Holmes v. State
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ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS
No.
DIVISION I
CACR 08-1274
LANELLE DEAN HOLMES
Opinion Delivered May 20, 2009
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM THE SEBASTIAN
COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT,
[NO. CR-98-3]
V.
STATE OF ARKANSAS
APPELLEE
HONORABLE J. MICHAEL
FITZHUGH, JUDGE
AFFIRMED
COURTNEY HUDSON HENRY, Judge
Appellant Lanelle Holmes appeals the revocation of her suspended sentence for which
she received a two-year term of imprisonment. For reversal, she contends that the State failed
to prove that she violated the terms and conditions of her suspended sentence. We affirm.
On April 9, 1998, appellant pled guilty to the offenses of possession of cocaine with
intent to deliver, possession of drug paraphernalia, and maintaining a drug premises. The trial
court sentenced appellant to eight years in prison with an additional twelve-year suspended
imposition of sentence for possession with intent to deliver, eight years with an additional
two-year suspended imposition of sentence for possession of drug paraphernalia, and six years
in prison for maintaining a drug premises. Additionally, the court ordered appellant to pay
$150 in court costs at the rate of $50 per month commencing sixty days after her release from
prison.
Appellant’s release from the department of correction occurred on April 16, 1999.
Nine years later, the State filed a petition to revoke appellant’s remaining suspended
imposition of sentence for her conviction of possession of cocaine with intent to deliver. In
its petition, the State alleged that appellant failed to abide by the conditions of her suspended
sentence by engaging in criminal conduct. Specifically, the State alleged that appellant
committed the offenses of possession of cocaine with intent to deliver, possession of drug
paraphernalia, maintaining a drug premises, simultaneous possession of drugs and firearms,
felon in possession of a firearm, and possession of marijuana. The State also alleged that
appellant had failed to pay court costs as ordered.
At the revocation hearing, the State elicited the testimony of Detective Wayne Barnett,
who was assigned to the narcotics unit of the Fort Smith Police Department. On the
afternoon of March 27, 2008, Barnett and other officers executed a search warrant of
appellant’s small, one-bedroom apartment.
When the officers entered the apartment,
appellant and her son, Marquis Holmes, were the only persons present. In the search, the
officers found no controlled substances on appellant’s person. However, they seized a plastic
bag, which contained hydrocodone residue, that was sitting on an end table near appellant.
The officers found a large number of plastic sandwich bags in a kitchen trash can. The corners
of these bags had been removed, and other bags, which were also missing corners, were found
scattered about the kitchen. Detective Barnett testified that drug traffickers used the corners
of plastic bags to package controlled substances for purposes of sale. Also in the kitchen, the
officers found a piece of Chore Boy, which is a copper scouring pad. Barnett explained that
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such pads are torn apart and used for smoking crack cocaine. In the dining area, the officers
found a set of digital scales and an open box of sandwich bags sitting on a microwave shelf.
In the bedroom, the officers found a 9mm handgun with a loaded clip in the closet.
The officers also found $720 in the closet. The officers seized 4.5 grams of cocaine from
Marquis Holmes’s pocket, along with $85 in cash. They also found 3.2 grams of marijuana
in Marquis’s vehicle. Detective Barnett testified that Marquis admitted that he was selling
drugs and that he was responsible for all of the drugs, money, and the gun that the officers
seized.
The State also introduced the payment ledger for appellant’s court costs. The ledger
showed a balance due of $150, which included an assessment for paying the costs by
installment.
Appellant also testified at the hearing. She said that she lived alone in the apartment
and that Marquis lived in Oklahoma. She stated, however, that Marquis spent several nights
each week with her and that, on those occasions, she slept in the living room while he slept
in the bedroom. Appellant testified that Marquis was visiting but not spending the night on
the day of the search. Appellant professed to know nothing about the gun, the scales, the
plastic bags, or the drugs found in Marquis’s pocket or his vehicle. Appellant further testified
that she worked and received disability benefits. She said that she made two payments of $25
toward her court costs and thought that she did not owe any additional money.
After hearing the evidence, the trial court revoked appellant’s suspended imposition
of sentence. This appeal followed the trial court’s entry of judgment sentencing her to two
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years in prison. For reversal, appellant asserts that the State failed to prove that she possessed
any of the contraband. She also argues that her failure to pay court costs was not willful.
To revoke probation or a suspended sentence, the trial court must find by a
preponderance of the evidence that the defendant inexcusably violated a condition of that
probation or suspension. Peterson v. State, 81 Ark. App. 226, 100 S.W.3d 66 (2003). The
State bears the burden of proof but need only prove that the defendant committed one
violation of the conditions in order to sustain a revocation. Haley v. State, 96 Ark. App. 256,
240 S.W.3d 615 (2006). The State’s burden is not as great in a revocation hearing as it is in
a criminal proceeding; therefore, evidence that is insufficient for a criminal conviction may
be sufficient for revocation. Bedford v. State, 96 Ark. App. 38, 237 S.W.3d 516 (2006). We
do not reverse a trial court’s findings on appeal unless they are clearly against the
preponderance of the evidence. Sisk v. State, 81 Ark. App. 276, 101 S.W.3d 248 (2003).
Because the determination of a preponderance of the evidence turns on questions of
credibility and the weight to be given testimony, we defer to the trial court’s superior position
to resolve those matters. Peterson, supra.
Arkansas Code Annotated section 5-64-403(c)(1)(A)(i) (Supp. 2007) provides in part
that it is unlawful for any person to use, or to possess with intent to use, drug paraphernalia
to pack, store, contain, ingest, or inhale, or otherwise introduce into the human body a
controlled substance. The term “drug paraphernalia” is defined in part as any equipment,
product, and material of any kind that is used, intended for use, or designed for use in
packaging, inhaling, or otherwise introducing into the human body a controlled substance.
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Ark. Code Ann. § 5-64-101(14)(A) (Supp. 2007). Drug paraphernalia includes a scale that
is used or intended for use in weighing a controlled substance, a container that is used or
intended for use in packaging a small quantity of a controlled substance, and any object that
is used or intended for use in inhaling or otherwise introducing a controlled substance into
the human body. Ark. Code Ann. § 5-64-101(14)(B)(v), (ix), and (xii).
In order to prove possession of contraband, constructive possession is sufficient.
Gamble v. State, 82 Ark. App. 216, 105 S.W.3d 801 (2003). Constructive possession may be
established by circumstantial evidence. George v. State, 356 Ark. 345, 151 S.W.3d 770 (2004).
While constructive possession can be implied when the contraband is in the joint control of
the defendant and another, joint occupancy alone is not sufficient to establish constructive
possession. Holt v. State, 104 Ark. App. 198, ___ S.W.3d ___ (2008). In joint-occupancy
cases, the State must also prove that the accused exercised care, control, and management over
the contraband and knew the matter possessed was contraband. Gamble, supra. Such control
and knowledge can be inferred from the circumstances, such as the proximity of the
contraband to the accused, the fact that it is in plain view, and ownership of the property
where the contraband is found. McKenzie v. State, 362 Ark. 257, 195 S.W.3d 370 (2005).
After examining the record, we are satisfied that the trial court’s decision to revoke
appellant’s suspended sentence is not clearly against the preponderance of the evidence.
Appellant leased the apartment, and she was present at the time of the search. The officers
discovered items of drug paraphernalia, such as a set of scales, a smoking device, sandwich
bags, and bags with their corners removed. These items of drug paraphernalia were in plain
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view and in the common areas of the apartment. Therefore, appellant’s knowledge and
control of these things can be inferred from the circumstances. Accordingly, we hold that
there was sufficient evidence to support the revocation of appellant’s suspended sentence for
possessing items of drug paraphernalia. Because only one violation need be sustained, we do
not address the other alleged transgressions, including appellant’s failure to pay court costs.
Embedded within appellant’s sufficiency-of-the-evidence argument is the contention
that she was denied the right of confrontation. Appellant argues that the violation occurred
when Detective Barnett testified that officers applied for a search warrant based on a
controlled drug sale made by appellant to a confidential informant. Appellant objected to this
testimony on hearsay and confrontation grounds, but the trial court overruled the objection
after the following discourse with the prosecuting attorney:
THE COURT: Is this being offered for the truth of it or why he did what he
did?
PROSECUTOR: I would like the Court to know why Detective Barnett
obtained the search warrant for that address.
THE COURT: All right. Your objection is overruled.
We have observed that, although the rules of evidence, including the hearsay rule, are
not strictly applicable in revocation proceedings, the right to confront witnesses does apply.
Caswell v. State, 63 Ark. App. 59, 973 S.W.2d 832 (1998); Goforth v. State, 27 Ark. App. 150,
767 S.W.2d 537 (1989). An out-of-court statement is not hearsay if it is offered, not for the
truth of the matter asserted, but to show the basis of action. Dednam v. State, 360 Ark. 240,
200 S.W.3d 875 (2005).
Testimony that is not hearsay raises no confrontation-clause
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concerns. Id.; see also Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 59-60 n.9 (2004) (observing that
the Confrontation Clause does not bar the use of testimonial statements for purposes other
than establishing the truth of the matter asserted); United States v. Tucker, 533 F.3d 711 (8th
Cir. 2008) (noting that testimonial statements offered for purposes other than their truth do
not implicate the Confrontation Clause). Here, appellant complains of testimony that was not
hearsay because it was not offered for the truth of the matter asserted. From the colloquy
between the court and the prosecutor, it is evident that the court allowed this testimony for
the limited purpose of establishing the reason why the officers applied for a search warrant.
Because the testimony was not offered for its truth, the trial court’s ruling did not offend the
Confrontation Clause. Therefore, we find no merit in appellant’s argument.
Affirmed.
P ITTMAN and M ARSHALL, JJ., agree.
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