Williams v. State
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NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION
ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS
DIVISION III
No.
CACR07-801
LASHONNA WILLIAMS,
Opinion Delivered 7
JANUARY 2009
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM THE UNION
COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT,
[NO. CR-2005-568-4]
V.
STATE OF ARKANSAS,
APPELLEE
HONORABLE CAROL CRAFTON
ANTHONY, JUDGE
AFFIRMED
D. P. MARSHALL JR. , Judge
A Union County jury convicted LaShonna Williams of possessing cocaine and
marijuana with the intent to deliver. She was sentenced to forty years in prison for the
cocaine conviction and four years for the marijuana conviction, with the sentences
running concurrently. Williams appeals, challenging the sufficiency of the evidence
to support both convictions, an evidentiary ruling, and the imposition of her sentence
by a circuit judge other than the one who presided over her trial.
We must address Williams’s sufficiency challenges first. Standridge v. State, 357
Ark. 105, 112, 161 S.W.3d 815, 818 (2004). It is unlawful for any person to possess
cocaine or marijuana with the intent to deliver it. Ark. Code Ann. §§ 5-64-101, -401
(Supp. 2007). To prove that Williams possessed the drugs, the State had to show that
she knew they were drugs and that she exercised care, control, and management over
them. Dodson v. State, 88 Ark. App. 380, 385, 199 S.W.3d 115, 118 (2004). It was
not necessary for the State to prove that Williams actually had the drugs in her hands,
as possession of contraband may be established by constructive possession—the control
or right to control the contraband. Tubbs v. State, 370 Ark. 47, 50, 257 S.W.3d 47,
49–50 (2007). Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict,
substantial evidence supports Williams’s possession convictions. 370 Ark. at 50, 257
S.W.3d at 50.
Police received a call from a confidential informant describing a Chevrolet
Suburban—with a vanity plate “Ms. Williams” on the front—that contained a large
amount of cocaine. Officers stopped the Suburban, which Williams’s husband, Craig
Williams, was driving. Craig Williams jumped from the Suburban and ran. He was
promptly caught; and he was holding a plastic sack containing “cookies of crack
cocaine.” Police impounded and searched the Suburban. The search revealed a large
amount of marijuana under the front passenger seat.
While one officer was searching the Suburban, other officers saw a dark Nissan,
known to be associated with Craig Williams, drive by the police department. Officers
followed the Nissan to Williams’s house. Around the same time, the confidential
informant made a three-way call to LaShonna Williams. During the conversation,
Officer Matt Means heard Williams say that “a police dog and law enforcement were
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searching her husband’s truck and that she needed to get to their house to get some
stuff out.”
The officers watched the Nissan arrive at Williams’s home. Williams and
LaQuita Palmer exited the car, went inside the home, and began removing items. The
officers saw Palmer carry a multi-colored, flowered bag out of the house and place it
inside the Nissan’s passenger compartment. They also saw Williams carry out a heavy
object wrapped in a black garbage bag and place it in the trunk. The women left
Williams’s house in separate cars, with Palmer driving the Nissan.
Police stopped Williams’s vehicle, which contained no contraband. They also
stopped the Nissan. In that car, officers found marijuana in the flowered bag, crackcocaine and $2,000.00 wrapped in a towel in the trunk, a band-aid box in the trunk
containing small bags of marijuana, and the black garbage bag containing a safe. When
police opened the safe, they found almost $40,000.00 and more than two pounds of
cocaine.
Williams does not challenge the content or amount of the seized drugs. She
argues only that she never possessed the drugs and did not know that they were drugs.
Her husband’s testimony at trial—that she had no knowledge of the drugs he
possessed—supports Williams’s argument. But her actions do not. The phone call
between Williams and the confidential informant (a man with whom she later
admitted she was having an affair) is evidence that Williams had knowledge about the
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drugs. Police saw Williams and Palmer removing the drugs from her house—a house
in which Williams and her husband, not Palmer, lived. And the women removed
nothing but drugs and large amounts of money from the house. The State established
that Williams exercised care, control, and management over the cocaine and
marijuana. Tubbs, 370 Ark. at 50, 257 S.W.3d at 50. Thus substantial evidence
supports her possession convictions. Ibid.
Williams next argues that the circuit court abused its discretion by admitting
hearsay testimony over her objection. LaQuita Palmer did not testify at Williams’s
trial. And the circuit judge granted Williams’s motion in limine to prevent the State
from introducing Palmer’s statements. While testifying, Police Officer Randall Conley
talked about his encounter with Palmer. He testified that he told Palmer he pulled her
over for running a stop sign and asked if she had anything in the vehicle he needed to
know about. Palmer responded that she had marijuana in the front seat. Williams’s
attorney then objected on hearsay grounds. The circuit judge responded “proceed.”
No one asked for clarification.
We have some doubt about whether the court’s response was a specific ruling
that preserved her hearsay objection for appellate review. Compare Rodriguez v. State,
372 Ark. 335, 339–40, __ S.W.3d __, __ (2008). Assuming, as Williams argues, that
the court implicitly overruled her objection, the error was harmless. Marmolejo v. State,
102 Ark. App. 264, 268, __ S.W.3d __, __ (2008). Setting aside Palmer’s statement,
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the jury still had before it Williams’s phone conversation, her removal of drugs from
her house, and a forensic chemist’s verification of the weight and content of the drugs.
The State presented overwhelming proof of Williams’s guilt. We therefore see no
prejudice in the admission of Palmer’s statement. 102 Ark. App. at 268–69, __ S.W.3d
at __.
Finally, Williams argues that her sentence was illegally imposed because the
sentencing judge was not the same judge who presided over her trial. Williams claims
that Rule of Criminal Procedure 33.2 requires that the same circuit judge who presides
over a trial must also sentence the defendant tried. We disagree. The Rule states that,
“[a]t the time sentence is pronounced and judgment entered, the trial judge must
advise the defendant of his right to appeal, the period of time prescribed for perfecting
the appeal, and either fix or deny bond.” Ark. R. Crim. P. 33.2. We conclude that
the Rule uses “trial” as a synonym for “circuit,” as the bench and bar often do. There
are many reasons why the judge who presided over a trial may be unavailable to
sentence a defendant. Here, Judge John Cole acted as a substitute for Judge Carol
Anthony during Williams’s two-day trial. During sentencing, Williams became ill and
had to be removed from the court room by medics. When court re-convened almost
two weeks later, Judge Anthony (who handled some of the pre-trial issues in this case)
returned and sentenced Williams. Judge Anthony complied with Rule 33.2 by
informing Williams of her right to appeal.
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Moreover, Williams has not shown any prejudice from the judge change. Judge
Anthony imposed the sentences recommended by the jury—the minimum statutory
sentences for Williams’s crimes. And Judge Anthony ran the sentences concurrently
rather than consecutively. Because Judge Cole could not have imposed sentences
smaller than the ones imposed by Judge Anthony, Williams was not prejudiced by the
circumstances. Brown v. State, 82 Ark. App. 61, 68, 110 S.W.3d 293, 298 (2003); Ark.
Code Ann. § 16-90-107(e) (Repl. 2006). We therefore affirm on this issue.
VAUGHT, C.J., and PITTMAN, J., agree.
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