Baldwin v. Eberle
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ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS
DIVISION II
CA08-963
No.
PHILLIP M. BALDWIN
Opinion Delivered
April 1, 2009
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM THE PULASKI
COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT,
[NO. 80-4871]
V.
EUGENE EBERLE, III
APPELLEE
HONORABLE JOHN W. LANGSTON,
JUDGE
AFFIRMED
JOSEPHINE LINKER HART, Judge
Phillip M. Baldwin appeals from an order of revivor of judgment entered by the Pulaski
County Circuit Court. He argues that the trial court’s ruling was based on a misinterpretation
of the Arkansas revivor statute. We affirm.
The facts are not in dispute. On May 19, 1982, Eugene Eberle, III, a realtor doing
business as Eberle Realty, obtained a $10,313.04 judgment against Baldwin in an action for
breach of an exclusive listing contract. Eberle failed to collect the debt and in November 1987
filed a motion to revive the judgment. Eberle subsequently received an Order of Revivor of
Judgment that was entered on December 28, 1987. Again, the judgment was not satisfied, and
in March 1998, Eberle filed a motion for revivor. Baldwin failed to attend the April 20, 1998
hearing and the trial court granted the motion.
The judgment still remained unsatisfied. In April 2008, Eberle filed his third motion
for revivor. Baldwin appeared pro se at the April 18, 2008 hearing. There he argued that the
1998 revival of the judgment was invalid because Eberle failed to revive the judgment within
ten years as required by Arkansas Code Annotated section 16-65-501 (Repl. 2005). The trial
court found that Baldwin had failed to raise his objection to the 1998 revival in a timely
manner and was therefore barred by the doctrine of res judicata from raising it in the current
proceeding. It granted a new Order of Revivor.
On appeal Baldwin argues that the trial court erred in ordering the 2008 revival because
it failed to consider the “complete text” of the relevant statutes. He asserts that the plain text
of Arkansas Code Annotated section 16-65-501 clearly states, “[n]o scire facias to revive a
judgment shall be issued except within ten (10) years from the date of the rendition of the
judgment, or if the judgment shall have been previously revived, then within (10) years from
the order of revivor,” and it is undisputed that ten years had expired prior to the 1998 revivor
action. Further, he argues that the statute of limitations for actions on judgments, Arkansas
Code Annotated section 16-56-114 (Repl. 2005), which states, “Actions on all judgments and
decrees shall be commenced within ten (10) years after cause of action shall accrue, and not
afterward,” forecloses any collection effort after the judgment “expired” on December 22,
1987. We disagree.
On appellate review, we do not defer to a trial court’s conclusions of law. See Hartford
Fire Ins. Co. v. Sauer, 358 Ark. 89, 186 S.W.3d 229 (2004). Nonetheless, we find no error.
We believe this case is controlled by Lewis v. Bank of Kensett, 220 Ark. 273, 247 S.W.2d 354
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CA08-963
(1952). The broad holding of Lewis was that the revivor statute 1 upon which Baldwin now
relies only set forth the statute of limitations for reviving judgments. There our supreme court
stated that “a revivorship judgment is as effective and conclusive as an adjudication as other
judgments and a defendant is bound to plead all matters of defense that he has just as he would
in an ordinary suit.” 220 Ark. at 276, 247 S.W.2d at 355. It is not disputed that the 1998
revivor order was entered without objection by Baldwin or without a timely attempt to set that
order aside. At the 1998 proceeding, Baldwin had available the statute of limitations defense,
but he did not assert it. That opportunity has been lost. See Ark. R. Civ. P. 8 (c) (requiring
that affirmative defenses be pled); Smallwood v. Ellis Gin Co., 10 Ark. App. 41, 661 S.W.2d
410 (1983). Accordingly, the trial court did not err when it found that raising the statute of
limitations as a defense was barred by the doctrine of res judicata. General Am. Life Ins. Co.
v. Cox, 215 Ark. 860, 223 S.W.2d 775 (1949).
We acknowledge that Baldwin has cited two cases in support of his contention that the
plain language of section 16-65-501 “does in fact indicate that a person may not sue out a scire
facias to revive a judgment unless done prior to the expiration of ten (10) years from the date
of judgment.” However, we find these two cases, Malone v. Malone, 338 Ark. 20, 991 S.W.2d
546 (1999), and Agribank, FCB v. Holland, 71 Ark. App. 159, 27 S.W.3d 462 (2000), do not
compel a different result. Notwithstanding some loose language, neither Malone nor Holland
addresses the res judicata effect of a prior order of revivor as the supreme court did in Lewis
1
Although the Lewis court was interpreting Arkansas Statutes Annotated section 29-601,
the language is virtually identical to current Arkansas Code Annotated section 16-65-501.
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v. Bank of Kensett, supra, and, more importantly, neither case purports to overrule Lewis.
In Malone, the debtor tried to assert the statute of limitations defense in 1996 to bar the
revivor of a 1985 judgment for unpaid child support—the same defense that we noted that
Baldwin failed to avail himself of in 1998. The supreme court intimated that the defense
would have succeeded in Malone had not the legislature enacted Arkansas Code Annotated
section 9-14-235 (Repl. 1991). Obviously, we decide a much different issue in the instant
case.
Likewise, Holland concerned a judgment creditor who failed to revive a judgment
within the ten-year statute of limitations as required by Arkansas Code Annotated section 1665-501. However, the Holland court held that it was of no moment because it did not preclude
the appellant from pursuing an action on the judgment, the appellant’s chosen course of action
that had been foreclosed by the trial court when it erroneously concluded that it lacked
jurisdiction. Accordingly, the issue decided in Holland does not relate to our holding in the
instant case.
Affirmed.
V AUGHT, C.J., and B ROWN, J., agree.
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CA08-963
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