Titsworth v. State
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Cite as 2009 Ark. App. 106 (unpublished)
ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS
DIVISION IV
No. CACR08-817
JASON WYATT TITSWORTH
APPELLANT
Opinion Delivered FEBRUARY 18, 2009
V.
APPEAL FROM THE POLK COUNTY
CIRCUIT COURT,
[NO. CR-2006-198]
STATE OF ARKANSAS
HONORABLE J.W. LOONEY, JUDGE
APPELLEE
AFFIRMED
KAREN R. BAKER, Judge
Appellant, Jason Wyatt Titsworth, was convicted of two counts of theft of property,
both Class B felonies, by a jury in Polk County Circuit Court. Appellant was sentenced to
ten years’ imprisonment on each count to be served concurrently and was ordered to pay
restitution in the amount of $43,860.50 to Martin Marietta and $29,873.20 to GCR Tire
Center. Appellant raises three points for our review. First, appellant asserts that the trial
court erred in not granting his motion for a continuance. Second, appellant asserts that the
trial court erred in not suppressing his statement. Third, appellant asserts that the trial court
erred in not granting a motion for directed verdict on the two charges of theft where there
was insufficient evidence that the appellant knowingly took or exercised unauthorized control
over, or made an unauthorized transfer of an interest in, certain items of property valued at
Cite as 2009 Ark. App. 106 (unpublished)
$2,500 or more owned by Martin Marietta or GCR Tire Center. Finding no error, we affirm
appellant’s conviction.
Danny Gant testified that he was manager of GCR Tire Center, a commercial tire
dealer in Longview, Texas. GCR sells tires to companies operating mines and rock quarries.
One of his customers was the Martin Marietta Hatton Quarry in Polk County, Arkansas.
Gant stated that GCR had a consignment-type agreement with the Hatton Quarry: the Hatton
Quarry kept GCR’s tires and as the tires were needed, GCR would bill the customer. Gant
also testified that he knew appellant. He stated that appellant was a route driver for Crawford
Tire Recycling, a company that removed “junk” tires and performed section repairs on large
tires used on earth-moving equipment. Appellant had a routine route to the Hatton Quarry.
Gant explained that appellant had a flatbed trailer and a truck equipped with a crane for
handling this particular type of heavy tire. Gant testified that such equipment was necessary
to handle the tires because of their size and weight. (The tires were approximately twelve feet
tall and weighed from 1,000 to 5,000 pounds.)
Testimony showed that in October 2006, three of GCR Tire Center’s tires, a loader
tire and two haul-truck tires, were missing from the Hatton Quarry site. Wheeler, manager
for Hatton Quarry, testified that in addition to the consignment tires from GCR, four of
Martin Marietta’s new tires were also missing from the site. Wheeler testified that Martin
Marietta’s inventory was reviewed on a monthly basis. Martin Marietta’s office manager,
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Cite as 2009 Ark. App. 106 (unpublished)
Brenda Pollard, testified that the monthly inventory search revealed the seven missing tires.
She testified that GCR’s missing tires were valued at $29,873.20 and Martin Marietta’s
missing tires were valued at $43,860.50.
Being in the tire business, appellant was familiar with Robbie Rodgers, an employee
of GCR Tire Center. During an interview with the Texas Department of Public Safety,
appellant told officials that he received a call from Robbie, asking him if he knew of anyone
that would be interested in purchasing tires. Robbie told him that the tires were not listed on
the inventory and that the serial numbers had been removed from the tires. Appellant
explained to officials that he found an acquaintance that would be interested in purchasing
the tires. Appellant told Robbie that he had a buyer, and arrangements were made for
appellant to pick up the tires from the Hatton Quarry. Upon delivery of the tires to the buyer,
appellant was given $28,000. In another statement to police, appellant revealed that of the
$28,000 he received, he gave Robbie one-half, per their agreement. Also in that statement
to police, appellant told officials that Robbie told him that the tires were not on the inventory
list, that the tires were “just extra tires,” and that these tires would periodically be delivered
to the Hatton Quarry for no apparent reason.
Texas officials told appellant before, during, and after the interview that he was free
to leave and that appellant was not in custody at any point during the exchange. Testimony
showed that appellant drove himself to the station. Appellant was not in handcuffs at any
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Cite as 2009 Ark. App. 106 (unpublished)
time prior to or during the interview, and testimony showed that appellant felt free to step
outside to smoke a cigarette during the process. After talking with officials, appellant
consented to a polygraph test. Testimony showed that after the interview, there was no basis
for filing any charges against appellant. He left the police station freely. Texas officials
testified that they sent the information gathered from the interview to officials in Polk
County, Arkansas, for further investigation.
I. Denial of Motion for Directed Verdict
Although appellant’s last point on appeal concerns the trial court’s denial of his
motion for a directed verdict, we address this point first because of double jeopardy
considerations. See Burris v. State, 330 Ark. 66, 954 S.W.2d 209 (1997) (stating that when
an appellant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence, we address that issue prior to all
others in order to preserve the defendant’s right to freedom from double jeopardy). When
a defendant makes a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence on appeal, we view the
evidence in the light most favorable to the State. Dendy v. State, 93 Ark. App. 281, 218
S.W.3d 322 (2005) (citing Baughman v. State, 353 Ark. 1, 110 S.W.3d 740 (2003)). The test
for determining sufficiency of the evidence is whether the verdict is supported by substantial
evidence, direct or circumstantial; substantial evidence is evidence forceful enough to compel
a conclusion one way or the other beyond suspicion or conjecture; only evidence supporting
the verdict will be considered. Id. When a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence is
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Cite as 2009 Ark. App. 106 (unpublished)
reviewed, the conviction will be affirmed if there is substantial evidence to support it. Id.
Appellant was charged with two counts of theft of property.
Arkansas Code
Annotated section 5-36-103(a)(1) (Repl. 2006) provides that a person commits theft of
property if he or she knowingly “takes or exercises unauthorized control over, or makes an
unauthorized transfer of an interest in, the property of another person, with the purpose of
depriving the owner of the property.” In the present case, appellant argues that the State
failed to prove that he knowingly took, exercised control over, or made an unauthorized
transfer of interest in property of Martin Marietta and GCR Tire Center. He admits that the
testimony provided at trial was that the tires were missing, but asserts that the evidence failed
to show that appellant was the responsible party. Moreover, he asserts that the testimony at
trial failed to show that appellant knowingly took the tires and that he intended to purposely
deprive the owners of the property. This argument is unavailing.
There was sufficient evidence presented at trial to show that appellant knowingly took
or exercised unauthorized control over the tires. Appellant admitted to police that he indeed
removed the tires from the Hatton Quarry pursuant to an agreement that he had with Robbie.
He admitted that he knew the tires were not on any inventory list, and he admitted that the
serial numbers had been removed from the tires. He admitted selling the tires to another man
in the tire industry. Although appellant was employed as a truck driver for Crawford Tire
Recycling, a company that repairs and disposes of tires, removal and delivery of these
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Cite as 2009 Ark. App. 106 (unpublished)
particular tires was not on his list of job duties. Likewise, there was sufficient evidence that
appellant had the intent to deprive the owners of the property. Appellant admitted that he
sold the tires for $28,000, one-half of which he gave to Robbie per their arrangement.
Appellant’s share was $11,000, and $3,000 was the buyer’s share. While appellant argues
that this is not sufficient evidence to prove his intent to deprive the owners of their property,
this court has stated that a criminal defendant’s intent is seldom proved by direct evidence
and must normally be proved from the circumstances of the crime, and a jury is allowed to
draw upon its common sense to infer intent from the circumstances. DeShazer v. State, 94
Ark. App. 363, 230 S.W.3d 285 (2006). Considering the evidence in the light most favorable
to the State, we find that substantial evidence supports appellant’s conviction for two counts
of theft of property.
II. Denial of Motion for Continuance
We now turn to appellant’s first argument, that the trial court erred in denying his
motion for a continuance. Appellant asserts that the trial court should have granted the
motion where
the State did not disclose a State police investigator’s report indicating there were two
sets of inventories of the stolen property until a state police officer provided it the day
before trial; the State amended the criminal information two days before trial
changing the charges from one count to two counts and adding different owners; the
State provided 250 pages of telephone records two days before trial and 800 pages of
telephone records one day before trial; and where the defendant’s witness had medical
problems and couldn’t come to the hearing.
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Cite as 2009 Ark. App. 106 (unpublished)
The granting or denial of a motion for continuance is within the sound discretion of the trial
court, and the trial court’s decision will not be reversed absent an abuse of discretion
amounting to a denial of justice. Anthony v. State, 339 Ark. 20, 2 S.W.3d 780 (1999). The
burden of proving an abuse of discretion due to prejudice resulting from the denial of a
continuance is on appellant, and appellant must demonstrate prejudice before this court will
consider a trial court’s denial of a continuance to be an abuse of discretion. Dodson v. State,
358 Ark. 372, 191 S.W.3d 511 (2004).
While it is true that the prosecutor provided defense counsel with a new inventory list
and a voluminous amount of telephone records (1050 pages) just before trial, appellant failed
to point to anything contained in these documents that prejudiced him or otherwise led to his
conviction. In fact, a majority of the phone records—approximately 800 of the 1050
pages—were appellant’s own personal phone records.
This court has held that the
prosecution is not required to disclose information that is already accessible by defendant.
See Lowry v. State, 364 Ark. 6, 216 S.W.3d 101 (2005).
Moreover, when denying
appellant’s motion for a continuance, the trial court gave appellant the opportunity to object
to any witness that was not listed in the State’s discovery. The record does not show that
appellant made any such objection.
Outside appellant’s contention that counsel was
“overwhelmed” with the voluminous telephone records and that counsel did not have the
opportunity to evaluate whether additional witnesses were needed, appellant does not
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Cite as 2009 Ark. App. 106 (unpublished)
demonstrate how he was prejudiced. It is axiomatic that this court will not presume prejudice
where the appellant offers no proof of it, see, e.g., Rollins v. State, 362 Ark. 279, 208 S.W.3d
215 (2005), and some prejudice must be shown in order to find grounds to reverse a
conviction. See Woodbright v. State, 357 Ark. 63, 160 S.W.3d 315 (2004).
III. Denial of Motion to Suppress Custodial Statement
Our review of a denial of a motion to suppress evidence is de novo, and we make an
independent determination based on the totality of the circumstances, giving due deference
to the trial court’s ability to assess the credibility of the witnesses. Davis v. State, 351 Ark.
406, 94 S.W.3d 892 (2003). In Davis, our supreme court clarified the standard of review by
replacing a view of the evidence “in the light most favorable to the State” with a “proper
deference to the findings of the trial court,” which was held to be more consistent with the
standard announced by the United States Supreme Court. State v. Harmon, 353 Ark. 568, 113
S.W.3d 75 (2003) (quoting Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690 (1996)).
In this second point on appeal, appellant asserts that the trial court erred in not
suppressing his statement made during a polygraph test. He asserts that pursuant to Miranda
v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), once he said that he wished that he had an attorney, all
“questioning [should have ceased] until an attorney [was] present.”
In Riggs v. State, 339 Ark. 111, 118, 3 S.W.3d 305, 309 (1999), our supreme court
discussed when the safeguards of Miranda should apply:
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Cite as 2009 Ark. App. 106 (unpublished)
It is settled that the safeguards prescribed by Miranda become applicable as soon as
a suspect’s freedom of action is curtailed to a “degree associated with formal arrest.”
Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 440, 104 S.Ct. 3138, 82 L.Ed.2d 317 (1984),
citing California v. Beheler, 463 U.S. 1121, 1125, 103 S.Ct. 3517, 77 L.Ed.2d 1275
(1983) (per curiam). Stated another way, the Supreme Court defined custodial
interrogation as meaning the questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after
a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of action in any significant
way. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966);
see also Stansbury v. California, 511 U.S. 318, 114 S.Ct. 1526, 128 L.Ed.2d 293
(1994) (per curiam); and Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492, 97 S.Ct. 711, 50
L.Ed.2d 714 (1977) (per curiam). The Supreme Court further explicitly recognized
that Miranda warnings are not required simply because the questioning takes place
in the station house, or because the questioned person is one whom the police suspect.
Beheler, 463 U.S. at 1125, 103 S.Ct. at 3517. In resolving the question of whether a
suspect was “in custody” at a particular time, the only relevant inquiry is how a
reasonable man in the suspect’s shoes would have understood his situation. The initial
determination of custody depends on the objective circumstances of the interrogation,
not on the subjective views harbored by either the interrogating officers or the person
being interrogated. Stansbury, 114 S.Ct. at 1529; State v. Spencer, 319 Ark. 454, 457,
892 S.W.2d 484, 485 (1995). In later cases, we have followed the standards set forth
in Spencer. See, e.g., Wofford v. State, 330 Ark. 8, 952 S.W.2d 646 (1997); Solomon
v. State, 323 Ark. 178, 913 S.W.2d 288 (1996).
In the present case, a person in appellant’s shoes would not have believed that he was
in “custody.” Appellant spoke with Texas officials on a voluntary basis, and as the trial court
noted, he gave statements to Texas authorities with complete and total voluntariness.
Appellant drove himself to the interview. During the interview, he was never handcuffed.
He was not only free to leave at any point during the process, but actually exercised that right
by stepping outside to smoke a cigarette in the parking lot. Moreover, testimony showed that
officials repeatedly told appellant during the interview that he was not under arrest and that
he was free to leave. Based on the objective circumstances of this interview, we hold that
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Cite as 2009 Ark. App. 106 (unpublished)
appellant was not in custody and was free to leave at any time. Because there was no
custodial interrogation, Miranda did not apply.
Based on the foregoing, we affirm appellant’s convictions.
Affirmed.
P ITTMAN and G RUBER, JJ., agree.
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