately notified of the time, purpose, and subject
of the hearing, and whether or not appellant paid any of his outstanding fines and costs after
becoming demonstrably able to do so is not irrelevant to his intent regarding his earlier failure
to pay. In any event, we could not reverse on this record because appellant has failed to
demonstrate that he suffered any prejudice as the result of the admission of the disputed
evidence. Appellant cites Breeden v. State, 270 Ark. 90, 603 S.W.2d 459 (Ark. App. 1980),
for the proposition that error is presumed to be prejudicial unless it has been affirmatively
shown otherwise. Although that was once the law in Arkansas, it has not been since Berna
v. State, 282 Ark. 563, 670 S.W.2d 434 (1984), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1085 (1985), in which
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CACR08-1459
our supreme court held that prejudice would no longer be presumed and that we would no
longer reverse in the absence of demonstrated prejudice.
In the present case, appellant simply alleged lack of notice and asserted that it
constituted a due process violation. Significantly, he made no claim of surprise, nor did he
seek a continuance or indicate the necessity of altering his defense to meet the circumstances.
Those factors in themselves would support affirmance. See Phillips v. State, 40 Ark. App. 19,
840 S.W.2d 808 (1992). However, we note that counsel on appeal appears less than candid
with this court when he asserts that “[i]t is unknown what weight was given to the testimony
by the trial court,” because the trial court, in finding that appellant had violated the conditions
of his probation, twice expressly stated that he was not considering the allegation of failure to
pay in finding that appellant violated the terms and conditions of his probation. Under these
circumstances, it cannot reasonably be argued that appellant was prejudiced by admission of
evidence of his financial means subsequent to the date of his alleged failure to pay.
Affirmed
M ARSHALL and H ENRY, JJ., agree.
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CACR08-1459
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