Medlock v. State
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS
NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION
JUDGE DAVID M. GLOVER
DIVISION IV
CACR08-1018
April 8, 2009
DARRYL KENT MEDLOCK
APPELLANT
V.
APPEAL FROM THE CRAWFORD
COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT,
[CR-2004-356]
HONORABLE GARY R. COTTRELL,
JUDGE
STATE OF ARKANSAS
APPELLEE
AFFIRMED
Appellant, Darryl Medlock, pleaded nolo contendere in April 2005 to the offenses
of theft of property and overdraft. He was sentenced to concurrent terms of ten years in
the Arkansas Department of Correction on each offense, with an additional ten years’
suspended imposition of sentence; was assessed no fines or court costs; and was ordered to
pay restitution in the amount of $1046.96 in $75 monthly installments beginning sixty
days after his release from prison.
The State filed a petition to revoke Medlock’s suspended imposition of sentence in
December 2006, alleging that he had failed to make restitution payments since June 1,
2006, leaving an unpaid balance of $971.96. Medlock posted a $200 cash bond on the
revocation warrant. The revocation hearing was scheduled for October 24, 2007, but
Medlock failed to appear because he was incarcerated at the time on other charges; he was
arrested on the failure-to-appear warrant when he was released from the Department of
Correction on March 2, 2008. Due to Medlock’s recent release from prison, the trial
court continued the revocation hearing until May 28, 2008, to give him an opportunity to
start making payments. After the revocation hearing, the trial court found that Medlock
had failed to make payments on his ordered restitution, revoked his suspended imposition
of sentence, and sentenced him to three years in prison. Medlock appeals, arguing that the
trial court erred in finding that his nonpayment of restitution was willful and in failing to
consider alternative measures other than imprisonment. We affirm.
A trial court may revoke a defendant’s suspended sentence at any time prior to the
expiration of the period of suspension if it finds by a preponderance of the evidence that
the defendant has inexcusably failed to comply with a condition of his suspended sentence.
Ark. Code Ann. § 5-4-309(d) (Repl. 2006). In a hearing to revoke, the burden is on the
State to prove a violation of a condition of the suspended sentence by a preponderance of
the evidence. Stultz v. State, 92 Ark. App. 204, 212 S.W.3d 42 (2005). On appellate
review, the trial court’s findings are upheld unless they are clearly against the
preponderance of the evidence. Id. The appellate courts defer to the trial court’s superior
position to determine credibility and the weight to be accorded testimony. Id.
At the hearing, Medlock testified that he began working for Cloye’s Gear on May
21, 2008, earning $8.25 per hour, and that he was living with his mother. He said that
prior to his release from jail, he had no income to pay restitution, and that his mother
-2-
supported him. He acknowledged that he was released from prison in October 2005 and
did not return to prison until October 15, 2007, but he stated that he had paid $200 in
restitution prior to October 2007. However, a payment sheet introduced into evidence
by the State indicated that he had only paid $125 in restitution. Medlock also admitted
that he had made no restitution payments from the continuance in March 2008 until the
revocation hearing.
In revoking Medlock’s suspended sentence, the trial court found that Medlock had
been released from prison in October 2005 and had until October 15, 2007, to make
payments on the restitution and had failed to do so; that he had been given since March
10, 2008, to the revocation hearing to make payments and had failed to make any
payments; that only $125 in restitution had been made, with the last payment having been
made in February 2007; and that while Medlock had to return to prison on other charges,
that was not the fault of the trial court. The trial court found that Medlock had the ability
to pay and had failed to do so.
Where the alleged violation is a failure to make court-ordered payments, it is the
State’s burden, by a preponderance of the evidence, to prove that the failure to pay was
inexcusable. Phillips v. State, 101 Ark. App. 190, 272 S.W.3d 123 (2008). Once the State
introduces evidence of nonpayment, a defendant then bears the burden of going forward
with some reasonable excuse for his failure to pay. Id. Failure on the part of a defendant
“to make bona fide efforts to seek employment or to borrow money to pay restitution
-3-
may justify imprisonment.” Gossett v. State, 87 Ark. App. 317, 319, 191 S.W.3d 548, 54950 (2004).
Here, Medlock testified that prior to his release from jail on March 8, 2008, he had
no income to pay restitution and that his mother supported him. However, he presented
no evidence as to why he had no income. He was a forty-eight year old man who lived
with his mother, had no dependents, and had secured a job only one week before his
revocation hearing. He presented no evidence of anything that would have prevented
him from working before that time.
He had two years between being released from
prison and returning to prison on another charge in which to make payments on his
restitution, yet he only made $125 sum total in restitution. Nevertheless, he was able to
post $200 cash bond when he was arrested on the revocation petition. He was given
another opportunity to make restitution when the trial court continued the revocation
hearing from March 2008 until May 2008, yet he still made no restitution payments. The
trial judge had the best opportunity to assess Medlock’s demeanor and credibility, as he
was able to observe Medlock at the hearing, see Peppers v. State, 3 Ark. App. 166, 623
S.W.2d 544 (1981). We hold that the trial court’s finding of willful nonpayment was not
against the preponderance of the evidence.
Medlock also argues in passing that it was clearly against the preponderance of the
evidence for the trial court to not consider alternative punitive measures other than
imprisonment. However, when a trial court finds that nonpayment is willful, as the trial
court did in this case, it does not have to explore alternatives to imprisonment and may
-4-
revoke the suspended sentence and impose a term of imprisonment. Bowen v. State, 12
Ark. App. 147, 671 S.W.2d 763 (1984).
Affirmed.
G RUBER and M ARSHALL, JJ., agree.
-5-
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.
