Hawkins v. State
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Cite as 2009 Ark. App. 675
ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS
DIVISION III
CACR09-240
No.
Opinion Delivered
October 21, 2009
APPEAL FROM THE OUACHITA
COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT
[No. CR-2007-264-4]
JEREMY JERMANE HAWKINS
APPELLANT
V.
HONORABLE CAROL CRAFTON
ANTHONY, JUDGE
STATE OF ARKANSAS
APPELLEE
AFFIRMED
LARRY D. VAUGHT, Chief Judge
On September 27, 2007, appellant Jeremy Hawkins shot Richard Dennis in the arm
and hip while Dennis was visiting his cousin, Patrick Cole. Hawkins was subsequently
convicted by a Ouachita County jury of attempted first-degree murder, first-degree battery,
and possession of a firearm by certain persons. He was sentenced as a habitual offender to
ninety years’ imprisonment. On appeal, he contends that the trial court erred in denying his
motions for directed verdict that challenged the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the
convictions. We disagree and affirm.
On appeal from the denial of a motion for a directed verdict, the sufficiency of the
evidence is tested to determine whether the verdict is supported by substantial evidence,
direct or circumstantial. Blair v. State, 103 Ark. App. 322, 288 S.W.3d 713 (2008). Substantial
evidence is that evidence that is of sufficient force and character to compel a conclusion one
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way or the other beyond suspicion or conjecture. Blair, 103 Ark. App. at 326, 288 S.W.3d
at 716. Circumstantial evidence may constitute substantial evidence, but it must be consistent
with the defendant’s guilt and inconsistent with any other reasonable conclusion. Id., 288
S.W.3d at 716. We consider only the evidence supporting the guilty verdict and view the
evidence in the light most favorable to the State. Id., 288 S.W.3d at 716. Determinations of
credibility are left to the trier of fact. Id., 288 S.W.3d at 716.
Hawkins first challenges the attempted first-degree murder conviction. He contends
that Dennis and Cole provided inconsistent testimony about exactly where the shooting took
place—inside or outside of Cole’s apartment. He also argues that the State failed to prove that
Hawkins intended to kill Dennis based on testimony that Hawkins could have killed Dennis
if he wanted to, testimony that Hawkins merely wanted to scare Dennis, and testimony that
the gun “went off” accidentally.
A person commits murder in the first degree if, with a purpose of causing the death
of another person, the person causes the death of another person. Ark. Code Ann. §
5-10-102(a)(2) (Repl. 2006). A person attempts to commit an offense if he or she purposely
engages in conduct that constitutes a substantial step in a course of conduct intended to
culminate in the commission of an offense. Ark. Code Ann. § 5-3-201(a)(2) (Repl. 2006). A
person acts “purposely” with respect to his or her conduct or a result of his or her conduct
when it is the person’s conscious object to engage in conduct of that nature or to cause the
result. Ark. Code Ann. § 5-2-202 (1) (Repl. 2006).
When viewing the evidence favorable to the State, we hold that the trial court did not
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err in denying Hawkins’s directed-verdict motions on attempted first-degree murder. At trial,
Dennis testified that he and Cole were starting to eat pizza when Hawkins and two other men
barged into Cole’s apartment. Hawkins started making threats to Dennis concerning Dennis’s
efforts to visit his child.1 Hawkins said he would burn Dennis, and Dennis responded that
Hawkins “might as well go ahead [and] . . . burn me now . . . because I’m going to see my
child.” At that point, one of the men with Hawkins, Walter Morehead, handed Hawkins a
gun. According to Dennis, Hawkins pointed the gun at Dennis’s heart and fired. Dennis
threw his arm up and was shot in the arm. Dennis ran back into the apartment and upstairs,
thinking that Hawkins was following behind. As Dennis ran, he was shot again in the hip.
Hawkins and the other men immediately fled, at which time Dennis went downstairs, called
911 to report the incident, and then drove himself to the emergency room. Dennis’s injuries
required emergency surgery. At the time of trial, he still had a bullet in his hip, walked with
a limp, and suffered from nerve damage and pain.
Cole testified that when Dennis and Hawkins were arguing, Cole saw Morehead hand
a gun to Hawkins, and then Cole saw Hawkins shoot Dennis three or four times. Police
testimony at trial confirmed that three gun-shell casings were found near the front door of
Cole’s apartment. There was further testimony that there was a blood trail leading from the
front door of the apartment, inside the apartment, up the stairs, and in the parking lot. Finally,
Hawkins’s girlfriend testified that she dropped off Hawkins, Morehead, and a third man at
Cole’s apartment and waited in the car for them to return. While she waited, she heard two
Dennis fathered a child with Hawkins’s girlfriend.
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or three gunshots. She saw Hawkins run back to the car and they left. All of this evidence is
of sufficient force and character to compel a conclusion beyond suspicion or conjecture that
Hawkins attempted and intended to kill Dennis.
Hawkins’s argument primarily relies upon the credibility of the State’s witnesses. He
contends that the testimony of Cole and Dennis was inconsistent—and thus
incredible—because one testified that the shooting took place inside the apartment while the
other testified that the shooting took place just outside the apartment. At no time does
Hawkins explain how this inconsistency is relevant to the conviction. Nevertheless, we do
not attempt to weigh the evidence or assess the credibility of witnesses. Harmon v. State, 340
Ark. 18, 24, 8 S.W.3d 472, 476 (2000). That lies within the province of the trier of fact.
Harmon, 340 Ark. at 24, 8 S.W.3d at 476. We are bound by the fact finder’s determination
on the credibility of witnesses. Id., 8 S.W.3d at 476. Likewise, we have long held that the
trier of fact is free to believe all or part of a witness’s testimony. Id. at 25, 8 S.W.3d at 476.
Moreover, inconsistent testimony does not render proof insufficient as a matter of law, and
one eyewitness’s testimony is sufficient to sustain a conviction. Id., 8 S.W.3d at 476. Clearly,
the jury believed the testimony of Dennis and Cole and was not concerned with the small
discrepancy as to where precisely the shooting took place. We are bound by this
determination. Id., 8 S.W.3d at 476.
Hawkins also challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the conviction for
first-degree battery. His argument on this point mirrors his argument on the attempted firstdegree conviction—lack of intent and inconsistent testimony from Dennis and Cole. Because
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Hawkins’s motion for directed verdict on first-degree battery at trial did not include the
argument that the State failed to prove intent to cause physical injury to Dennis, we do not
address it on appeal. Ark. R. Crim. P. 33.1(c) (2009). This leaves the inconsistent testimony
of Dennis and Cole as Hawkins’s lone argument relating to the first-degree battery
conviction.
A person commits battery in the first degree if, with the purpose of causing serious
physical injury to another person, the person causes serious physical injury to any person by
means of a deadly weapon. Ark. Code Ann. § 5-13-201(a)(1) (Supp. 2009). “Serious physical
injury” is defined as physical injury that creates a substantial risk of death or that causes
protracted disfigurement, protracted impairment of health, or loss or protracted impairment
of the function of any bodily member or organ. Ark. Code Ann. § 5-1-102(21) (Supp. 2009).
The facts as outlined above provide more than sufficient evidence supporting the
conviction for first-degree battery. Dennis suffered serious physical injuries at the hand of
Hawkins. The injuries required surgery, and Hawkins continues to suffer with pain and
impairment as a result of the injuries. For the same reasons set forth above, we find no merit
to Hawkins’s argument that the inconsistent testimony of Dennis and Cole warrants reversal
of the first-degree battery conviction.
Finally, Hawkins challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the conviction
for felon in possession of a firearm. Arkansas Code Annotated section 5-73-103(a)(1) (Supp.
2009) provides that no person shall possess or own any firearm who has been convicted of a
felony. Hawkins’s only argument regarding this conviction revolves around the inconsistent
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testimony of Dennis and Cole. However, Hawkins again fails to explain how the
inconsistency is relevant to the possession-of-a-firearm conviction. Moreover, Hawkins’s own
evidence, a statement by Morehead that was read into evidence, clearly established that he
gave Hawkins a gun. This evidence, in conjunction with the testimony of Dennis and Cole
that Hawkins had a gun is more than sufficient evidence that Hawkins possessed a gun.
Finally, the record includes evidence that Hawkins had been convicted of three prior felonies.
As such, we hold that the trial court did not err in denying the motions for directed verdict
regarding the conviction for felon in possession of a firearm.
Affirmed.
GLADWIN and MARSHALL, JJ., agree.
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