Moore v. Keith Smith Co., Inc.
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NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION
ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS
DIVISION IV
No. CA 08-884
Opinion Delivered
DAVID MOORE, JOHN MOORE and
FREDA MOORE
APPELLANTS
MAY 6, 2009
APPEAL FROM THE GARLAND
COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT,
[NO. CIV 2006-1554-1]
V.
HONORABLE JOHN HOMER
WRIGHT, JUDGE
KEITH SMITH COMPANY, INC.
APPELLEE
AFFIRMED
JOHN B. ROBBINS, Judge
This case arises out of a breeder-hen contract between appellants David Moore, John
Moore, and Freda Moore and appellee Keith Smith Company, Inc. The Garland County
Circuit Court granted appellee partial summary judgment on appellants’ claims for fraud and
fraudulent inducement, promissory estoppel/breach of contract, and negligence and certified
the order as final pursuant to Ark. R. Civ. P. 54(b). Appellants raise four points for reversal,
contending that there are genuine issues of material fact undecided that render the summary
judgment inappropriate. Finding no error, we affirm.
Background
In 2003, appellants were interested in purchasing a poultry farm.1 They located what
they believed to be a suitable farm owned by Bill Grassie, who had a contract with appellee.
1
Freda and John Moore are the parents of David Moore.
Prior to the purchase of the Grassie farm, David Moore met with Jim Jones, manager of
appellee’s breeder-hen operation. Jones indicated that appellee would enter into a contract
with appellants and gave David Moore a list of previously prepared updates that needed to be
made to the facility. Appellants purchased the Grassie farm and the transaction closed on
December 22, 2003.
In February 2004, David Moore and appellee entered into a breeder-hen contract.
Under the contract, appellants agreed to house, feed, care for, and raise to marketing age, in
an approved house, any and all birds placed in their custody by appellee. Appellants were to
furnish all land, buildings, equipment, water, labor, and other facilities required. The contract
provided that it was for one flock. The contract also provided that either party could
terminate the contract for any reason by mailing written notice to the other party. A flock of
hens was placed with David Moore at that time.
In September 2004, appellee sent a letter to John Moore, stating that it had received
customer complaints about the quality of eggs coming from appellants’ farm. The letter
continued that, in order for appellee to leave the current flock with David Moore, John
Moore would have to assume total management for the farm. John Moore and appellee
entered into a contract dated September 16, 2004, for the remainder of the term of the
original contract between David Moore and appellee.
In November 2004, appellee informed appellants that they would have to replace the
nest system before appellee would renew the contract with appellants. It was explained that
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the existing system was worn out to the point that appellee was experiencing production
problems and customer complaints. The nests were replaced.
A second flock of hens was placed at the farm pursuant to a February 2005 contract
between John Moore and appellee. In November 2005, appellee sent a letter stating that it
would place a probationary flock with David Moore in early 2006. If David Moore’s
management was satisfactory to appellee, he would be placed back in the normal rotation to
receive a flock; however, if his management was deemed to be substandard, his contract
would be terminated. In December 2005, appellee decided not to enter into a contract with
David Moore for a probationary flock in 2006.
Appellants filed their complaint on December 21, 2006, asserting causes of action for
fraud, fraud in the inducement, breach-of-contract/promissory estoppel, and negligence. The
complaint was based on allegedly false representations Jim Jones made to David Moore prior
to appellants’ purchase of the farm. The misrepresentations included (a) that as long as David
Moore’s management of the flocks of hens placed with him was satisfactory, appellee would
continue to place additional flocks of hens; (b) that the hen facility at the Grassie farm was in
good condition and would be in very good condition after certain required updates were
completed; and (c) that the plaintiffs would not be required to replace nests in the hen house
for at least four to five years. Appellants sought compensatory and punitive damages. They
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later amended their complaint to add another claim for breach of contract.2 Appellee denied
the material allegations of the complaint.
On October 10, 2007, appellee filed its motion for summary judgment. Appellants
responded by filing a list of material facts that remain in dispute. Both parties submitted
excerpts of deposition testimony in support of their respective positions.
In his deposition, David Moore testified that he and his now-wife met with Jim Jones
prior to the purchase of the farm. He said that Jones told him that it was a flock-to-flock
contract. Moore said that he asked Jones about the conditions of the nests and was specifically
told that new nests would not be needed for four or five years. Moore did not inspect the
facility or the nests prior to the purchase and said that he was relying solely on what Jones
had told him. Moore further testified that Jones told him that the facility was in good
condition and would be in very good condition once the updates were completed. Moore
also related that Jones and another employee of appellee, Rodney Standridge, informed him
that before he would receive a second flock, he would have to replace all of the nests. He
opined that the facility was in terrible condition and that appellee should have known of all
the problems.
In his deposition, John Moore testified that he did not talk with Jim Jones or Bill
Grassie prior to the purchase of the farm. He said that, prior to the purchase of the farm, he
was told to check the condition of the nests and that he did this by having David Moore ask
2
The second breach-of-contract claim was for appellee’s failure to purchase market
eggs at a price of $0.10 per dozen. This claim was not resolved by the summary judgment
and is still pending in the circuit court.
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Jones. In his affidavit, Moore stated that he and David Moore were not able to go into the
facility until after the Grassie flock was removed in October 2003. At that time, there was
no way to determine how the nests worked because they had been raised in order to remove
the flock. He also asserted that, had Jones indicated that the nests might need to be replaced
in less than four or five years, or that market conditions might prevent appellee from offering
future contracts, he would not have purchased the farm.
Jim Jones testified by deposition that the update list given to David Moore contained
items that were required in a newly constructed house. Although he did not personally
inspect the facility after the Grassie flock was removed, he said that Rodney Standridge did
and found nothing wrong with the nests. He said that Standridge would be expected to
inform him if there were problems with the nests prior to a new owner taking over. Jones
was not aware of any problems with the nests during the last two or three years that Grassie
operated the farm, adding that the nests were in “good shape” prior to Grassie’s 2003 flock.
He acknowledged that the condition of the nests could not be determined if the birds were
in the nests. Although he did not recall a specific discussion with David Moore about the
nests, Jones said it was “possible” that he had said the nests “might” have to be replaced in
four or five years, but there was “no possibility” that he told Moore the nests “would not”
have to be replaced in that time frame. Jones denied discussing the condition of the facility
once the updates were made and could not recall whether those updates would be all that
would be required for several years.
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Jones discussed appellee’s policy on extending new contracts to current growers. He
said that, as long as management is satisfactory, appellee would issue new contracts and the
growers would be in the regular rotation to receive birds. Jones acknowledged that there
were times when appellee failed to extend contracts based on a downturn in market
conditions. He said that he meant what he said about placing a probationary flock with David
Moore in 2006 but that, collectively, appellee changed its mind. He said that the decision not
to place the probationary flock was made because appellants fell short on their numbers, there
was poor management, and that David Moore was not at the farm for most of the second
flock. Jones also said that he was concerned about other growers having longer-than-normal
down time between flocks.
Rodney Standridge, who had considerable experience as a grower, testified that he
gave David Moore advice prior to Moore receiving the first flock of birds. He said that it was
important to have the slats that the nests rest upon level and straight and that they were not
level and straight in Moore’s case, causing him trouble from the start. Standridge denied
knowing from the first that Moore was going to have trouble, adding that it became obvious
when the birds came into peak production. According to Standridge, the nests were
approximately fifteen years old and could be repaired so as to be serviceable. He did not
recall whether he inspected the farm and made a list of things needed to be done in order
to have the farm meet appellee’s standards for a new grower. He did not recall seeing the list
of updates given to David Moore. Standridge also said he knew that, with good management
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on his part as a grower, he would receive another flock, but that market conditions could
change that.
Bret Humphreys, an employee of appellee, testified that the nests could not be
repaired.
The Circuit Court’s Ruling
On March 9, 2008, the circuit court entered an order granting partial summary
judgment to appellee. In its order, the court found that any representation by Jim Jones as
to the quality and condition of the nests was a matter of opinion and could not be the basis
of a fraud action. The court also found that appellants could have discovered the condition
of the nest had they exercised due diligence and inspected the Grassie farm before they
purchased it. The circuit court also granted summary judgment on appellants’ breach-ofcontract/promissory estoppel claim, finding that, because the contract was for one flock, the
contract was not breached. The court noted that promissory estoppel was not available to
appellants because there was an enforceable contract between the parties. The court also
noted that the contract contained a provision stating that either party could terminate the
contract at any time for any reason. The court then addressed appellants’ claim that appellee
was negligent in failing to determine that the nests needed to be replaced before appellants
purchased the Grassie farm and entered into a contract with appellee. The court found that
appellee had no duty to inspect the nests and that the contract put the onus on the appellants
to have adequate facilities. Finally, the court also granted summary judgment to appellee on
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appellants’ claim for punitive damages. The court certified the order as a final judgment
pursuant to Ark. R. Civ. P. 54(b). This appeal followed.
Standard of Review
The law is well settled that summary judgment is to be granted by a circuit court only
when it is clear that there are no genuine issues of material fact to be litigated, and the party
is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Felton v. Rebsamen Med. Ctr., Inc., 373 Ark. 472,
___ S.W.3d ___ (2008). Once the moving party has established a prima facie entitlement to
summary judgment, the opposing party must meet proof with proof and demonstrate the
existence of a material issue of fact. See id. On appellate review, we determine if summary
judgment was appropriate based on whether the evidentiary items presented by the moving
party in support of the motion leave a material fact unanswered. See id. We view the
evidence in a light most favorable to the party against whom the motion was filed, resolving
all doubts and inferences against the moving party. See id. Our review focuses not only on
the pleadings, but also on the affidavits and documents filed by the parties. See id.
Arguments on Appeal
Appellants first argue that the circuit court erred in granting summary judgment on
their fraud or fraud in the inducement claims. Appellants’ argument is that there are material
facts remaining in dispute concerning appellee’s representations about receiving future flocks
and the condition of the facility, specifically, the nests. We disagree.
Appellants insist that appellee had a duty to inform them that a downturn in the
market may prevent appellee from extending another contract, even if their management was
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satisfactory. However, liability for nondisclosure may be found only in special circumstances.
See Ward v. Worthen Bank & Trust Co., 284 Ark. 355, 681 S.W.2d 365 (1984). Appellants did
not plead that there were special circumstances in the present case. Moreover, an action for
fraud or deceit may not be predicated on representations relating solely to future events. Delta
School of Commerce, Inc. v. Wood, 298 Ark. 195, 766 S.W.2d 424 (1989). The representations
in question illustrated appellee’s policy concerning future renewals. Since these
representations were made before any contract was signed, they could not have represented
a past event or present circumstance. These representations could only have alluded to
appellee’s future performance of contracts yet to be executed.
With regard to appellants’ fraud claim as it relates to the condition of the facility,
the circuit court was correct in granting summary judgment because the alleged
misrepresentation was an expression of opinion. A good-faith expression of opinion,
concerning a matter not susceptible of accurate knowledge, cannot furnish the basis for deceit
or fraud. Delta School of Commerce, supra. Our supreme court has said that statements that
things are “good,” or “valuable,” or “large,” or “strong,” necessarily involve to some extent
an exercise of individual judgment, and even though made absolutely, the hearer must know
they can be only expressions of opinion. Cannaday v. Cossey, 228 Ark. 1119, 1121, 312
S.W.2d 442, 444 (1958). In the present case, the statement by Jones that the facility was in
“good shape” involved Jones’s individual judgment and was an expression of his opinion.
Also, there is no evidence that Jones was not acting in good faith when he made the
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statement. Therefore, the circuit court correctly granted summary judgment on the fraud
claim.
Appellants next argue that there are material issues of fact concerning their breach-ofcontract and promissory estoppel claim. Appellants rely on the same alleged
misrepresentations that formed the basis for their fraud claim. Promissory estoppel is not to
be used as a vehicle to engraft a promise on a contract that differs from the written terms of
the contract. See, e.g., Halls Ferry Inv., Inc. v. Smith, 985 S.W.2d 848 (Mo. App. 1998).
Promissory estoppel is a basis for recovery when formal contractual elements do not exist.
Community Bank of N. Ark. v. Tri-State Propane, 89 Ark. App. 272, 203 S.W.3d 124 (2005).
However, in the present case a formal contract does exist. Therefore, appellants cannot
proceed on the basis of promissory estoppel. Taylor v. George, 92 Ark. App. 264, 212 S.W.3d
17 (2005).
In their third point, appellants argue that there were genuine issues of material fact
remaining as to whether appellee was negligent in determining what updates to the facility
were needed. Appellants’ argument is that, because appellee undertook to provide a list of
updates to be made to the facility prior to their purchase, appellee was negligent in not
determining that the nests would have to be replaced.
The law of negligence requires as essential elements that the plaintiff show that a duty
was owed and that the duty was breached. Lacy v. Flake & Kelley Mgmt., Inc., 366 Ark. 365,
235 S.W.3d 894 (2006). The issue of whether a duty exists is always a question of law, not
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to be decided by a trier of fact. Id. If no duty of care is owed, summary judgment is
appropriate. Id.
According to appellants, the negligence occurred when appellee prepared the list of
needed updates or repairs in July 2003. Although a duty can arise from contractual
relationships, see Tackett v. Merchant’s Sec. Patrol, 73 Ark. App. 358, 44 S.W.3d 349 (2001),
the contractual relationship between the parties in the present case arose after appellee’s
allegedly negligent inspection of the facility. Assuming without deciding that appellee
undertook a duty to inspect the nests, there is no evidence that appellee was negligent in its
inspection. Just because appellee inspected the nests and did not find that the nests needed
to be replaced at the time the update list was prepared does not establish that appellee was
negligent in its inspection. We cannot find from this record that appellee assumed any duty
to inspect the facility, and, therefore, the circuit court correctly granted summary judgment
on this claim.
We need not discuss appellants’ fourth point because we have affirmed the circuit
court’s summary judgment on the claims for compensatory damages. See generally Hudson v.
Cook, 82 Ark. App. 246, 105 S.W.3d 821 (2003) (recognizing that, in the absence of an
award for compensatory damages, punitive damages are barred).
Affirmed.
PITTMAN and GRUBER, JJ., agree.
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