Matlock v. Matlock
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SLIP OPINION
Cite as 2009 Ark. App. 759
ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS
DIVISION IV
No. CA09-366
TRUDY MATLOCK,
Opinion Delivered
November 11, 2009
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM THE BOONE
COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT,
[NO. DR-04-296-3]
V.
JAMES MATLOCK,
APPELLEE
HONORABLE JOHN R. PUTMAN,
JUDGE
AFFIRMED
KAREN R. BAKER, Judge
Appellant Trudy Matlock challenges the trial court’s distribution of marital property
claiming two points of error: (1) The trial court erred in not distributing the remaining
personal property; (2) The trial court abused its discretion in the amount of alimony and the
length of the alimony award. The crux of her argument is that the trial court erred in not
distributing certain items omitted from the parties’ agreement and in establishing the
parameters of the award of alimony, asserting that the trial court’s failure to provide for the
allocation of debts and items omitted from the parties’ agreement rendered the parties’
agreement for the distribution of certain items inequitable. We find no error and affirm.
At the time of the divorce, Trudy was sixty-two years old. She and appellee James
Matlock were married for thirty-eight years when James filed for divorce. James sued for
Cite as 2009 Ark. App. 759
general indignities and Trudy counter-claimed for general indignities, later amended to
include the grounds of adultery.
The divorce was subsequently granted on grounds of
separation for eighteen months.
During the marriage, James had acquired a one-half ownership interest in two
businesses in the trucking industry. The parties also had a one-half interest in a farm in
Marion County, a house in Harrison sold during the separation, a marital home in Harrison,
various vehicles, cattle, assets of bank accounts, insurance, a mutual fund, and credit card
debt.
The parties reached a settlement agreement on the value of Trudy’s interests in the two
businesses, the farm, the marital home, the cattle, the bank counts, insurance and mutual
funds. James agreed and was ordered to pay Trudy $412,500 for her interest in the two
trucking companies, $67,000 for her interest in the farm, one-half of the bank accounts, cash
surrender of the insurance policy, a retirement account and twenty-four percent of the
proceeds from the sale of approximately eighty heifers. Trudy received the marital home
liable for the mortgage with James being credited with $5500 in his equity in the marital
home.
Although appellant argues in her first point that the trial court failed to distribute or
consider “the marital debt and the boat, motor and trailer,” the decree specifically stated that
“each party will keep the personal property in his or her possession . . ..” Furthermore,
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despite the argument in her brief to the contrary, the trial court identified appellee as the
owner of the bass boat, motor and trailer and specified that those items were in the
possession of appellee.
Accordingly, appellant’s argument regarding those items is
inconsistent with the record, and we find no merit to that aspect of her claim.
On the issue of alimony, the court awarded Trudy temporary spousal support in the
amount of $2500 plus a $750 monthly house payment. This temporary award was based
upon Trudy’s monthly expenses totaling $2991.85 excluding the mortgage, and the testimony
of CPA Larry Keeter that James had a net income available to him of $14,473 monthly.
At the final hearing, Trudy testified that she had been completely dependent upon
James financially since 1984, that she had broken her back twenty-five years before with
continuing medical needs and limitations from the injury, and that she had met the shortfall
in her monthly expenses by accumulating credit card debt. Larry Keeter testified that after
examining James’s corporate and personal tax returns and pursuant to Administrative Order
Number 10, he calculated that James had a net available income of $15,300 a month. James
testified that his affidavit of financial means showed his monthly income as $3100 and in
order to pay his wife the settlement he would have to borrow the money at a repayment cost
of $6000 a month. He also stated that he does not have any idea what he makes and what it
costs him to live.
Seven and one-half months after the trial, the judge granted the divorce approving the
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settlement agreement and granted alimony in the amount of $1800 to end November 2010.
He denied retroactive spousal support and ordered each party to pay their own attorney’s fees
and costs. The court took no action on the credit card debt.
Debts of the parties have always been a circumstance to be considered in divorce
cases in awarding alimony. Yohe v. Yohe, 238 Ark. 642, 383 S.W.2d 665 (1964); Shirey v.
Shirey, 87 Ark. 175, 112 S.W. 369 (1908). In fact, our supreme court has opined that it
would be unrealistic for a judge to refuse to consider the debts of the parties in deciding a
divorce case. See Hackett v. Hackett, 278 Ark. 82, 643 S.W.2d 560 (1982). Debts incurred
by the parties regarding marital property can be ordered to be settled as between the parties.
Goodlett v. Goodlett, 209 Ark. 297, 190 S.W.2d 14 (1945). Obligations jointly made by the
parties can be ordered to be settled, as between the parties. Riegler v. Riegler, 243 Ark. 113,
419 S.W.2d 311 (1967). An award of realty to the wife, silent as to who shall pay the
mortgage, is an award subject to the mortgage. Crosser v. Crosser, 121 Ark. 64, 180 S.W.
337 (1915). But the fact that marital debts may be considered does not mean the judge must
divide the debts. See Hackett, supra. He may leave the parties as he found them, obligated
individually or jointly to the creditor who is not ordinarily a party to a divorce and cannot
therefore be bound by an order regarding the parties’ debts. Id.
In this case, the trial judge heard the evidence regarding the debt and accepted the
parties’ settlement agreement, which was silent as to the distribution of the debt. A review
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of the record indicates that appellant never identified the distribution of the debt as an issue
to be tried. Appellate courts will not consider arguments such as these not raised below or
ruled upon in its de novo review of the record. Taylor v. Taylor, 369 Ark. 31, 250 S.W.3d
232 (2007). Under these circumstances, the trial court did not err in failing to specifically
address any impact that the allocation of debt would have upon the division of property and
award of alimony proceedings or to specifically identify the equities affected by leaving the
parties as he found them. See Means v. Means, 58 Ark. App. 42, 49, 946 S.W.2d 188, 191
(1997); see also Urban Renewal Agency v. Hefley, 237 Ark. 39, 371 S.W.2d 141 (1963) (The
purpose of pleadings is to notify the court and other parties of the issues to be tried.);
Bachus v. Bachus, 216 Ark. 802, 227 S.W.2d 439 (1950) (In the absence of such a request,
it was not error to not award alimony.).
While the trial court did not err by not specifying the impact that the allocation of
debt would have upon the division of property and award of alimony proceedings, we cannot
say that the trial court did not consider that impact in establishing the parameters of the
alimony award. In arguing that the trial court abused its discretion in the amount of alimony
and the length of the alimony award, appellant compares her detailed financial needs with
the “total lack of concern by James Matlock who did not know his income or his expenses....”
However, James testified that he would have to borrow the money to satisfy his obligation
to Trudy under the agreement for division of marital property. He further testified that his
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Cite as 2009 Ark. App. 759
monthly payment on that loan would be over six thousand dollars for a ten-year period, and
that he anticipated the sale of the farm from his marital property award to ensure he met that
obligation because of a decrease in his income.
On appeal, Trudy skillfully explains the criteria considered in determining the amount
of alimony award and the comparison of the parties’ resources and needs and argues
articulately that the trial court’s award of alimony failed to meet the purpose of alimony–to
rectify economic imbalances in earning power and standard of living in light of the particular
facts of each case. See Kuchmas v. Kuchmas, 368 Ark. 43, 243 S.W.3d 270 (2006).
However, given that alimony and property divisions are complementary devices that a trial
judge employs to make the dissolution of a marriage as equitable as possible, Evtimov v.
Milanova, 2009 Ark. App. 208, --- S.W.3d ---, we cannot say that the trial court erred in its
award. While Trudy anticipates that income generated from her share of the marital property
will be insufficient to allow her to maintain her standard of living, James similarly anticipates
the need to liquidate a significant, income producing, marital asset awarded to him in order
to satisfy his obligation pursuant to the parties’ agreement. The circuit court has the
discretion to award alimony that is reasonable under the circumstances. Taylor v. Taylor, 369
Ark. 31, 250 S.W.3d 232 (2007). An abuse of discretion means discretion improvidently
exercised, i.e., exercised thoughtlessly and without due consideration. Evtimov, supra. Our
supreme court and this court have emphasized in the past that the circuit court is in the best
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Cite as 2009 Ark. App. 759
position to view the needs of the parties in connection with an alimony award. See Taylor,
supra. We cannot say that the trial court exercised its discretion improvidently, thoughtlessly
and without due consideration under these circumstances.
Accordingly, we find no error and affirm.
G RUBER and B ROWN, JJ., agree.
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