Rogers v. State
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NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION
ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS
No.
DIVISION II
CACR 08-815
Opinion Delivered
CHAMIKA SHANTA ROGERS
APPELLANT
JANUARY 14, 2009
APPEAL FROM THE PULASKI
COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT,
FIRST DIVISION, [NO. CR2007-2629]
V.
HONORABLE MARION A.
HUMPHREY, JUDGE
STATE OF ARKANSAS
APPELLEE
AFFIRMED
JOHN B. ROBBINS, Judge
Appellant Chamika Shanta Rogers appeals her conviction for first-degree battery
entered by the Pulaski County Circuit Court after a bench trial. Her sole argument on appeal
is that she should be entitled to a new trial because the trial court abused its discretion in
overruling her hearsay objection to testimony offered by an investigating police officer, who
identified her as the person who inflicted injuries on the victim, Seacombe Strong. Strong
did not appear at the trial, and the officer was permitted to relate Strong’s identification of
appellant as the person who hit him in the face with a broken bottle. The State argued that
this testimony was admissible as an exception to the hearsay rule as an “excited utterance”
pursuant to Ark. R. Evid. 803(2). The trial judge agreed, and appellant argues that this ruling
constitutes an abuse of discretion. We disagree with appellant and affirm.
The circuit court has wide discretion in making evidentiary rulings, and we will
not reverse its ruling on the admissibility of evidence absent an abuse of discretion. See
Brunson v. State, ___ Ark. ___, ___ S.W.3d ___ (Dec. 14, 2006). Arkansas Rule of Evidence
803 provides hearsay exceptions that render statements potentially admissible, regardless of the
availability of the declarant. Among those is the exception for an excited utterance, which
is defined in the Rule at subsection (2) as “[a] statement relating to a startling event or
condition made while the declarant was under the stress of excitement caused by the event
or condition.”
It is for the circuit court to determine whether a statement was made under the stress
of excitement. See Davis v. State, 362 Ark. 34, 207 S.W.3d 474 (2005). There are several
factors to be considered when determining if a statement is an excited utterance. See id. The
lapse of time, the age of the declarant, the physical and mental condition of the declarant, the
characteristics of the event, and the subject matter of the statement are all factors to be
considered. See id. Furthermore, for the exception to apply, there must be an event that
excites the declarant. See id. It must appear that the declarant’s condition at the time was
such that the statement was spontaneous, excited, or impulsive rather than the product of
reflection and deliberation. See id. The statements must be uttered during the period of
excitement and must express the declarant’s reaction to the event. See id. The general rule
is that an utterance following an exciting event must be made soon enough thereafter that it
can reasonably be considered a product of the stress of the excitement rather than of
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intervening reflection or deliberation. Id. See also Peterson v. State, 349 Ark. 195, 76 S.W.3d
845 (2002); Warner v. State, 93 Ark. App. 233, 218 S.W.3d 330 (2005).
In this bench trial, the prosecutor called the responding police officer to the stand
to testify. Officer Rozado stated that he had worked in the North Little Rock police
department for six years and had responded within minutes to a disturbance call on May 12,
2007, to a house at 718 North Olive. Rozado was “very familiar” with the victim, Seacombe
Strong, due to previous calls to the police on domestic disturbances. Rozado said that Strong
was barely recognizable on sight because Strong was bleeding so profusely from his face,
which was seriously cut, and that blood also covered Strong’s legs. Rozado recognized
Strong’s voice, stating that Strong was “very intoxicated . . . upset and belligerent.” Three
color photographs were entered into evidence to show the severity of injury. Rozado stated
he told Strong that “you two are going to kill each other.” Rozado said Strong told him who
did this, which drew a hearsay objection. The prosecutor offered the statement as an excited
utterance.
In laying a foundation for the argument that this fit a hearsay exception, the prosecutor
elicited further testimony from Rozado that appellant and Strong had “this ongoing thing . . .
taking out no contact orders.” Rozado then explained that Strong, known to have a drug and
alcohol problem, was “very upset, visibly upset.” Rozado stated that he had so many dealings
with Strong that he knew when Strong was excited, which he was that night. The officer
agreed that when he described Strong as belligerent, this was Strong’s demeanor pretty much
all the time.
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The prosecutor argued to the trial judge that the officer’s hearsay comment, identifying
appellant as the perpetrator, came within minutes of the call to police, when the victim was
covered in blood from a severe gouging of his face and while the victim was very upset. The
prosecutor contended that the statement fit within the excited utterance exception. The
defense counsel resisted, but the trial court decided to allow the statement. Appellant was
ultimately found guilty of first-degree battery, and this appeal followed.
On appeal, appellant reasserts her argument, contending that while the victim was
upset and bleeding, there was no indication that Strong was acting under anything other than
behavior typical to him, which was belligerence and intoxication. Therefore, appellant argues
that the trial court abused its discretion in allowing the hearsay testimony of Officer Rozado
identifying appellant as the person who caused Strong’s injuries. We disagree.
This statement came from the victim of a violent crime, minutes after the police were
summoned, and the victim was “visibly upset,” injured, and “excited.” Compare Wright v.
State, 368 Ark 629, 249 S.W.3d 133 (2007); Barrett v. State, 354 Ark. 187, 119 S.W.3d 485
(2003); Fudge v. State, 341 Ark. 759, 20 S.W.3d 315 (2000). On this evidence, we cannot
conclude that the trial judge abused his considerable discretion in making this evidentiary
ruling.
Affirmed.
B AKER, J., agrees.
H ART, J., concurs. B AKER, J., joins.
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H ART, J., concurring. The declarant did not testify at trial. Rather, the declarant’s
statements were introduced through a police officer’s recitation of what he was told by the
declarant, which the circuit court found to be an excited utterance made by the declarant.
Though not done here and not argued on appeal, parties in future, similar cases should parse
the reasons why a declarant has made a statement to police.
According to the abstract, the officer told the declarant that “you two are going to kill
each other . . . because every time either you’re hurting her or she’s hurting you.” Also, the
officer further testified that the declarant “was upset by what he felt was a lack of action by
law enforcement.” As recently stated in Jones v. Currens, ___ Ark. App. ___, ___ S.W.3d ___
(Dec. 17, 2008), in considering whether a statement falls within the excited-utterance
exception to the hearsay rule, the circuit court should consider whether the declarant’s
condition at the time was such that the statement was spontaneous, excited, or impulsive
rather than the product of reflection and deliberation. Based on the above-quoted testimony,
one could argue that the declarant’s statements were not excited utterances, but were made
in response to police interrogation and were geared to encourage police action.
Furthermore, in instances where a declarant is making statements to police, parties
should also consider whether the statements may be introduced without offending the
Confrontation Clause of the United States Constitution. Statements are considered
nontestimonial when made in the course of police interrogation and under circumstances
objectively indicating that the primary purpose of the interrogation is to enable police
assistance to meet an ongoing emergency, but are testimonial if circumstances objectively
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indicate that there is no ongoing emergency and the primary purpose of the interrogation is
to establish or prove past events potentially relevant to later criminal prosecution. Davis v.
Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 822 (2006). Testimonial statements, however, may not be admitted
unless the declarant is unavailable to testify and the defendant had a prior opportunity to
cross-examine the declarant. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 53–54 (2004). One could
argue here that the declarant’s statements were testimonial, as the statements proved past
events relevant to later criminal prosecution.
Nevertheless, considering the arguments presented on appeal, I agree with the majority
that this case must be affirmed.
B AKER, J., joins.
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