Carter v. State
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
Cite as 2009 Ark. App. 683
ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS
DIVISION III
No. CACR 08-1385
Opinion Delivered
EDWARD LEE CARTER
APPELLANT
V.
STATE OF ARKANSAS
OCTOBER 21, 2009
APPEAL FROM THE GARLAND
COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT,
[NO. CR-08-144-1]
HONORABLE JOHN HOMER
WRIGHT, JUDGE
APPELLEE
AFFIRMED
JOHN B. ROBBINS, Judge
Appellant Edward Lee Carter was tried before a jury in Garland County Circuit Court
and found guilty of aggravated robbery. Appellant challenges the sufficiency of proof that he
actually committed a theft from Wal-Mart on Albert Pike in Hot Springs, Arkansas, in order
to sustain a conviction for aggravated robbery. The State contends that it presented sufficient
proof that appellant left the store and brandished a firearm for the purpose of committing a
theft of property (video games and DVDs) from Wal-Mart. After reviewing the evidence
under the proper standard of review, we affirm.
Arkansas Code Annotated section 5-12-102(a) (Repl. 2006) states in relevant part that
in order to prove that a person has committed robbery, the State must show that the person
employed or threatened to employ physical force upon another person, with the purpose of
committing a felony or misdemeanor theft. A defendant can be convicted of robbery even
Cite as 2009 Ark. App. 683
if no property is actually taken because the emphasis is on the express or implied threat of
physical harm to the victim. See Ross v. State, 346 Ark. 225, 57 S.W.3d 152 (2001); Harris
v. State, 308 Ark. 150, 823 S.W.2d 860 (1992).
When an appellant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support a conviction
on appeal, this court's test is whether there is substantial evidence to support the verdict. Britt
v. State, 83 Ark. App. 117, 118 S.W.3d 140 (2003). Substantial evidence is evidence that is
of sufficient force and character that it will, with reasonable certainty, compel a conclusion
one way or another. Cluck v. State, 365 Ark. 166, 226 S.W.3d 780 (2006). In determining
whether the evidence is substantial, evidence is viewed in the light most favorable to the
State, considering only the evidence that supports the verdict. Bell v. State, 371 Ark. 375, 266
S.W.3d 696 (2007). The means to challenge the sufficiency of the evidence is via a motion
for directed verdict. Ark. R. Crim. P. 33.1(a) (2008).
In this case, the State presented testimony from Salli Redding and Jessica Brewer.
Redding was shopping. Brewer had come to the Wal-Mart with appellant, and she too was
shopping. Both Redding and Brewer observed appellant place video games from Brewer’s
shopping cart into the front of his pants. Brewer checked out of the garden center,
purchasing Christmas lights. Redding watched as appellant left the store with Brewer.
Redding followed them outside and confronted appellant about leaving the store with
merchandise stuck inside his pants, at which point appellant drew a gun from his pocket and
pointed it at Redding. Appellant left with Brewer. Brewer testified that she saw appellant
-2-
Cite as 2009 Ark. App. 683
pull a gun but did not see him point it at Redding. Brewer accompanied appellant to a
nearby resale store, where he sold the items as used electronics.
Appellant argues, as he did at trial, that the State failed to prove that he had actual
unauthorized possession of the alleged items from Wal-Mart, that there was no proof that any
security alarm sounded as he exited the store, and that no representative of the store testified
to a loss of merchandise. Thus, appellant contends that without proof of an actual theft, there
could be no aggravated robbery. We disagree.
As noted above, the focus is on the threat made to the victim, which was established
by Redding’s testimony. While there was substantial evidence that appellant completed a
theft, the State was not required to prove the actual accomplishment of a theft, only the
purpose to do so. Compare McKinzy v. State, 313 Ark. 334, 853 S.W.2d 888 (1993)(holding
that the offense is complete when physical force is threatened; no transfer of property need
take place). See also Ark. Code Ann. § 5-36-102(c) (establishing a presumption that “knowing
concealment, upon an actor’s person” of store goods is done for the purpose of depriving the
owner of that property). Under our standard of review, we hold that the State’s proof met
that burden.
As a result, we affirm the conviction.
KINARD and HENRY, JJ., agree.
-3-
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.