Reed v. State
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NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION
ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS
DIVISION III
No. CACR08-946
RICHARD REED,
Opinion Delivered
APRIL 8, 2009
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM THE SALINE
COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT,
[NO. CR2007-650A-2]
V.
STATE OF ARKANSAS,
APPELLEE
HONORABLE GARY ARNOLD,
JUDGE
AFFIRMED
KAREN R. BAKER, Judge
Appellant Richard Reed was arrested and charged with manufacturing methamphetamine.
In accordance with Rule 24.3 of the Arkansas Rules of Criminal Procedure, appellant entered a
conditional plea of guilty to the charge. The trial court determined that a factual basis existed for
the plea and that the plea was voluntary. As a result, appellant was sentenced to twenty years’
imprisonment in the Arkansas Department of Correction to run concurrent with a sentence that
appellant was currently serving. On appeal, he contends that the trial court erred in denying his
motion to suppress. We affirm.
At the hearing on appellant’s motion to suppress, the State presented one witness, narcotics
officer Detective Lance Smith. Detective Smith testified that around 10 p.m. on July 20, 2007, he
received a tip about a possible methamphetamine lab at a trailer home near Boone Road across from
the Corner Market in Saline County. Detective Smith arrived at the location in an unmarked car.
He parked the car, exited the vehicle, and discreetly approached the trailer home. As he got closer,
he could smell what he described as a “defined chemical odor.” He explained that the odor was
consistent with the production of methamphetamine, specifically the “gassing off process” involving
the HCL generator. He had become accustomed to the distinct odor during his training as a narcotics
officer, which consisted in part of cooking methamphetamine in order to become accustomed to the
odor. When he identified the odor, he immediately called Sergeant Wood to inform him that a
methamphetamine lab was in process and to request that back-up officers be sent to the location.
While he waited for the back-up officers to arrive, Detective Smith looked through a window
located near the front door of the trailer home. The window was slightly open and the blinds were
somewhat raised “at an angle.” Through the window, he could see a light on, and he could see a
white male—later determined to be appellant—sitting at a table. He could also hear a female voice
as well as a third person walking toward the other end of the trailer home. While he was observing
the male sitting at the table, Detective Smith saw him raise a glass object to his mouth, put a lighter
underneath one end of it, and appear to inhale and exhale light smoke. Detective Smith also noticed
a counter top behind the table. On the counter top was a clear plastic bottle with a black lid sitting
on top of it. Smith described the bottle as having “a tube running off of it and there was gas coming
off of it.” The bottle had “crystal stuff” inside of it, which Smith knew to be consistent with an HCL
generator. Detective Smith also watched as a second white male entered the room holding a bottle
with “black tape around [the] side” of the bottle. The male appeared to be wrapping tape around the
top of the bottle and placing it in a plastic bag.
When the back-up officers arrived at the scene, Detective Smith motioned for them to come
over to where he was standing and observing through the window. As he motioned for the officers,
the occupants of the home noticed him standing outside. Detective Smith testified that one of the
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occupants yelled to the others, and they all began to scatter. Detective Smith testified that he was
concerned that when the occupants saw him and began to run that they would attempt to destroy
evidence. He and the other officers hurried to the front door. Detective Smith announced “Benton
Police Department,” opened the door, and went inside. The occupants were escorted outside and
handcuffed. Detective Smith testified that he had the individuals leave the trailer home because of
the seven to ten different types of harmful and deadly gases that methamphetamine labs produce
during almost every stage of production. He also testified that his goal was to get everyone out of
the trailer home and to a safe area. Once everyone was outside, Smith made a sweep of the house,
opening windows to let the gases clear out of the home. Smith and the other officers also removed
two bottles, one of which had gases emitting from it. Once the bottles were outside, they were
photographed and sealed off so that gases would no longer escape. Smith also removed an item from
a heating element, but did not unplug the heating element for fear that it would create a spark.
After the occupants were outside and the home was somewhat ventilated, Smith needed to
wait approximately thirty minutes before re-entering the home to allow the harmful gases to escape.
During this time, Smith spoke with appellant. Appellant was sitting outside the trailer home. Smith
informed appellant that he wanted consent to search the home and informed appellant of his rights.
Specifically, appellant was informed of his right to refuse or at any point stop the search of the home.
Appellant was given the consent form. Appellant appeared to understand the form, the form was
read to him, and he signed the form.
Detective Smith testified that appellant was “quite
cooperative.” Appellant was present during the entire search, and at one point, assisted the officers
by showing them two white plates with methamphetamine residue on them. At the conclusion of
the search, appellant was taken to the Saline County jail.
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After a hearing on appellant’s motion to suppress, the trial court found that “based upon
probable cause, the exigent circumstances, and the defendant’s consent, the arrest of the defendant
and the search of his residence were lawful.” Appellant’s motion to suppress evidence was denied.
This appeal followed.
An appellate court conducts a de novo review of a denial of a motion to suppress evidence
based on a totality of the circumstances, reviewing findings of historical facts for clear error and
determining whether those facts give rise to reasonable suspicion or probable cause, giving due
weight to inferences drawn by the trial court. Davis v. State, 351 Ark. 406, 94 S.W.3d 892 (2003);
Weatherford v. State, 93 Ark. App. 30, 216 S.W.3d 150 (2005).
On appeal, appellant contends that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress
evidence because the officers lacked both exigent circumstances and probable cause when they
entered appellant’s home without a warrant.
Warrantless searches in private homes are
presumptively unreasonable, and the burden is on the State to prove that the warrantless activity was
reasonable. Steinmetz v. State, 366 Ark. 222, 234 S.W.3d 302 (2006) (citing Baird v. State, 357 Ark.
508, 182 S.W.3d 136 (2004)). However, an officer may enter a home without a warrant if the State
establishes an exception to the warrant requirement. Baird, supra. An exception to the warrant
requirement occurs where, at the time of entry, there exists probable cause and exigent
circumstances. Steinmetz, supra (citing Mann v. State, 357 Ark. 159, 161 S.W.3d 826 (2004)).
Probable cause is determined by applying a totality-of-the-circumstances test and exists when the
facts and circumstances within the officers’ knowledge and of which they had reasonably trustworthy
information are sufficient in themselves to warrant a man of reasonable caution to believe that an
offense has been or is being committed. See Baird, supra. Exigent circumstances are those
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requiring immediate aid or action, and, while there is no definite list of what constitutes exigent
circumstances, several established examples include the risk of removal or destruction of evidence,
danger to the lives of police officers or others, and the hot pursuit of a suspect. See Mann, supra.
Under our case law, this court may only examine those exigent circumstances that existed at the time
of the entry. See id. In evaluating whether exigent circumstances exist, we are to consider the extent
to which the police had an opportunity to obtain a warrant, and whether it was foreseeable that the
chosen police tactics might precipitate the kind of circumstances contemplated by Rule 14.3.
Robbins v. State, 94 Ark. App. 393, 231 S.W.3d 79 (2006) (citing Mann, supra).
Arkansas Rule of Criminal Procedure 14.3 (2008) states that an officer who has reasonable
cause to believe that premises contain individuals in imminent danger of death or serious bodily
harm or things imminently likely to burn, explode, or otherwise cause death, serious bodily harm,
or substantial destruction of property or things subject to seizure which will cause or be used to cause
death or serious bodily harm if their seizure is delayed; may, without a search warrant, enter and
search such premises and vehicles, and the persons therein, to the extent reasonably necessary for
the prevention of such death, bodily harm, or destruction. (Emphasis added.)
The testimony at the hearing showed that Detective Smith, a trained narcotics officer,
recognized immediately upon approaching appellant’s trailer home a “defined chemical odor,”
indicative of the production of methamphetamine. He also observed what he believed to be
methamphetamine paraphernalia through a window, including what he knew to be consistent with
an HCL generator. He watched two individuals inside the home, who were actively engaged in the
methamphetamine cook and heard the voice of a third individual. Based upon his training and
experience, he concluded that the occupants of the home were at risk of serious bodily harm from
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the dangerous gases produced in the methamphetamine lab. These facts provided the necessary
exigent circumstances to justify entering the house without a warrant under Rule 14.3. See Loy v.
State, 88 Ark. App. 91, 195 S.W.3d 370 (2004). In Loy, this court explained:
We hold that the initial entry of Officers Spenser and Willis was justified under subsection
(a) of Rule 14.3 of the Arkansas Rules of Criminal Procedure. Based upon what the officers
saw and smelled when appellant opened the door, they believed that methamphetamine was
being manufactured, which, based upon their knowledge of meth labs, would pose a threat
of immediate serious bodily harm to anyone in the residence. The officers also had reason
to believe that there were other persons in the residence based upon the footsteps that they
heard when they first arrived and the fact that there was a female sitting at the table who said
that she thought there was a female in the back of the house. We hold that this was proper
in light of the circumstances.
Loy, 88 Ark. App. at 104, 195 S.W.3d at 376.
Similarly, in the instant case Detective Smith was trained and experienced in dealing with
methamphetamine labs, and he concluded that a methamphetamine lab was on the premises based
upon his experience and training concerning the “distinct” odor.
He recognized that the
methamphetamine lab produced harmful gases that posed a threat of immediate serious bodily harm
to the three occupants of the home. We find, as in Loy, that under these specific circumstances the
trial court did not err in finding that exigent circumstances existed to justify the warrantless entry
into appellant’s home.
In addition, appellant contends that his consent to search his home was not “altogether
voluntary.” An officer may conduct searches and make seizures without a search warrant or other
color of authority if consent is given to the search. Ark. R. Crim. P. 11.1(a); Welch v. State, 364 Ark.
324, 219 S.W.3d 156 (2005). A person may consent to a warrantless search; however, the State has
the burden of proving that the consent was freely and voluntarily given and that there was no actual
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or implied duress or coercion. Ark. R. Crim. P. 11.1(b); Welch, supra. The Supreme Court has held
that a valid consent to search must be voluntary, and that “[v]oluntariness is a question of fact to be
determined from all the circumstances.” Welch, 364 Ark. at 328–29, 219 S.W.3d at 158 (quoting
Ohio v. Robinette, 519 U.S. 33, 40 (1996)).
Appellant cites to Scott v. State, 347 Ark. 767, 780, 67 S.W.3d 567, 576 (2002), in support
of the argument that if the voluntariness of consent must be judged in light of the totality of the
circumstances, appellant’s consent did not appear altogether voluntary. Yet, appellant was informed
of his right to withhold his consent and stop the search of his home. Appellant appeared to
understand his rights and signed the consent to search form. He was cooperative and even assisted
the officers in conducting the search. We, therefore, hold that in light of all the circumstances in this
case, the trial court did not err in finding appellant’s consent to the search of his home was
unequivocal and voluntarily given.
Affirmed.
ROBBINS and KINARD , JJ., agree.
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