Smith v. Wal-Mart Assocs., Inc.
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ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS
DIVISION I
No. CA 08-1467
WILLA DEAN SMITH
Opinion Delivered April 29, 2009
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM THE ARKANSAS
WORKERS’ COMPENSATION
COMMISSION
[NO. F706255]
V.
WAL-MART ASSOCIATES, INC.,
ET AL.
APPELLEES
AFFIRMED
COURTNEY HUDSON HENRY, Judge
Appellant Willa Dean Smith appeals the decision of the Arkansas Workers’
Compensation Commission finding that she was not performing employment services at the
time of her injury. For reversal, appellant contends that the Commission’s findings are not
supported by substantial evidence and that the Commission erred in its interpretation of the
employment-services doctrine. We affirm the Commission’s decision.
In November of 2004, appellant began working in the delicatessen at Wal-Mart in
Clinton. On January 16, 2007, appellant, then age sixty-seven, left the store for an eye doctor
appointment during her lunch break. On her way back to work, she purchased a sandwich,
which she planned to eat in the store before clocking in and resuming her duties. The main
entrance to the store lay on the east side of the building. When appellant returned to the
store, she parked her vehicle in the lot on the north side of the building. The Clinton area
had experienced an ice storm the previous evening, and when appellant alighted from her
vehicle, she slipped on the ice and fell onto the pavement. As a result, appellant severely
injured her left shoulder.
At the emergency room, a doctor performed a closed reduction as treatment for her
dislocated left shoulder. Ultimately, Dr. David Collins, an orthopedic surgeon, diagnosed
appellant with a full-thickness, rotator-cuff tear of the left shoulder and axillary nerve palsy.
Dr. Collins performed surgery to repair the rotator-cuff tear on April 27, 2007. In her
testimony, appellant stated that Dr. Collins had not released her from his care and that Dr.
Collins contemplated additional surgery. Appellant filed a claim for benefits associated with
the treatment of her left shoulder. In making this claim, appellant contended that she
sustained the fall during the course and scope of her employment because Wal-Mart’s policy
required employees to park in the north lot in order to reserve parking for its customers closer
to the entrance of the store. Wal-Mart resisted appellant’s claim with the argument that
appellant was “off the clock” and not performing employment services at the time of the
accident.
At the hearing before the administrative law judge (ALJ), appellant testified that, given
a choice, she would not have parked in the north lot. Appellant said, however, that she
participated in an orientation program when she was hired and that the program leader
advised her that employees were required to park on the north end of the building so that
customers would have better access to the store. Appellant said that she understood that any
employee who received three write-ups for violating this policy was subject to termination.
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Appellant testified that parking spaces for employees in the north lot were painted with white
lines and that parking spaces for customers were lined with yellow paint.
Appellant
introduced into evidence a photograph of the north parking lot, and she marked with a pen
the space in which she parked her car on the day of the accident. Appellant designated a
space with yellow lines. She testified that the photograph was taken months after the
accident, and she believed that the white-lined spaces were painted yellow since the accident.
Andrea White, a former Wal-Mart employee and co-worker of appellant, testified that
she also learned of the parking policy during orientation. White said that Wal-Mart required
employees to park in the north parking lot to save spaces near the main entrance for
customers. She testified that she was told that employees who repeatedly violated this policy
could be terminated. Through White’s testimony, appellant introduced into evidence the
handwritten notes that White took during the orientation program, on which White wrote
that employee parking was in the north lot.
Appellant also presented the testimony of Candy Vanholk, another co-worker, who
testified that she received newsletters regarding the parking policy, which stated that employee
parking was on the north side of the store to allow parking spaces for customers at the front
of the store. Vanholk had also heard of employees being asked to move their vehicles to the
north lot, but she was not aware of any employee being disciplined for violating the policy.
Chuck Huddleston, the manager of the Clinton store, testified on behalf of Wal-Mart.
He said that employee parking was on the north side of the building and that the area had
parking spaces marked with both white and yellow lines. Huddleston testified that employees
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were asked to park in the white-lined spaces, while the yellow-lined spaces were reserved for
customers. He said, however, that he did not strictly enforce this policy, whereas the previous
manager had disciplined two employees for violating the policy, including one who was
terminated for the violation. Huddleston admitted that he routinely parked in the north lot
in a white-lined space.
Huddleston further testified that another Wal-Mart policy expressly forbids employees
from engaging in any work-related activities while they are “off the clock.” He said that this
policy was strictly enforced and that he, as a manager, would be terminated if he had
knowledge of an employee working while off the clock. Huddleston testified that appellant
would not have been allowed to eat lunch while on the clock and that parking in the north
lot had no relationship to her job in the delicatessen.
Arlene Janet Wells worked at Wal-Mart for twenty-two years and held the position
of personnel manager at the Clinton store. She testified that she leads orientation programs
and that new employees are told to park in the north lot. Wells stated, however, that she
never tells employees that they could be disciplined for violating the parking policy. She also
said that some employees regularly park in other areas. Additionally, Wells testified that the
north parking lot has always had spaces lined in both yellow and white paint and that, to her
knowledge, none of the white-lined spaces were recently painted yellow.
Laura Murphree, an employee at the store, testified that employee parking was on the
north side of the building. She said that the north lot had yellow and white-lined spaces and
that employees were to park in the white-lined spaces.
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Tracy Roth, another employee, testified that employees were supposed to park on the
north side of the building but that no one had ever discussed with her what would happen
if an employee did not park there. She said that she parked in other places on occasion and
was not disciplined for doing so. Roth recalled one instance when a member of management
questioned her about why she had not parked in the north lot. She said that she explained
to the manager that she was getting off work late at night, and she said that the manager did
not require her to move her vehicle.
Appellant introduced into evidence a copy of Wal-Mart’s national parking policy. The
policy stated that it reserved parking closest to the store for customers and that facility
managers were to designate areas for employee parking. The policy further stated that an
employee who violated the policy would be subject to discipline, including termination.
After hearing the evidence, the ALJ found that the store maintained a policy that
required employees to park in the north parking lot in white-lined spaces. The ALJ also
found that the policy advanced Wal-Mart’s interests because requiring employees to park in
a remote location allowed spaces for customer parking close to the main entrance of the store.
Based on these findings, the ALJ concluded that employees were performing employment
services when parking in the north lot in white-lined spaces. However, the ALJ found that
appellant did not park in a white-lined space at the time of the accident, and thus the ALJ
concluded that appellant was not performing employment services when the accident
occurred. Consequently, the ALJ denied the compensability of appellant’s claim. The
Commission subsequently affirmed and adopted the ALJ’s decision.
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For reversal of the Commission’s decision, appellant contends that substantial evidence
does not support the finding that the parking policy included the requirement of parking in
white-lined spaces or the finding that she did not park in one of those spaces. Appellant
further argues that the Commission erred by applying the requirement of performing
employment services too narrowly in the context of this case.1
In order for an accidental injury to be compensable, it must arise out of and in the
course of employment. Ark. Code Ann. § 11-9-102(4)(A)(i) (Supp. 2007). A compensable
injury does not include an injury which is inflicted upon the employee at a time when
employment services are not being performed. Ark. Code Ann. § 11-9-102(4)(B)(iii). An
employee is performing employment services when she is doing something that is generally
required by the employer. Dairy Farmers of America, Inc. v. Coker, 98 Ark. App. 400, 255
S.W.3d 905 (2007). We use the same test to determine whether an employee is performing
employment services as we do when determining whether an employee is acting within the
course and scope of employment. Texarkana Sch. Dist. v. Conner, 373 Ark. 372, ___ S.W.3d
___ (2008). The test is whether the injury occurred within the time and space boundaries of
1
In its brief, Wal-Mart takes issue with the Commission’s determination that the
requirement of parking in a designated area constitutes the performance of employment
services. Wal-Mart insists that appellant was not performing employment services because she
was off the clock and still on lunch break at the time of the accident. If we accepted that
argument, the result would nonetheless require us to affirm the Commission’s denial of
benefits. However, we are in no position to express an opinion on this matter because we
do not make our own findings of fact in workers’ compensation cases. See Sonic Drive-In v.
Wade, 36 Ark. App. 4, 816 S.W.2d 889 (1991). Nor are we at liberty to affirm on the ground
that the Commission reached the right result for the wrong reason, as we do in appeals from
trial courts. Cook v. Alcoa, 35 Ark. App. 16, 811 S.W.2d 329 (1991).
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the employment when the employee was carrying out the employer’s purpose or advancing
the employer’s interest, directly or indirectly. Parker v. Comcast Cable Corp., 100 Ark. App.
400, 269 S.W.3d 391 (2007). As the claimant, appellant bore the burden of proving a
compensable injury by a preponderance of the credible evidence. See Ark. Code Ann. § 119-102(4)(E)(i).
The going-and-coming rule ordinarily precludes recovery for an injury sustained while
the employee is going to or returning from her place of employment because an employee
is generally not acting within the course of employment when traveling to and from the
workplace. CV’s Family Foods v. Caverly, ___ Ark. App. ___, ___ S.W.3d ___ (Feb. 25,
2009). Prior to Act 796 of 1993, the premises exception to the going-and-coming rule
provided that, although an employee at the time of injury had not reached the place where
her job duties were discharged, her injury was considered to be within the course and scope
of the employment, if the employee was injured while on the employer’s premises. Hightower
v. Newark Pub. Sch. Sys., 57 Ark. App. 159, 943 S.W.2d 608 (1997). In Hightower, however,
we held that the statutory requirement of the 1993 Act that an employee must be performing
employment services at the time of the injury eliminated the premises exception to the goingand-coming rule.
In reviewing decisions from the Workers’ Compensation Commission, we view the
evidence and all reasonable inferences deducible therefrom in the light most favorable to the
Commission’s findings, and we affirm if the decision is supported by substantial evidence.
Foster v. Express Personnel Servs., 93 Ark. App. 496, 222 S.W.3d 218 (2006). Substantial
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evidence exists if reasonable minds could reach the Commission’s conclusion. Jivan v.
Economy Inn & Suites, 370 Ark. 414, 260 S.W.3d 281 (2007). When a claim is denied because
the claimant has failed to show an entitlement to compensation by a preponderance of the
evidence, the substantial-evidence standard of review requires us to affirm if the Commission’s
opinion displays a substantial basis for the denial of relief. Whitlach v. Southland Land & Dev.,
84 Ark. App. 399, 141 S.W.3d 916 (2004).
Questions concerning the credibility of witnesses and the weight to be given to their
testimony are within the exclusive province of the Commission. Cedar Chem. Co. v. Knight,
372 Ark. 233, 273 S.W.3d 473 (2008). When there are contradictions in the evidence, it is
within the Commission’s province to reconcile conflicting evidence and to determine the true
facts. Id. The Commission is not required to believe the testimony of the claimant or any
other witness, but it may accept and translate into findings of fact only those portions of the
testimony it deems worthy of belief. Patterson v. Ark. Dep’t of Health, 343 Ark. 255, 33
S.W.3d 151 (2000). Thus, we are foreclosed from determining the credibility and weight to
be accorded to each witness’s testimony. Arbaugh v. AG Processing, Inc., 360 Ark. 491, 202
S.W.3d 519 (2005).
We first address appellant’s argument that substantial evidence does not support the
Commission’s finding that the parking policy included the requirement of parking in whitelined spaces. She contends that the greater weight of the evidence established that the policy
required employees to park in the north lot without limitation as to the color of the lines on
the parking spaces. The evidence on this subject was contradictory, and the Commission
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resolved the conflicts in the evidence and found that the policy required employees to park
in white-lined spaces. Considering the standard of review, we are unable to say that the
Commission’s decision is not supported by substantial evidence.
Appellant further contends that the evidence does not support the Commission’s
finding that she did not park in a white-lined space. Again, the Commission made this
determination by resolving conflicts in the evidence. The parking space that appellant pointed
out in the photograph as being the one in which she parked that day is clearly marked with
yellow lines. The Commission found credible the testimony that the color of the lines was
not altered after the accident. We must conclude that substantial evidence supports this
finding as well.
The primary focus of appellant’s appeal is her contention that the Commission
interpreted the requirement of performing employment services too narrowly. Appellant
bases this argument on the broad statement of law that employment services are being
performed when the employee is doing something she is generally required to do. See Wallace
v. West Fraser South, Inc., 365 Ark. 68, 225 S.W.3d 361 (2006) (emphasis supplied). Appellant
asserts that it is irrelevant what color lined her parking space as long as she parked in the north
parking area, which advanced the general purpose of Wal-Mart’s parking policy to reserve
spaces for customers near the main entrance of the store. We find no merit in this argument.
Appellant contended that she was performing employment services when the accident
occurred because she was complying with Wal-Mart’s directive to park in the north lot. The
evidence revealed that the north lot had both yellow and white-lined spaces, and we have
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affirmed the Commission’s determination that the policy included the requirement for
employees to park in white-lined spaces. We have also upheld the Commission’s finding that
appellant parked in a yellow-lined space, which the evidence showed was closer to the
building than the white-lined spaces in the north parking lot. The Commission’s decision
that appellant did not comply with the parking policy is consistent with the evidence found
credible by the Commission. Thus, the Commission rendered its decision in keeping with
the evidence before it. As the Commission’s decision displays a substantial basis for the denial
of relief, we affirm that decision.
Affirmed.
G LOVER and B ROWN, JJ., agree.
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