Grider v. Ark. Dep't of Health & Human Servs.
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION
DIVISION II
CA08-707
January 28, 2009
ESSIE SIMPSON GRIDER
APPELLANT
V.
ARKANSAS DEPARTMENT OF
HEALTH & HUMAN SERVICES
APPELLEE
APPEAL FROM THE BRADLEY
COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT,
[JV-06-65-5]
HONORABLE TERESA FRENCH,
JUDGE
AFFIRMED
Appellant, Essie Simpson Grider, appeals from the order terminating her parental
rights to her children S.G., born October 15, 1997, and A.G., born March 10, 2004. She
contends that there was insufficient evidence to support the terminations. We disagree
and affirm.
This case began on September 17, 2006, when the Department of Health and
Human Services (DHHS) exercised an emergency hold on S.G. and A.G.
In an Agreed
Adjudication Order, effective November 29, 2006, the circuit court adjudicated the
juveniles dependent-neglected.
The court found that the evidence supported an
adjudication due to environmental neglect and appellant’s admitted substance abuse. The
goal of the case was set as reunification, and the court approved the DHHS case plan.
Appellant was ordered, in part, to (1) submit to and complete a drug and alcohol
assessment and provide a copy of any recommendations for treatment to DHHS and to the
court; (2) submit to random drug screens; (3) provide proof indicating that all outstanding
fines had been paid; (4) submit to a psychological evaluation; (5) clean her house so that it
was suitable for the children to live in and clean any mattresses and other furniture that
had been urinated upon or obtain new ones before the juveniles could return home; (6)
obey the case plan and orders of the court; and (7) follow the drug and alcohol assessment
and enter a ninety-day inpatient drug rehabilitation program. Additionally, the case plan
provided that appellant (1) complete parenting classes and demonstrate improved parenting
skills; (2) receive homemaker services weekly and learn housekeeping skills; (3) visit
weekly with her children; (4) obtain an accurate diagnosis regarding her medical
condition; (5) attend counseling to address mental-health issues; and (6) remain drug free.
After appellant completed her inpatient drug treatment, the case plan was updated and she
was required to complete outpatient drug counseling.
On February 23, 2007, approximately five months after the juveniles’ removal, the
court held a review hearing. The children were continued in foster care, and the goal of
the case remained reunification with appellant. The court found that DHHS had made
reasonable efforts to achieve the goal of reunification but that appellant had only partially
complied with the case plan: she had failed one drug screen and had not contacted her
doctor about her drug use and need for different pain medication. At this hearing the
court issued additional orders, including that appellant (1) seek medical attention for her
staph infections; (2) complete inpatient drug treatment; (3) obtain and maintain stable
housing and employment; (4) obtain and maintain stable transportation; and (5) comply
-2-
with the DHHS case plan and the court’s orders. The court noted appellant’s statement
that she had recently paid all her fines in Bradley County but “does have a recent new
charge and owes the fine there and she does have a new charge in Drew County.” Prior
orders of the court that were not in conflict with the new order remained in effect.
Another review hearing was held on May 21, 2007, approximately eight months
after the children’s removal. Again, the court found that DHHS had provided reasonable
efforts and that appellant had partially complied with the case plan. Prior orders were
continued.
On August 24, 2007, the court held another review and found that DHHS had
made reasonable efforts to assist appellant with reunification. Appellant again was found to
be in partial compliance with the court’s orders: she had completed inpatient treatment,
failed one drug screen perhaps attributable to cold medicine, tested negative in one drug
screen, and “not complied with all the NA/AA meetings as part of her discharge
assessment.”
The court found that appellant had been released from inpatient drug
rehabilitation June 18, 2007; had attended her first outpatient counseling session August 8,
2007; and had obtained housing at 144 Bradley Court in Warren, Arkansas, where her
nineteen-year-old daughter was living with her. Prior orders of the court were continued.
Appellant was also ordered to continue mental-health and substance-abuse counseling,
prepare a budget, and attend NA/AA meetings and document attendance.
On September 19, 2007, a year after the children’s removal, the court began a
permanency-planning hearing. The court continued the goal of reunification and found
-3-
that DHHS had made reasonable efforts to finalize a permanency plan. The permanencyplanning court report noted that appellant had not had any visits with her children due to
her inaccessibility to the agency.
The court further found that appellant had partially
complied with the case plan and court orders, specifically, by completing inpatient drug
treatment, continuing outpatient treatment, and remaining drug free. She was found not
in compliance for failing to pay all the costs associated with maintaining a stable, safe
home. She also continued to associate with known drug users and still had outstanding
fines. All of the prior orders were continued. Appellant was additionally ordered to visit
regularly with the juveniles, contact DHHS weekly, allow DHHS into her home at least
bi-weekly, attend counseling, not associate with any past and/or present drug users, and
obtain stable transportation and insurance in her name.
Appellant was ordered to make
significant measurable progress within the next thirty days before the court would
continue with the goal of reunification. She was ordered to draft a budget with DHHS;
provide proof of attendance to NA and AA meetings; document proof of paid fines and
dismissal of any outstanding criminal charges; show proof of transportation, including a
reinstated driver’s license and insurance; attend visitation; and view “The Clock is
Ticking” video. Appellant was warned that these issues were to be completed before the
completion of the permanency-planning hearing, which would take place in October
2007.
On October 22, 2007, the court changed the goal of the case to termination of
parental rights. The court found that appellant had failed to make substantial measurable
-4-
progress, had not shown that she was able to care for the children, and was not compliant
with the case plan. Although she had established a home and completed inpatient drug
treatment and parenting classes, the court noted that she had been unable to comply with
the court’s orders and repeatedly associated with known drug users. She failed to pay all
the costs associated with maintaining a safe, stable home and providing the basic necessities
for her children. She did not maintain an environmentally safe home for the children to
live in, and it was not safe enough to allow visitation there.
She did not produce a
budget sufficient to show that she could care for the juveniles financially, and she failed to
be truthful with the court when testifying. The court additionally found that appellant
failed to comply with her outpatient counseling. The court continued its prior orders and
ordered appellant to reimburse DHHS $400 for her counseling sessions.
On January 16 and February 13, 2008, a termination-of-parental-rights hearing was
held.
As a result of that hearing, the court terminated appellant’s parental rights to her
two children, finding, in part, that she had failed to remedy the cause of their removal.
This appeal followed.
Sufficiency of the Evidence
In this appeal, appellant contends that the evidence was not sufficient to support the
circuit court’s termination of her parental rights. Specifically, she argues that the circuit
court’s order was defective because it failed to meet the statutory requirements of Arkansas
Code Annotated section 9-27-341 (Repl. 2008). Alternatively, she argues that the circuit
court committed clear error by “completely disregarding” DHHS’s only expert witness.
-5-
An order terminating parental rights must be based upon a finding by clear and
convincing evidence:
(A) That it is in the best interest of the juvenile, including consideration of
the following factors:
(i) The likelihood that the juvenile will be adopted if the
termination petition is granted; and
(ii) The potential harm, specifically addressing the effect on the health
and safety of the child, caused by returning the child to the custody
of the parent, parents, or putative parent or parents; and
(B) Of one (1) or more of the following grounds:
....
Ark. Code Ann. § 9-27-341(b)(3) (Repl. 2008).
Our standard of review is de novo, but we will not reverse a circuit court’s findings
in a dependency-neglect case unless they are clearly erroneous or clearly against the
preponderance of the evidence. Arkansas Dep’t of Health & Human Servs. v. Jones, 97 Ark.
App. 267, 248 S.W.3d 507 (2007). Clear and convincing evidence is that degree of proof
that will produce in the fact finder a firm conviction as to the allegation sought to be
established. Camarillo-Cox v. Arkansas Dep’t of Human Servs., 360 Ark. 340, 201 S.W.3d
391 (2005). A finding is clearly erroneous when, although there is evidence to support it,
the reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with a definite and firm conviction that a
mistake has been made. Id. In resolving the clearly erroneous question, we give due
regard to the opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility of witnesses. Id.
-6-
Appellant asserts that the circuit court produced an order that was defective on its
face because it 1) failed to state a finding concerning the likelihood of adoption, 2) made
no specific finding regarding any potential harm to the children, and 3) did not outline any
statutory grounds for termination. The abstract does not show that these arguments were
raised below or that appellant objected to the court’s order, e.g., appellant did not file a
motion under either Rule 52 or Rule 60 of the Arkansas Rules of Civil Procedure. We
have long held that we will not consider arguments raised for the first time on appeal, and
we decline to do so here. Jones, supra. Moreover, even if we were to address this issue on
its merits, we would find no basis for reversal. See McFarland v. Arkansas Dep’t of Human
Servs., 91 Ark. App. 323, 210 S.W.3d 143 (2005).
Appellant argues alternatively that it was clear error for the circuit court “to
completely disregard” DHHS’s only expert witness, clinical therapist Karen Walker,
whom the court accepted as an expert in the field of counseling.
The assignment of
weight and credibility to expert testimony is within the scope of the court’s discretion.
Skokos v. Skokos, 344 Ark. 420, 40 S.W.3d 768 (2001). Moreover, the appellate court
gives a high degree of deference to the trial court because of its far superior position to
observe the parties before it and to judge the witnesses’ credibility. Posey v. Arkansas Dep’t
of Health & Human Servs., 370 Ark. 500, 262 S.W.3d 159 (2007); Williams v. Arkansas
Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 99 Ark. App. 95, 257 S.W.3d 574 (2007). Here, we
cannot say that the circuit court erred by failing to give Walker’s expert testimony the
weight that appellant asserts it deserved.
-7-
Appellant complains that the findings in support of termination made only one
conclusory reference to Walker’s testimony, when the circuit court found that “mother
did not attend all of her mental health appointments.”
Appellant urges this court to
review particular portions of Walker’s testimony and to conclude on the entire evidence
that a mistake has been made.
Appellant notes Walker’s statements that appellant was compliant in her attendance
at counseling sessions that started in October 2006 and were reopened in August 2007;
that appellant did not have a “pattern of non-attendance” in attending seven scheduled
appointments after August 17, 2007, and giving satisfactory reasons for missing six; and
that Walker’s counseling with appellant was not affected by her release for noncompliance with the New Beginnings program in Warren, Arkansas. Appellant also relies
upon the following testimony by Walker regarding appellant’s progress.
Although
appellant suffered a relapse and her drug use resulted in infected areas on her hand and
arms that Walker saw, those injuries were not observed after August 17, 2007. Appellant
made much progress with Walker’s counseling program in that her thinking became “a
bit” clearer; she no longer had the interference of drugs, which she had used heavily in the
past; and “there were impairment issues” in her mental faculties after August 17. Walker
testified that she would like to see appellant’s progress continue and that, should appellant’s
children be placed back with her, the adjustment issues they would face were solvable.
Appellant points to evidence in her favor besides Walker’s testimony. Appellant
completed a parenting program in Warren, Arkansas, and successfully completed inpatient
-8-
drug rehabilitation treatment in Gassville.
Her counselor in Gassville noted her
“remarkable progress,” desire to remain drug free and be a better mother, and request to
continue outpatient treatment in Warren, which treatment the counselor also
recommended. Appellant complains that the circuit court’s finding in the termination
order that she had no stable housing contrasts with the October 22, 2007 finding that she
had established a home. She asserts that Walker’s testimony shows appellant’s compliance
with mental-health concerns. She notes a lack of proof, except for the positive drug test
perhaps attributable to her medication, that she did not refrain from using illegal
substances. Concluding that she substantially and materially complied with the case plan
and the court’s orders, appellant asks that the order terminating her parental rights be
reversed.
We have stated that we defer to the circuit court in determining the weight to
which an expert’s testimony is entitled. DHHS correctly notes in the present case that
Walker’s testimony about appellant’s mental health did not go to the definitive issues of
her drug use and environmental neglect, which were the reasons for the children’s
removal and for their adjudication as dependent/neglected.
Completion of the case plan alone does is not determinative in decisions to
terminate parental rights; what matters is whether completion of the case plan achieved the
intended result of making the parent capable of caring for the child. Wright v. Arkansas
Dep’t of Human Servs., 83 Ark. App. 1, 115 S.W.3d 332 (2003).
Here, Walker
characterized appellant’s compliance as “fair” in attending approximately half the
-9-
scheduled appointments for her second session of counseling, which began on August 17,
2007. Walker stated that she would not know if appellant had relapsed by using drugs
unless appellant admitted to the relapse. It was Walker’s opinion that appellant would
continue to need counseling services should the children be returned to her, probably for
a year to fourteen months. Walker stated that A.G. would have definite adjustment issues
and would not be really stable and secure for up to a year. Walker had no opinion on
whether to recommend that reunification efforts continue because her therapy with
appellant was individual, Walker’s information had been received through appellant, and
there was not enough information to “look at the whole.”
The assignment of weight and credibility to Walker’s testimony was within the
scope of the circuit court’s discretion. There is no merit to appellant’s argument that the
court clearly erred by completely disregarding testimony of DHHS’s only expert witness.
Affirmed.
K INARD and M ARSHALL, JJ., agree.
-10-
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.
