George v. State
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NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION
ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS
DIVISION II
No. CACR08-1118
Opinion Delivered
April 22, 2009
APPEAL FROM THE MILLER
COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT
[NO. CR-99-31-1]
RICHARD DONNELL GEORGE
APPELLANT
V.
HONORABLE KIRK JOHNSON,
JUDGE
STATE OF ARKANSAS
APPELLEE
AFFIRMED
LARRY D. VAUGHT, Chief Judge
Richard George appeals the Miller County Circuit Court’s order revoking his
probation. On appeal, George argues that the trial court lacked jurisdiction and that there was
insufficient evidence to support the revocation. We affirm.
On August 30, 1999, George was sentenced to five years’ probation after pleading
guilty to theft by receiving. On January 7, 2004, the State filed a petition to revoke George’s
probation, alleging that he violated the conditions of his probation. Specifically, the State
alleged that George failed to report to his supervising officer and failed to pay court-ordered
financial obligations. A bench warrant for George’s arrest was also issued on January 7, 2004.
George was arrested on March 9, 2007. At the revocation hearing held on May 27,
2008, the State introduced the testimony of George’s probation officer, Jo Fredrickson. She
testified that George was advised of the conditions of his probation, which included his duty
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to report to his probation officer and his responsibility to pay costs, fines, and probation
supervision fees. She said that George violated all of those conditions. The last contact she had
with George was on August 28, 2003, and George had made no payments of costs, fines, or
fees since his probation began.
George acknowledged that when he was placed on probation in August 1999, his
conditions of probation required him to report to his probation officer and pay his fines.
George admitted that he last contacted his probation officer on August 28, 2003, and that he
had made no payments toward his court-ordered financial obligations.
According to George, he was unable to report and pay his fines for two reasons. The
first was because in May 2003 he was sentenced to two years’ imprisonment in Texas after
violating a sentence of probation based on a 1994 charge of the unauthorized use of a motor
vehicle. He claimed that his attorney who represented him for the 2003 Texas revocation told
George that the two-year Texas term of imprisonment would run concurrent with his
Arkansas probation. Therefore, according to George, when he was given an early release from
the Texas prison in November 2003, he thought that his Arkansas probation obligations were
satisfied.
George’s second reason for failing to comply with his probation conditions was because
in September 2005 he was arrested and jailed in Texas for twenty-one days and then placed
on ten years’ probation for failing to pay child support. George testified that since March
2007, he had been reporting to his Arkansas probation officer as required; however, he
conceded that he had not been fulfilling his financial obligations because he injured his
shoulder and could not work.
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The trial court granted the State’s petition to revoke, stating:
[T]he facts are very clear that the Defendant has done absolutely nothing toward
resolving the probation that he was granted back in 1999 . . . with little or no
payments. In fact, I’m not sure that there has been any payments toward the financial
obligations. . . . It’s been almost five years since he last reported, although he reported
the last few months after he was released from custody. . . . So the court does find that
Mr. George has violated the terms and conditions of his probation. He is hereby
sentenced to 20 years in the Arkansas Department of Corrections (sic).
George appeals the revocation, arguing first that the trial court lacked jurisdiction. He asserts
that his probationary period ended on August 30, 2004, and concedes that the arrest warrant
relating to the petition to revoke was timely issued on January 7, 2004, pursuant to Ark. Code
Ann. § 5-4-309(e)(2) (Repl. 2006).1 However, he claims that because he was not arrested
until March 7, 2007—three years after the warrant was issued and two years and seven months
after his probation term expired—the warrant was unreasonably delayed and invalid. He relies
upon Ark. Code Ann. § 5-1-109(f) (Repl. 2006), which provides that “a prosecution is
commenced when an arrest warrant or other process is sought to be executed without
unreasonable delay.”
The facts in this case are very similar to those in Richmond v. State, 326 Ark. 728, 934
S.W.2d 214 (1996). Richmond, in February 1989, was sentenced to five years’ probation after
pleading guilty to several crimes. The State filed a petition to revoke Richmond’s probation,
and in 1990 a bench warrant was issued for Richmond’s arrest. The warrant was not served
until July 1995, approximately seventeen months after Richmond’s probation period expired.
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Ark. Code Ann. § 5-4-309(e)(2) provides: “A court may revoke a suspension or
probation subsequent to the expiration of the period of suspension or probation if before
expiration of the period: . . . [a] warrant is issued for the defendant’s arrest for violation of
suspension or probation . . . .”
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After Richmond’s probation was revoked, he appealed, arguing that the trial court lacked
jurisdiction to revoke his probation after the expiration of his probation period because the
warrant was stale. Richmond relied upon Ark. Code Ann. §§ 5-4-309(e)(2) and 5-1-109(f)
for support.
There, our supreme court held that pursuant to Ark. Code Ann. § 5-4-309(e)(2),
because the warrant was issued within the five-year probation period, under the plain
language of the statute, the warrant was not stale and Richmond was properly served.
Richmond, supra. The supreme court then stated that in order to prove that the delay was
unreasonable, under Ark. Code Ann. § 5-1-109(f), Richmond had to present facts and
evidence of an unreasonable delay at trial and then abstract that evidence. Because Richmond
failed to abstract such evidence, the supreme court held that they could not make a
determination on that issue. Richmond, supra.
Here, George did not present any evidence or argument below that demonstrated that
there was an unreasonable delay in serving the warrant on him. If the supreme court in
Richmond could not reach this issue because Richmond failed to abstract evidence of
unreasonableness of the delay, our court cannot reach the issue because George failed to
present below any evidence or argument of the unreasonableness of the delay. Accordingly,
we cannot reach the merits of George’s jurisdictional argument.
George’s second argument on appeal is that there is insufficient evidence to support
the revocation. While George admits he failed to comply with the conditions of his probation,
he argues that he excusably failed to comply. He claims he did not report to his Arkansas
probation officer because his attorney told him that he had fulfilled his Arkansas probation
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conditions by serving time in a Texas prison in 2003. As for his failure to satisfy his financial
obligations, he argues that his failure to pay was not willful; rather, he could not pay because
he owed child support and he was injured and unable to work.
In a hearing to revoke a probation or suspended imposition of sentence, the State must
prove its case by a preponderance of the evidence. Haley v. State, 96 Ark. App. 256, 240
S.W.3d 615 (2006). To revoke probation or a suspension, the trial court must find by a
preponderance of the evidence that the defendant inexcusably violated a condition of that
probation or suspension. Ark. Code Ann. § 5-4-309 (Repl. 2006); Haley, supra. The State
bears the burden of proof, but need only prove that the defendant committed one violation
of the conditions. Id. When appealing a revocation, the appellant has the burden of showing
that the trial court’s findings are clearly against the preponderance of the evidence. Id.
Evidence that is insufficient for a criminal conviction may be sufficient for the revocation of
probation or suspended sentence. Id. Because the determination of a preponderance of the
evidence turns on questions of credibility and the weight to be given testimony, we defer to
the trial court’s superior position. Id.
We hold that the evidence is sufficient to support the trial court’s revocation of
probation. The facts are undisputed that George failed to report to his probation officer and
pay his court-ordered financial obligations. While George testified that he did not think he
had to report in Arkansas after he was released from prison in Texas, there were no
documents or witnesses to corroborate George’s testimony, and the trial court was not
required to believe him. See Scott v. State, 27 Ark. App. 1, 764 S.W.2d 625 (1989) (stating that
the trial court was not required to believe the appellant’s testimony especially in light of the
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fact that he was the one most interested in the outcome). Further, George made no effort to
contact his Arkansas probation officer to confirm his probation obligations after he was
released from the Texas prison.
As for George’s failure to satisfy his financial obligations, because he concedes he did
not make any payments, we must determine whether his failure to pay was willful. See
Robinson v. State, 29 Ark. App. 17, 775 S.W.2d 916 (1989) (holding that when considering
revocation for failure to pay restitution, the court must consider whether the failure was
willful or due to inability to pay). George claims he could not make the payments because he
has child-support obligations; however, he has not paid child support either as evidenced by
his 2005 Texas imprisonment and probation. Moreover, George testified that from November
2003 until March 2007 he worked in Texas, but yet he made no probation payments during
that period. While he claims that he was recently injured and cannot work, he offered no
explanation as to why he has not made any payments since 1999.
In sum, the evidence in this case sufficiently supports the trial court’s finding that “the
facts are very clear that [George] has done absolutely nothing toward resolving the probation
that he was granted back in 1999.”
Affirmed.
M ARSHALL and B AKER, JJ., agree.
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