Eubanks v. Eubanks
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ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS
DIVISION I
No. CA07-1119
KENNETH DEWAYNE EUBANKS
APPELLANT
Opinion Delivered April 29, 2009
V.
APPEAL FROM THE CRAIGHEAD
COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT,
[NO. DR-2003-1013]
HOLLY JEAN CLEM EUBANKS
APPELLEE
HONORABLE LEE FERGUS, JUDGE
AFFIRMED
COURTNEY HUDSON HENRY, Judge
Appellant Dewayne Eubanks appeals the divorce decree ending his marriage to appellee
Holly Eubanks. For reversal, he challenges the circuit court’s award of alimony to appellee,
the court’s valuation of his interest in a limited-liability company, and the court’s allowance
of attorney’s fees to appellee. We affirm.
The parties to this appeal married in December 1982. During the marriage, appellant
went to medical school and is now a board-certified neurosurgeon. Appellant is the sole
shareholder in his medical group known as Spine-Arkansas. Spine-Arkansas also employs a
chiropractor, Dr. Terry Barnett. Appellant, Dr. Barnett, and accountant Stan Lamb are each
one-third members of a limited-liability company known as Black Dog Development, LLC
(Black Dog). The three members formed Black Dog to facilitate the purchase of unimproved
real estate upon which to build a clinic. In 2003, Black Dog purchased a parcel of land for
$288,000, and the land remained unimproved at the time of trial.
Prior to the parties’ separation, appellee stayed at home to raise the parties’ five
children, three of whom have reached their majority. The parties separated in January 2003
because appellant started living with another woman, Debra West. Appellant introduced
West to representatives of medical device companies, and she became a sales representative
for those companies. Appellant helped West form a limited-liability company, DL Medical,
through which West distributes medical devices.
Although West is a regional sales
representative, appellant is her only client.
Appellee filed her complaint for divorce on December 30, 2003. Appellant answered,
denying the material allegations of the complaint. After the court began hearing testimony,
appellee filed a supplemental third-party complaint against Spine-Arkansas, West, and DL
Medical, asserting that appellant used West and the other entities to shield appellant’s assets
and income from appellee. The supplemental complaint sought the imposition of a
constructive trust on West’s income and that of the associated entities.
The trial spanned eleven days, which extended over a period of eighteen months. In
the divorce decree entered on March 30, 2007, the circuit court found appellant’s income to
be $171,853 per year, or $14,321 per month, and the court ordered appellant to pay child
support of $3,007 per month. The circuit court also ordered appellant to pay appellee
alimony of $5,155 per month. The court ruled that the alimony award would not
automatically cease if appellee remarried but rather that it would be reduced by fifty percent
upon her remarriage. In valuing appellee’s marital share in Black Dog, the court cited
testimony that appellant currently owned a one-third interest in the corporation and
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testimony that appellant might acquire the interest of Stan Lamb in the future. The court
then referred to testimony that appellee’s marital share would be worth $30,688 if appellant
retained a one-third interest and $54,000 if appellant acquired a one-half interest. The court
“split the difference” and valued appellee’s share at $42,344. The court also directed appellant
to pay a $9,000 loan received from appellee’s mother. Additionally, the circuit court ordered
appellant to pay $60,000 towards appellee’s attorney’s fees and $11,726 in fees for her
accountant. Finally, the circuit court denied appellee’s third-party complaint seeking the
imposition of a constructive trust.
On April 12, 2007, appellant filed a motion for a new trial and request for specific
findings of fact. In his motion for a new trial, appellant asserted that irregularities in the
proceedings deprived him of a fair trial; that the circuit court’s division of marital property and
the awards of child support and alimony were made under the influence of passion or
prejudice; that the court’s rulings were clearly contrary to the evidence and the law; and that
errors of law occurred at trial to which he raised objections. On April 25, 2007, appellant
filed a notice of appeal from the decree of divorce. The circuit court held a hearing on
appellant’s new-trial motion on April 30, 2007. On May 16, 2007, the court entered an order
granting the motion in part and denying the motion in part. The court reduced appellee’s
marital share of Black Dog to $30,688. The court also reduced the amount of attorney’s fees
owed to appellee to $45,000, and the court eliminated the requirement that appellant repay
the debt to appellee’s mother. In all other respects, the trial court denied the motion for a
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new trial. On May 18, 2007, appellant filed an amended notice of appeal from the order
addressing the motion for a new trial.
As a preliminary matter, we must first acknowledge a jurisdictional defect concerning
the circuit court’s order deciding appellant’s motion for a new trial. Even if not raised by the
parties, the question of subject-matter jurisdiction is always open, cannot be waived, can be
questioned for the first time on appeal, and can be raised by the appellate court. Zolliecoffer
v. Post, 371 Ark. 263, 265 S.W.3d 114 (2007). Rule 59(b) of the Arkansas Rules of Civil
Procedure requires a motion for a new trial to be filed no later than ten days after the entry
of judgment. Like any motion to vacate, alter, or amend a judgment that is filed ten days after
the entry of judgment, new-trial motions are deemed denied if the trial court neither grants
nor denies the motion within thirty days. Ark. R. App. P.–Civil 4(b)(1). Otherwise, the trial
court must decide the motion for a new trial within thirty days and enter that decision of
record. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Isely, 308 Ark. 342, 823 S.W.2d 902 (1992). If the trial court
does not enter the decision of record within thirty days, the court loses jurisdiction to act on
the motion, and any order entered after thirty days is void and of no effect. Ark. State Hwy.
Comm’n v. Ayres, 311 Ark. 212, 842 S.W.2d 853 (1992); Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. of Ark.,
Inc. v. Suddrick, 49 Ark. App. 84, 896 S.W.2d 452 (1995).
In the present case, appellant timely filed a motion for a new trial on April 12, 2007.
Thus, the trial court had thirty days after that date to decide the motion and enter that
decision of record. This thirty-day time period expired on May 14, 2007. The trial court
entered its order deciding the motion beyond this deadline on May 16, 2007. Therefore, the
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order is void because the trial court lost jurisdiction to act on the motion after the expiration
of thirty days. Because the motion for a new trial was deemed denied by the court’s inaction,
the rulings in the divorce decree stand without alteration. Slaton v. Slaton, 330 Ark. 287, 956
S.W.2d 150 (1997) (holding that late entry of new trial order reinstated the original order).
Turning now to the first point on appeal, appellant argues that the circuit court erred
in calculating his income for purposes of setting alimony and child support.
He also
challenges the court’s award of alimony.
Appellant initially argues that the circuit court should not have imputed any income
to him. In its ruling, the circuit court determined appellant’s income by starting with income
of $144,751 per year as calculated by his own accountant. The court imputed an additional
$2,258 per month, or $27,102 of annual income to appellant to arrive at appellant’s disposable
income. T he testimony established that West, through DL Medical, provided appellant with
two credit cards used to finance trips, paid for his dental work, and provided him with a
computer, among other things. Other testimony showed that appellant lived in a home
owned by West and that appellant’s payment of $700 in rent to West was approximately
one-third of the monthly expenses. West also gave appellant money as needed to pay bills,
including his child support and alimony payments.
The payment of personal expenses by third parties can be considered income for
purposes of setting child support or alimony. See Brown v. Brown, 76 Ark. App. 494, 68
S.W.3d 316 (2002); Weir v. Phillips, 75 Ark. App. 208, 55 S.W.3d 804 (2001). Likewise, the
supreme court has held that a gift from a payor’s grandparents, a certificate of deposit, and
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retirement payments all fell within the broad range of a payor’s sources of income for
child-support purposes. Ford v. Ford, 347 Ark. 485, 65 S.W.3d 432 (2002). Although
appellant argues that federal law prohibits a physician from benefitting financially by having
a financial interest in a company that supplies medical devices utilized by the physician, see
42 U.S.C. § 1395nn, the circuit court correctly noted that the issue in this case is the amount
of income available to appellant. The question of whether appellant violated federal law was
not at issue. In the present case, we cannot say that the circuit court erred by imputing
income to appellant based on the evidence showing a third-party’s payment of his personal
expenses.
As a further argument under this point on appeal, appellant contends that the circuit
court erred in ordering the payment of lifetime alimony to appellee. The duration of alimony
is within the circuit court’s discretion. See Hiett v. Hiett, 86 Ark. App. 31, 158 S.W.3d 720
(2004). The purpose of alimony is to rectify the economic imbalances in earning power and
standard of living in light of the particular facts of each case. Kuchmas v. Kuchmas, 368 Ark.
43, 243 S.W.3d 270 (2006). The primary factors that a court should consider in awarding
alimony are the financial need of one spouse and the other spouse’s ability to pay. See id. The
circuit court may also consider other factors, including the couple’s past standard of living,
the earning capacity of each spouse, the resources and assets of each party, and the duration
of the marriage. See Johnson v. Cotton-Johnson, 88 Ark. App. 67, 194 S.W.3d 806 (2004). We
adhere to no mathematical formula or bright-line rule in awarding alimony. See Kuchmas,
supra; Valetutti v. Valetutti, 95 Ark. App. 83, 234 S.W.3d 338 (2006). The circuit court may
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make an award of alimony that is reasonable under the circumstances. Kuchmas, supra.
Contrary to appellant’s argument, the record does not indicate that the circuit court
awarded appellee lifetime alimony in lieu of an interest in appellant’s medical practice or
non-marital property, as forbidden by our decision in Hollaway v. Hollaway, 70 Ark. App.
240, 16 S.W.3d 302 (2000) (holding that an award of lifetime alimony was improper where
it was made in lieu of giving the wife an interest in her husband’s non-vested military
retirement). Instead, the record shows that the trial court considered the appropriate factors
in making this decision. The court considered the financial circumstances of both parties,
as well as appellant’s far greater earning capacity and the extent of appellee’s financial need.
The court also took into consideration the length of the marriage, twenty-two years, and
appellee’s testimony that the parties agreed she would stay at home and raise the children.
The court noted appellee’s lack of a college degree and appellee’s absence from the job
market for nearly twenty years. On this record, we cannot say that the circuit court abused
its discretion by awarding lifetime alimony. See Johnson, supra (affirming a lifetime alimony
award to wife even though she was a physician where wife stayed at home to raise the
children and husband’s income far exceeded her potential earnings); Hiett, supra (affirming
lifetime alimony award where wife was relatively young and healthy, had taken college
courses, but stayed home during a twenty-five-year marriage).
This brings us to consideration of the amount of the alimony award. Appellant is
correct in asserting that fault or misconduct is not a factor in awarding alimony. See Russell
v. Russell, 275 Ark. 193, 628 S.W.2d 315 (1982). However, our review of the record does
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not indicate that the circuit court considered fault in assessing alimony. The circuit court
considered the evidence surrounding appellee’s needs and appellant’s ability to pay, the
lifestyle the parties enjoyed, and the other factors mentioned above in reaching this decision.
In light of established precedent and the facts before us, we find no abuse of discretion.
Appellant next contends that the circuit court erred in valuing his interest in Black
Dog. His argument contains two subpoints. First, he contends that the circuit court erred
in allowing the testimony of an appraiser whose name had not been disclosed. Second, he
argues that the methodology used by appellee’s expert was flawed and not based on the fair
market value of appellant’s interest in Black Dog. A trial court’s decision to admit evidence
is within its discretion and will not be reversed absent an abuse of discretion. Rose Care, Inc.
v. Ross, 91 Ark. App. 187, 209 S.W.3d 393 (2005). Also, a circuit court’s valuation of
property for purposes of property division will not be reversed unless it is clearly erroneous.
Hoover v. Hoover, 70 Ark. App. 215, 16 S.W.3d 560 (2000).
As previously noted, this case was tried over an extended period of time. Near the
end of the trial, appellee informed appellant that she intended to recall Stephen Orr, an
accountant and a valuation expert, to value appellant’s interest in Black Dog. She also
indicated that she was going to call an appraiser to testify as to the value of the land owned
by Black Dog. Appellant relies on Arkansas State Highway Commission v. Frisby, 329 Ark. 506,
951 S.W.2d 305 (1997), and argues that he was prejudiced because appellee did not disclose
that she was going to call an appraiser to testify as to the value of the land owned by Black
Dog. He also argues that, as a result, he did not hire his own expert to value the land.
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Although appellant objected to the appraiser’s testimony at trial, he did not move for a
continuance. The supreme court has held that the failure to request a continuance under
such circumstances amounts to a failure to show prejudice. Mid-South Rd. Builders v. Ark.
Contractors Licensing Bd., 328 Ark. 630, 946 S.W.2d 649 (1997). We will not reverse absent
a showing of prejudice. Id.
Appellant also asserts that Orr’s methodology in valuing his interest in Black Dog is
flawed because he did not consider the debt Black Dog owed to Spine-Arkansas and the
other assets owned by Black Dog. We have stated that a circuit court’s decision adopting an
expert’s recommendation as to the valuation of marital property will not be reversed unless
it is clearly erroneous. Jones v. Jones, 29 Ark. App. 133, 777 S.W.2d 873 (1989). Orr did not
value appellant’s interest as a member of Black Dog; instead, he valued appellant’s interest in
the land because the land was Black Dog’s only asset. Orr also testified that he did not
consider the debts Black Dog owed to Spine-Arkansas because appellant received that money
as wages through Black Dog and thus was considered as income to appellant. Appellant’s
objection to Orr’s testimony goes to the weight to be given Orr’s opinion as to the value of
appellant’s interest in Black Dog. See Ark. State Hwy. Comm’n v. Schell, 13 Ark. App. 293,
683 S.W.2d 618 (1985). The circuit court, as the fact-finder, determines the weight to be
given testimony, and we conclude that the trial court’s findings valuing appellant’s interest
in the company are not clearly against the preponderance of the evidence.
Appellant also argues that Orr previously represented that he would not offer an
opinion as to appellant’s interest in Black Dog. However, Orr explained that, at the time he
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made this statement, appellee had not asked him to value the interest in Black Dog. When
a party complains about the failure to update discovery, the matter lies within the discretion
of the trial court. Ross, supra. Appellant did not consider the alleged discovery violation
egregious enough to request a continuance. Thus, we cannot say that appellant has
demonstrated any prejudice from the trial court’s refusal to exclude Orr’s testimony. Because
we do not reverse absent a showing of prejudice, we find no abuse of discretion. Mid-South
Rd. Builders, Inc. v. Ark. Contractor Licensing Bd., 328 Ark. 630, 946 S.W.2d 649 (1997). See
also Hill v. Billups, 85 Ark. App. 166, 148 S.W.3d 288 (2004) (finding no abuse of discretion
in not excluding expert’s testimony when expert revised his opinion).
Further, citing Kinkhead v. Spillers, 336 Ark. 60, 983 S.W.2d 425 (1999), appellant
contends that the circuit court erred by making a division of his interest in Black Dog
because the other members of the company were not joined in the lawsuit. Appellant’s
reliance on this decision is misplaced because Kinkhead is a case involving a partition, and it
has no application here because the trial court was not partitioning the land. Under the
divorce decree, appellant will still retain his interest in Black Dog, as will the other members.
Here, the trial court determined the current value of appellant’s interest in Black Dog.
Therefore, it is not necessary for the other members to be before the court because their
interests are unaffected by the divorce decree.
For his third and final point on appeal, appellant argues that the circuit court erred in
awarding appellee a portion of her attorney’s fees and the fees for her accountant. Appellant
does not object to the hourly rate for appellee’s counsel or to the circuit court’s authority to
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award expert witness fees. His argument is that appellee and her attorney spent much time
and effort on theories that the circuit court ultimately rejected and, therefore, she did not
prevail so as to entitle her to an award of attorney’s fees.
It is settled law that circuit courts have inherent power to award attorney’s fees in
domestic relations proceedings. Page v. Anderson, 85 Ark. App. 538, 157 S.W.3d 575 (2004).
Arkansas Code Annotated section 9-12-309(a) (Repl. 2008) authorizes the circuit court to
award either party a reasonable attorney’s fee and makes no provision for the fee to be
awarded only to the prevailing party. Appellant cites no authority for the proposition that
appellee had to prevail to be entitled to fees. In fact, the supreme court has allowed a wife
to recover her attorney’s fees in cases where the husband was granted the divorce. See Cook
v. Cook, 233 Ark. 961, 349 S.W.2d 809 (1961);Walls v. Walls, 232 Ark. 638, 339 S.W.2d 430
(1960); Laird v. Laird, 201 Ark. 483, 145 S.W.2d 27 (1940). We thus find no merit in
appellant’s argument.
Turning to the amount of the fees, we cannot say that the circuit court abused its
discretion in awarding appellee $60,000 toward her attorney’s fees and over $11,000 in costs
and expert witness fees. The circuit court must consider the relative financial positions of the
parties in making such an award. McKay v. McKay, 340 Ark. 171, 8 S.W.3d 525 (2000). The
circuit court made an express finding that appellant prolonged the proceedings by not
cooperating during discovery, and even destroying records. Moreover, while the circuit
court may not have granted appellee any relief by imposing a constructive trust on West and
her company, the court imputed substantial income to appellant based on testimony arising
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out of appellee’s efforts. Given the factors discussed above in regard to appellee’s claim for
alimony, the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in awarding appellee her fees.
Affirmed.
GLOVER and BROWN , JJ., agree.
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