Munn v. State
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NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION
ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS
DIVISION III
No. CACR 08-1024
NICHOLAS ANDRE MUNN
APPELLANT
Opinion Delivered MARCH 18, 2009
V.
APPEAL FROM THE CRITTENDEN
COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT,
[NO. CR 2001-926 & CR 2008-95]
STATE OF ARKANSAS
HONORABLE DAVID BURNETT,
JUDGE
APPELLEE
AFFIRMED AS MODIFIED
WAYMOND M. BROWN, Judge
On April 1, 2008, Nicholas Andre Munn pleaded guilty to violating the terms and
conditions of a previous suspended sentence and was sentenced to ten years’ imprisonment.
That same day, he also pleaded guilty to separate charges and received ten years’ suspended
imposition of sentence. The judgment and commitment order reflected that the term of
imprisonment and the suspended imposition of sentence were to be served consecutively.
Munn filed a motion to correct the judgment and commitment order to reflect concurrent
sentences, but the trial court denied the motion. Munn appeals to this court, arguing that the
trial court should have granted his motion. The State concedes error and urges this court to
reverse. We agree. Accordingly, we modify the judgment and commitment order to reflect
concurrent sentences.
On June 11, 2003, Munn pleaded guilty to the charge of battery in the first degree
in case CR-2001-926, for which he was sentenced to five years’ imprisonment followed by
five years’ suspended imposition of sentence. Munn was paroled on December 2, 2004, and
his suspended imposition of sentence began on that date. The State petitioned the court to
revoke the suspended imposition of sentence on January 29, 2008, alleging among other
things that he committed the new crimes of battery in the first degree and terroristic act. The
new crimes were part of case CR-2008-95. Munn negotiated guilty pleas for both the
revocation and the new charges. In case CR-2001-926, Munn received ten years’
imprisonment. In case CR-2008-95, he received ten years’ suspended imposition of
sentence. The judgment and commitment order in CR-2008-95 reflected that the sentences
in the two cases would be served consecutively. Munn filed a motion to correct the
judgment and commitment order, alleging that consecutive sentences were contrary to the
law and asking that the sentences be run concurrently. The court denied the motion after
hearing arguments from counsel. Munn filed a timely appeal to this court.
As he did below, Munn argues that his suspended imposition of sentence should be
served concurrently with his term in the Arkansas Department of Correction. Sentencing is
entirely a matter of statute in Arkansas. E.g., State v. Hardiman, 353 Ark. 125, 114 S.W.3d
164 (2003); Ward v. State, 97 Ark. App. 294, 248 S.W.3d 489 (2007). Questions regarding
the interpretation of a sentencing statute are reviewed de novo by this court. Ward, supra. In
this case, the relevant statute is Ark. Code Ann. § 5-4-307 (Repl. 2008):
(a) Except as provided in subsection (c) of this section, a period of suspension or
probation commences to run on the day it is imposed.
(b)(1) Whether imposed at the same or a different time, multiple periods of suspension
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CACR 08-1024
or probation run concurrently.
(2) The period of a suspension or probation also runs concurrently with any federal
or state term of imprisonment or parole to which a defendant is or becomes subject
to during the period of the suspension or probation.
(c) If a court sentences a defendant to a term of imprisonment and suspends
imposition of sentence as to an additional term of imprisonment, the period of the
suspension commences to run on the day the defendant is lawfully set at liberty from
the imprisonment.
Subsection (c) only applies when a term of imprisonment is accompanied by the
suspended imposition of another term. See Richardson v. State, 85 Ark. App. 347, 157 S.W.3d
536 (2004). The instant case does not fall under subsection (c), as Munn’s sentences, though
entered on the same day, did not accompany each other. Therefore, subsections (a) and (b)
apply, and the suspended imposition of sentence in CR-2008-95 should have begun on the
day imposed, not the day that he completes his term of imprisonment in CR-2001-926.
Where the law does not authorize the particular sentence pronounced by the trial
court, the sentence is unauthorized and illegal, and we can either reverse and remand or
correct the sentence without reversing and remanding. See State v. Fountain, 350 Ark. 437,
88 S.W.3d 411 (2002). In this case, the circuit court was not authorized to run the suspended
imposition of sentence consecutive to his term of imprisonment. Therefore, we modify the
judgment and commitment order in CR-2008-95 to reflect concurrent sentences and affirm
the sentence as modified.
Affirmed as modified.
VAUGHT, C.J., and HART, J., agree.
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CACR 08-1024
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