Bubba Props., LLC v. Bell
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ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS
DIVISION II
No. CA08-92
BUBBA PROPERTIES, LLC
APPELLLANT
Opinion Delivered January
14, 2009
APPEAL FROM THE COLUMBIA
COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT,
[NO. CV2004-49]
V.
RONNY BELL
APPELLEE
HONORABLE DAVID F. GUTHRIE,
JUDGE
AFFIRMED
JOSEPHINE LINKER HART, Judge
Bubba Properties, LLC, appeals from a summary judgment in favor of attorney Ronny
Bell. Bubba argues that the trial court erred in ruling: 1) that Bubba’s legal-malpractice suit
against Bell was barred by the statute of limitations, and 2) that Bell had no duty to perform
the work that was the basis of the suit. We affirm on the statute-of-limitations ground,
making it unnecessary to address the remaining argument.
The members of Bubba Properties, LLC, were also investors in a company called Quail
Piping Products. Quail needed approximately one million dollars worth of equipment for a
new manufacturing venture but could not obtain financing. Bubba agreed to buy the
equipment, finance it through Farmers Bank, and lease it to Quail.
In November 1999, one of Bubba’s members, T.J. Hammer, asked attorney Ronny
Bell to prepare the equipment lease. According to Bell, Hammer was a sophisticated former
banker who gave him explicit drafting instructions. The final document provided that Bubba
would lease the equipment to Quail for five years; that Quail would pay Bubba $1,288,750
in principal and interest over that period; that Bubba would retain title to the equipment; and
that, at the end of five years, Quail could purchase the equipment for one dollar. The lease
contained no provision for voluntary termination by Quail. Bell did not file a financing
statement or advise Bubba that one was needed. An attorney would later state in an affidavit
filed by Bubba that the document prepared by Bell created a secured sales transaction, for
which a UCC financing statement was necessary to perfect Bubba’s interest in the equipment.
In July 2003, Quail filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy. The bankruptcy court found that
Bubba and Farmers Bank failed to perfect a security interest in the equipment, and it ordered
the equipment sold to pay Quail’s other, secured creditors. Thereafter, Farmers sued Bubba
and its members on January 27, 2004, to collect $450,000 due on the loan.1 Bubba answered
and filed a third-party complaint against Bell for legal malpractice. The complaint alleged that
Bell failed to perfect Bubba’s security interest in the equipment and that, had he done so,
Bubba could have obtained a release of the equipment in bankruptcy, sold it, and applied the
proceeds to the Farmers loan. Bell denied any wrongdoing and pled the statute of limitations
as a defense.
On July 18, 2007, Bell moved for summary judgment. He argued that the malpractice
claim should be dismissed because: 1) he had no duty beyond the scope of his instructions
1
Farmers subsequently obtained consent judgments from Bubba and its members.
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from T.J. Hammer; and 2) the three-year statute of limitations had run. The circuit court
agreed on both counts, ruling with regard to the statute of limitations:
The Statute of Limitations governing claims of legal malpractice is three years. The
statute runs from the date of the last occurrence which is the basis of the claim. The
last legal work performed by Ronny Bell for Bubba Properties was in November 1999,
and there is no allegation of fraud or misrepresentation. This claim was filed in
November 2004, five years after the occurrence, and is therefore time barred.
Bubba appeals from the summary judgment.
Summary judgment is to be granted only when it is clear that there are no genuine
issues of material fact to be litigated, and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter
of law. Nash v. Hendricks, 369 Ark. 60, 250 S.W.3d 541 (2007). The purpose of summary
judgment is not to try the issues but to determine whether there are any issues to be tried. Id.
Legal-malpractice actions are governed by a three-year statute of limitations. See
Parkerson v. Lincoln, 347 Ark. 29, 61 S.W.3d 146 (2001). Our courts employ the occurrence
rule in determining when the limitations period begins to run. See Moix-McNutt v. Brown, 348
Ark. 518, 74 S.W.3d 612 (2002); Ragar v. Brown, 332 Ark. 214, 964 S.W.2d 372 (1998);
Goldsby v. Fairley, 309 Ark. 380, 831 S.W.2d 142 (1992); Moore Inv. Co. v. Mitchell, Williams,
Selig, Gates & Woodyard, 91 Ark. App. 102, 208 S.W.3d 803 (2005). Under this rule, the
limitations period commences when the attorney’s negligent act occurs. See, e.g., Goldsby,
supra; Moore Inv. Co., supra. Here, Bell’s negligence, if any, occurred in 1999 when he drafted
the lease and allowed it to be executed without filing a financing statement or advising Bubba
that one was needed. The 2004 complaint was therefore time-barred.
Bubba argues that the limitations period did not commence until April 2003, the last
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date on which Bell could have filed a financing statement and perfected Bubba’s security
interest in the equipment. According to Bubba, Bell’s negligence was not complete and
caused no harm until that point. However, our supreme court has declined to accept the
argument that the statute of limitations is not triggered until the plaintiff suffers injury. See,
e.g., Moix-McNutt, supra; Flemens v. Harris, 323 Ark. 421, 915 S.W.2d 685 (1996); Morris v.
McLemore, 313 Ark. 53, 852 S.W.2d 135 (1993); Ford’s, Inc. v. Russell Brown & Co., 299 Ark.
426, 773 S.W.2d 90 (1989). The supreme court consistently holds that, for statute-oflimitations purposes, it is the date of the negligent act that controls. See Moix-McNutt, supra;
Flemens, supra.
Bubba also points out that Bell had the opportunity to revisit the lease on several
occasions after 1999 and correct his error. However, it is undisputed that Bell performed no
additional work directly related to the lease after 1999. Thus, under these facts, the limitations
period cannot be extended on that basis. Compare Morrow Cash Heating & Air, Inc. v. Jackson,
96 Ark. App. 105, 239 S.W.3d 8 (2006) (extending the onset of the limitations period where
the defendant’s erroneous advice was repeatedly urged until it was accepted). Further, Bell
cannot be considered “intermittently and repeatedly negligent” between 1999 and 2003 by
virtue of his continuing failure to file a financing statement or advise Bubba regarding one.
See Moore Inv. Co., 91 Ark. App. at 108, 208 S.W.3d at 806 (disavowing the continuingrepresentation rule, which provides that the statute of limitations does not begin to run until
the relationship between the professional and the client has ended for a particular matter).
Bell’s alleged negligence occurred in 1999, and that is the year in which the statute of
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limitations began to run.
Bubba additionally contends that our supreme court crafted exceptions to the
occurrence rule in Wright v. Compton, Prewett, Thomas & Hickey, 315 Ark. 213, 866 S.W.2d
387 (1993); Pope County v. Friday, Eldredge, & Clark, 313 Ark. 83, 852 S.W.2d 114 (1993);
and Stroud v. Ryan, 297 Ark. 472, 763 S.W.2d 76 (1989). However, the supreme court stated
in Ragar, supra, that it applied the occurrence rule in Wright. Further, the court rejected
arguments similar to Bubba’s in Ragar, supra, and Goldsby, supra, based on the unique
circumstances in Pope County and Stroud. We likewise hold that those cases do not require us
to cast aside the occurrence rule here.
We therefore affirm the circuit court’s order granting summary judgment.
Affirmed.
R OBBINS and B AKER, JJ., agree.
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CA08-92
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