City of Jonesboro v. Morgan
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
Not designated for publication.
ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS
DIVISION I
No. CA08-920
Opinion Delivered M ARCH 4, 2009
CITY OF JONESBORO, MUNICIPAL
LEAGUE WC TRUST, CARRIER
APPELLANTS
V.
APPEAL FROM THE ARKANSAS
WORKERS’ COMPENSATION
COMMISSION
[NO. F509574]
TAMMY MORGAN
APPELLEES
AFFIRMED
ROBERT J. GLADWIN, Judge
This appeal follows the June 17, 2008 decision of the Workers’ Compensation
Commission (Commission) affirming and adopting the January 11, 2008 opinion of the
Administrative Law Judge (ALJ), that found that appellee Tammy Morgan was entitled to a
wage-loss-disability award of fifty-five percent over and above the twelve-percent anatomical
impairment. On appeal, appellants City of Jonesboro (Employer) and Municipal League W
C Trust (Carrier) argue that the Commission erred in awarding appellee permanent-disability
benefits because Employer had offered her suitable re-employment within her physical
limitations. We affirm.
Facts
Appellee, whose date of birth is March 21, 1963, is a high school graduate. She also
attended community college in West Virginia, taking courses in the criminal-justice and
surgical-tech programs, although she did not complete a degree in either program. Appellee’s
early employment history includes working as a claims adjuster, a bartender, and in a
family-owned restaurant. At the time of these previous employments, appellee did not have
any physical limitation or restrictions.
Upon returning to Arkansas in 2000, following her divorce, appellee secured a parttime position as a police officer for the city of Hughes, Arkansas. Appellee was in that
position when she was hired by Employer. Appellee commenced her employment with
Employer as a police officer on February 1, 2002. On December 29, 2003, she sustained the
compensable injury that is the subject of the present claim. The injury occurred when she
was chasing an individual in response to a call. As she attempted to pull a female suspect off
of a fence, she crawled up onto the fence, grabbed the suspect, and fell backward. After
securing the suspect, appellee explained to her sergeant that she had injured her back. Her
sergeant had appellee complete her incident report and then go home.
When she reached her residence, she realized she had landed very hard upon falling,
at which time she reported to her superiors that she was going to have her back examined.
Appellee presented to the emergency room at St. Bernards Regional Medical Center on the
day of the fall. At that time, she was given a shot for pain and sent home with instructions
to return the following day for x-rays, because another accident had required the full attention
of the staff that evening. She returned the next day, and a CAT scan indicated that she had
pulled some muscles in her back.
-2-
CA08-920
Appellee subsequently came under the care of Dr. William C. Kent, appellants’
designated medical provider and primary care physician. Dr. Kent later referred appellee to
Dr. Scott Schlesinger, a Little Rock neurosurgeon, who conducted a neurological
consultation on September 14, 2005. Appellee was seen in follow-up by Dr. Schlesinger on
January 13, 2006, and pursuant to his diagnosis and recommended treatment plan, she
underwent a lumbar right L5-S1 transforaminal decompression and TLIF fusion for
spondylolithesis and neuro foramen disc herniation at L5-S1 on January 31, 2006.
Appellee was seen in follow-up by Dr. Schlesinger following her surgery, and between
April 14, 2006, and June 7, 2006, appellee underwent three epidural steroid injections. Dr.
Schlesinger referred appellee to a rheumatologist for ongoing problems. On November 10,
2006, appellee underwent a Functional Capacity Evaluation (FCE) pursuant to a referral from
Dr. Schlesinger. The November 14, 2006 report relative to the afore evaluation reflects, in
pertinent part:
Overall, Ms. Morgan demonstrated the ability to perform work in the LIGHT work
classification according to the US Department of Labor guidelines. She did exhibit
several characteristics of Medium level work due to her decreased general mobility and
decreased standing/walking abilities, she is best suited for Light work as defined below.
Appellee was again seen by Dr. Schlesinger on November 15, 2006. After noting the
results of the FCE and her continuing back and leg pain, he opined that appellee had reached
maximum-medical improvement , and gave her a permanent-partial-disability rating of twelve
percent, in accordance with the American Medical Association Guides to the Evaluation of
Permanent Impairment, 4th Edition.
-3-
CA08-920
Appellee continues to take Celebrex, Ultram, Tylenol and Nexium, and also uses
Lidocaine patches in connection with the December 29, 2003 injury. Appellee also takes
Crestor for her cholesterol. Appellee takes other medicines for non-injury-related complaints
including Singulair (for sinuses) and Celexa (after previously taking Lexapro). Because of the
side effects of her medication, appellee does not drive while taking her medication. Appellee
resides in Rector and does not drive beyond Paragould even when not taking her medicine.
Prior to the December 29, 2003 compensable injury, appellee was very active in sports,
constantly played with the children, climbed mountains in North Carolina, ran approximately
a mile and a half every day, and tended to the yard and flower beds. Now, her husband
frequently has to help her get out of the car. She is unable to pick up her grandchildren, and
she has difficulty bending over to do laundry or dishwashing. She is no longer able to work
outside in the yard or in her flower garden, and activities such as shopping are limited or
modified due to appellee’s physical capability, including using a shopping cart as a walker or
a motorized cart.
Regarding appellee’s current condition, some days she experiences a very sharp
constant pain on the right side of her spine. Even when not experiencing the sharp pain,
appellant feels a dull throb but is able to function when she gets her pain down to that level.
Appellee also experiences pain in her right leg, in the form of a shooting pain down the back
of her thigh to her knee and numbness in her right ankle, which she attributes to the
December 29, 2003 injury. Appellee estimates that she has fallen at least ten times since the
-4-
CA08-920
December 29, 2003 accident as a result of numbness in her entire right leg. She occasionally
uses a walker that was provided to her following her back surgery.
In a typical thirty-day period, appellee experiences at least five bad days when she is
unable to get out of bed or can only make it to her recliner with the help of her husband and
stepson. Her good days, where the pain is just a dull throb, are approximately ten to twelve
days a month. On those days she is able to get out of bed, take her medicine, and may have
a couple of hours when she is still not in deep pain. However, her condition is unpredictable,
and normal activities can cause the severe pain to return. Appellee is unable to predict when
she will experience a bad day, and she has concerns about being a dependable employee if
employment was secured. Additionally, physical tasks such as bending, lifting, stooping,
pushing, pulling, being on her feet, pursuing suspects and the ability to get in and out of a
vehicle rapidly were all required to perform her job as a police officer, but they are
unmanageable in her current condition.
In February 2007, appellee discussed potential alternative employment with Ms.
Suzanne Hackney, former Director of Human Resources for Employer; however, appellee
maintains that she was merely informed of the jobs that Employer had available, rather than
actually being offered a position. Ms. Hackney acknowledged that she did not pre-screen
based on appellee’s qualifications or medical restrictions. Multiple positions were discussed
during the meeting, but only two were within the range of appellee’s physical restrictions.
Both positions included education or experience that appellee lacks.
Regarding an
advertising-marketing-tech position appellee discussed with Ms. Hackney, it is undisputed that
-5-
CA08-920
appellee did not have the minimum qualification of two years experience in a related field of
advertising, and she has very limited computer experience from her previous work as an
insurance claims adjuster.
An additional constraint is that her residence in Rector is
approximately thirty-five miles from Jonesboro. Ms. Hackney also informed appellee of a
grant-assistant position, but it was merely a temporary job of six weeks’ duration, with no
benefits. Appellee lacks knowledge of federal regulations pertaining to grants, is not proficient
in the use of Microsoft Office, and has not obtained a bachelor’s degree, all stated
requirements of the job.
Ms. Hackney testified in the hearing before the ALJ that, based upon her dealings with
appellee, she has found appellee to be honest and straightforward. Further, based on her
observation of appellee both within and outside the confines of the courtroom, Ms. Hackney
noted that appellee “appears to have difficulty getting up and down” and noticed that she
would “grimace when she starts to get up.” Ms. Hackney acknowledged that appellee was
not qualified for the advertising-tech position, as reflected in the written job description, but
explained that there are numerous times that Employer has to take less than what it has
wanted and train the people hired. Ms. Hackney stated that the job description did reflect the
minimum qualification for the job, but she insisted that accommodations would have been
made on behalf of appellee to place her in the advertising-tech position. Ms. Hackney
testified that she had informed Mr. Joel Gardner, the coordinator who was in charge of the
advertising-tech position, that the job would be discussed with appellee. Ms. Hackney
-6-
CA08-920
conceded, however, that the advertising-tech position was one requiring daily attendance at
work.
Ms. Hackney confirmed that she told appellee “that all those jobs were available to
her,” but admitted that she did not commit the offer of the jobs to appellee in a written letter,
merely offering them verbally. After appellee declined the “offers,” Ms. Hackney said she
handed appellee a sheet of paper that said appellee had been offered these jobs, and appellee
signed that she declined them. That signed document, however, is not a part of the evidence
in the hearing record. Ms. Hackney acknowledged that she was aware that appellee was
represented by an attorney at the time of the February 2007 meeting, but that she did not
convey to appellee’s attorney the offer of any job by Employer to appellee prior to the
February 2007 meeting.
Appellee is currently pursuing her associate of arts degree. She plans to enter the
business administration segment of the nursing field. Regarding her capability to perform
such a job once she obtains a degree, her goal is to secure a position where the employer calls
people on an as-needed basis. She hopes to be able to work on her “good days,” maybe one
or two days a week.
On January 11, 2008, the ALJ filed his opinion, finding that appellee was entitled to
a wage-loss-disability award of fifty-five percent over and above the twelve-percent
anatomical impairment. The ALJ determined that the evidence indicated that, although
Employer provided appellee with a total list of job openings within the City of Jonesboro, it
did not extend a job offer to appellee. Of the total jobs identified by Ms. Hackney, only two
-7-
CA08-920
were within appellee’s physical restrictions/limitations. However, the ALJ found that both
positions, on their faces, required education and experience that appellee did not possess.
Further, of the two positions, one was a temporary position with no benefits. At the time of
her injury, appellee’s annual salary was approximately $28,964.00.
The ALJ further determined that the evidence supports a finding that, while appellee
is unable to earn meaningful wages as a police officer as a result of the December 29, 2003
compensable injury and permanent physical restrictions and limitations in connection
therewith, she has not been foreclosed from earning meaningful wages in other employments.
He found that appellee failed to sustain her burden of proof by a preponderance of the
evidence that she has been rendered permanently and totally disabled as a result of the
December 29, 2003 compensable injury.
Appellants appealed the decision of the ALJ to the Commission. On June 17, 2008,
the Commission filed its opinion affirming and adopting the decision of the ALJ. Appellants
filed a timely notice of appeal on June 30, 2008.
Standard of Review
Typically, on appeal to this court, we review only the decision of the Commission, not
that of the ALJ. Daniels v. Affiliated Foods S.W., 70 Ark. App. 319, 17 S.W.3d 817 (2000).
In this case, the Commission affirmed and adopted the ALJ’s opinion as its own, which it is
permitted to do under Arkansas law. See Death & Permanent Total Disability Trust Fund v.
Branum, 82 Ark. App. 338, 107 S.W.3d 876 (2003). Moreover, in so doing, the Commission
makes the ALJ’s findings and conclusions the findings and conclusions of the Commission.
-8-
CA08-920
See Branum, supra. Therefore, for purposes of our review, we consider both the ALJ’s order
and the Commission’s majority order.
In appeals involving claims for workers’ compensation, this court views the evidence
and all reasonable inferences deducible therefrom in the light most favorable to the
Commission’s decision and affirms the decision if it is supported by substantial evidence. See
Kimbell v. Ass’n of Rehab Indus. & Bus. Companion Prop. & Cas., 366 Ark. 297, 235 S.W.3d
499 (2006). Substantial evidence is evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as adequate
to support a conclusion. Id. The issue is not whether the appellate court might have reached
a different result from the Commission; if reasonable minds could reach the result found by
the Commission, the appellate court must affirm the decision. Id. We will not reverse the
Commission’s decision unless we are convinced that fair-minded persons with the same facts
before them could not have reached the conclusions arrived at by the Commission. Dorris v.
Townsends of Ark., Inc., 93 Ark. App. 208, 218 S.W.3d 351 (2005).
Questions concerning the credibility of witnesses and the weight to be given to their
testimony are within the exclusive province of the Commission. Patterson v. Ark. Dep’t of
Health, 343 Ark. 255, 33 S.W.3d 151 (2000). When there are contradictions in the evidence,
it is within the Commission’s province to reconcile conflicting evidence and to determine the
true facts. Id. The Commission is not required to believe the testimony of appellee or any
other witness, but may accept and translate into findings of fact only those portions of the
testimony that it deems worthy of belief. Id. Thus, we are foreclosed from determining the
credibility and weight to be accorded to each witness’s testimony. Arbaugh v. AG Processing,
-9-
CA08-920
Inc., 360 Ark. 491, 202 S.W.3d 519 (2005). As our law currently stands, the Commission
hears workers’ compensation claims de novo on the basis before the ALJ pursuant to Arkansas
Code Annotated section 11-9-704(c)(2), and this court has stated that we defer to the
Commission’s authority to disregard the testimony of any witness, even an appellee, as not
credible. See Bray v. Int’l Wire Group, 95 Ark. App. 206, 235 S.W.3d 548 (2006).
Discussion
The wage-loss factor is the extent to which a compensable injury has affected the
claimant’s ability to earn a livelihood. Henson v. General Elec., 99 Ark. App. 129, 257 S.W.3d
908 (2007). The Commission is charged with the duty of determining disability based upon
a consideration of medical evidence and other matters affecting wage loss, such as the
claimant’s age, education, and work experience. Id. Objective and measurable physical or
mental findings, which are necessary to support a determination of “physical impairment” or
anatomical disability, are not necessary to support a determination of wage-loss disability. Id.
To be entitled to any wage-loss-disability benefit in excess of permanent-physical impairment,
a claimant must first prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that he or she sustained
permanent-physical impairment as a result of a compensable injury. Id. Other matters to be
considered are motivation, post-injury income, credibility, demeanor, and a multitude of
other factors. Id. The Commission may use its own superior knowledge of industrial
demands, limitations, and requirements in conjunction with the evidence to determine
wage-loss disability. Id. A claimant’s lack of interest in pursuing employment with her
-10-
CA08-920
employer and negative attitude in looking for work are impediments to our full assessment
of wage loss. Logan County v. McDonald, 90 Ark. App. 409, 206 S.W.3d 258 (2005).
Appellants assert that they located available and suitable work for appellee, but she
rejected their attempts to accommodate her physical limitations.
Moreover, Employer
maintains that it was prepared to work with appellee to educate, train, and accommodate her.
Appellants contend that this case appears to be the “mirror image” of Torrey v. City of Fort
Smith, 55 Ark. App. 226, 934 S.W.2d 237 (1996), in which this court held that,
[A]t a minimum Ark. Code Ann. § 11-9-505(a) requires that when an employee who
has suffered a compensable injury attempts to re-enter the work force, the employer
must attempt to facilitate the re-entry into the work force by offering additional
training to the employee, if needed, and reclassification of positions, if necessary.
Torrey, 55 Ark. App. at 231, 934 S.W.2d at 241. Here, Employer asserts that it sought to
facilitate re-entry, but appellee denied them the opportunity to explore even the possibility
of her succeeding in the advertising position.
In addition to Employer’s efforts to return appellee to employment, appellants point
out that appellee has (1) supervisory experience from running a family restaurant; (2) worked
as a claims adjuster for Blue Cross and Blue Shield, as well as their competitors, for several
years; and (3) some limited computer experience related to her employment with Blue Cross
and Blue Shield. Notwithstanding appellee’s various abilities that transcend her limitations,
appellants point out that she now contends that she is unable to drive due to her medications.
Despite that, she is able to attend classes, pick up her stepson who lives a “significant” distance
away, and manages to go on other various personal outings. They argue that there are no
medical records that support her contention that her medications make her unfit to drive.
-11-
CA08-920
Appellants cite Arkansas Code Annotated section 11-9-522(b)(2), which states in
pertinent part that
so long as an employee, subsequent to his or her injury, has returned to work, has
obtained other employment, or has a bona fide and reasonably obtainable offer to be
employed at wages equal to or greater than his or her average weekly wage at the time
of the accident, he or she shall not be entitled to permanent partial disability benefits
in excess of the percentage of permanent physical impairment established by a
preponderance of the medical testimony and evidence.
Here, appellants maintain that appellee was offered an advertising- tech position that was in
the same general hourly pay rate as her previous position with the police department.
However, despite multiple reassurances from Ms. Hackney that the supervisor of the position
would work with her and train her to do necessary functions of the positions, appellee refused
to even attempt to work in the position. Appellants reiterate that a claimant’s lack of interest
in pursuing employment with her employer and negative attitude in looking for work are
impediments to our full assessment of wage loss. Logan County v. McDonald, supra. Appellants
claim that there is no medical evidence to support her contention that she is experiencing pain
so great as to prevent her from being able to work in an almost completely sedentary
job—which the advertising tech position would have been—especially given her own
testimony detailing physical activities that are just as, if not more, stressful than what she
would be required to do in that position.
Arkansas Code Annotated section 11-9-526 states that if any injured employee refuses
employment suitable to her capacity offered to or procured for her, she shall not be entitled
to any compensation during the continuance of the refusal, unless in the opinion of the
Commission, the refusal is justifiable. Appellants assert that, based on the medical evidence
-12-
CA08-920
presented, and the description given of the advertising tech position offered to the claimant,
there is no reasonable justification for appellee to have turned down the employment offered
to her. If she can travel approximately thirty miles, each way, to pick up her grandson, attend
classes pursuing a college degree, and stand outside to hold fence posts and assist her husband
with other manual labor around their home, appellants assert that there is no reason that she
will not even attempt to work in a position that would require her to sit at a desk for the
majority of the day, with only occasional driving.
In addition to considering a claimant’s lack of motivation to return to work, the
Commission is charged with the duty of determining disability based upon consideration of
the medical evidence and other matters affecting wage loss, such as the claimant’s age,
education, and work experience. See Logan County v. McDonald, supra. Appellants reiterate
that, although appellee is disabled to some extent, she is not so disabled as to be unable to
function in a mostly sedentary job such as the advertising tech position. They reiterate that
she is not uneducated and is currently pursuing an associate’s degree with plans to
subsequently seek a bachelor’s degree. Appellee’s position as a police officer afforded her skills
that are readily transferable to a variety of positions, and she possesses other work experience
that would easily transfer to other responsibilities, especially in a situation like the advertisingtech position where she had assurances that Employer would have provided her with any
additional training and accommodations needed.
In summary, appellants acknowledge that appellee has some difficulties that others may
not have, but her education, work experience, and related skills would, at the very least, make
-13-
CA08-920
it possible for her to be trained for either of the positions that were offered by Employer. As
such, they argue that the award of fifty-five percent wage-loss disability was inappropriate and
should be reversed, or at least reassessed to more accurately reflect her residual disability.
Appellee correctly points out that appellants’ reliance on Arkansas Code Annotated
section 11-9-505 and Torrey, supra, is entirely misplaced because she never sought up to one
year in salary reimbursement. Although appellants contend that they made a bona fide and
reasonably obtainable offer of return to work at wages equal to or greater than her average
weekly wage at the time of the accident to appellee, no evidence was offered regarding the
salary for the alleged job offer—despite the specific requirement in section 11-9-522(b)(2) that
the wages for the new position be equal to or greater than appellee’s average weekly wage at
the time of the accident. She refers to the additional requirements of the advertising-tech
position of being at work daily, as well as driving and getting in and out of a vehicle to call
on customers, and maintains that it should have been obvious to Ms. Hackney from her own
observations of appellee’s physical difficulties in getting around that appellee would not have
been able to perform the principle requirements of the job. Ms. Hackney specifically testified
that she thought appellee had been honest and straightforward, and acknowledged both her
difficulty in getting around and the appearance of her being in pain.
Although the ALJ, and later the Commission, rejected her claim of permanent-total
disability, they did examine all of the wage-loss factors and determined her wage-loss disability
to be fifty-five percent based upon her current physical restrictions, coupled with the
frequency with which she experiences days where her activity level is almost non-existent
-14-
CA08-920
without considerable assistance from her husband. They found that in her present physical
state she could not be a consistently reliable and dependable employee in terms of reporting
to work on a daily basis. It was within their purview to make such determinations based upon
the evidence before them.
Pursuant to Arkansas Code Annotated section 11-9-522(b)(1), the Commission has the
authority to increase a claimant’s disability rating when a claimant has been assigned an
anatomical-impairment rating to the body as a whole. See Lee v. Alcoa Extrusion, Inc., 89 Ark.
App. 228, 201 S.W.3d 449 (2005). Based upon the factors set forth in the ALJ’s opinion, later
affirmed and adopted by the Commission, we hold that the Commission’s decision is
supported by substantial evidence; accordingly, we affirm.
Affirmed.
V AUGHT, C.J., and K INARD, J., agree.
-15-
CA08-920
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.