Ewells v. State
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Cite as 2009 Ark. App. 720
ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS
DIVISION I
CACR08-657
No.
Opinion Delivered
DAMONT L. EWELLS
APPELLANT
V.
November 4, 2009
APPEAL FROM THE GARLAND
COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT
[NO. CR-2007-228-IV]
HONORABLE MARCIA R.
HEARNSBERGER, JUDGE
STATE OF ARKANSAS
APPELLEE
REVERSED AND REMANDED
JOHN MAUZY PITTMAN, Judge
Appellant was sentenced to five years’ imprisonment after a jury found him guilty of
being a felon in possession of a firearm. Appellant argues that the trial court erred in
permitting the State, in closing arguments, to make an erroneous statement of law, and in
refusing to allow appellant’s attorney to counter this error in his own closing argument. We
agree, and we reverse and remand for retrial.
It is undisputed that appellant was found by the police to be driving a car with a gun
under the seat. The contested facts relate to appellant’s knowledge and intent. Appellant
testified at trial that he was using his uncle’s car and that he neither knew nor ever said that
he knew that there was a gun in the car. During closing argument, counsel for the State told
the jury that “[e]ven if it wasn’t his, it was under the seat in a car he was driving, and that’s
Cite as 2009 Ark. App. 720
guilty under Arkansas law.” Appellant’s attorney objected to this as a misstatement of the law;
the State replied that the crime was a strict-liability offense that required no mens rea. The
trial court overruled appellant’s objection. During appellant’s closing argument, his attorney
told the jury that the defendant was not guilty unless he knew that the gun was in the car.
The State objected based on misstatement of the law. The trial court sustained this objection.
The jury subsequently found appellant guilty.
The State concedes that it was in error as to the law and that a person must have
knowledge of the presence of contraband to possess it within the meaning of the statute. See
Banks v. State, 315 Ark. 666, 869 S.W.2d 700 (1994); Moore v. State, 304 Ark. 257, 801
S.W.2d 638 (1990). The question, then, is whether appellant was prejudiced by the error.
In reviewing an allegedly improper closing argument, we must consider the remarks and
weigh their probable effect upon the issues, then look to the action of the trial court in
dealing with them; if the trial court has not eliminated the sinister effect of the remarks, and
they seem to have created prejudice and likely produced a verdict not otherwise obtainable,
then the appellate court should reverse. Barr v. State, 336 Ark. 220, 984 S.W.2d 792 (1999).
When the evidence of guilt is overwhelming and the error is slight, we can declare that the
error was harmless and affirm. Id.
Here, although the evidence was sufficient to withstand a directed-verdict motion, the
question of appellant’s knowledge that the firearm was in the vehicle, and thus, of his intent
to commit the offense of which he was convicted, rested entirely upon the jury’s assessment
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CACR08-657
Cite as 2009 Ark. App. 720
of the credibility of the witnesses. The trial court’s denial of appellant’s objection to the
prosecutor’s statement may not in itself have been reversible. However, by later sustaining
the prosecutor’s objection to appellant’s argument that knowledge was an essential element
of the offense, the trial court not only failed to rectify the harm, but in fact compounded it.
In light of the combined effect of these errors, and because the issue rested almost entirely on
a question of credibility, we cannot say that appellant was not prejudiced by them.
Reversed and remanded.
HART and GLOVER, JJ., agree.
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CACR08-657
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