Masterson-Heard v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs.
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Cite as 2009 Ark. App. 623
ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS
DIVISION IV
No. CA09-504
DAWN MASTERSON-HEARD and
JAMES HEARD
APPELLANTS
V.
ARKANSAS DEPARTMENT OF
HUMAN SERVICES
APPELLEE
Opinion Delivered September
30, 2009
APPEAL FROM THE MARION
COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT,
[NO. JV07-45-2]
HONORABLE GARY ISBELL, JUDGE
AFFIRMED
ROBERT J. GLADWIN, Judge
Appellants Dawn Masterson-Heard and James Heard appeal from an order terminating
their parental rights in K.H. (born July 3, 2006). They do not challenge the sufficiency of the
evidence to support the termination order. Instead, they argue that the Arkansas Department
of Human Services (“DHS”) did not meet the notice requirements of the Indian Child
Welfare Act (“ICWA”), which provides enhanced substantive and procedural safeguards in
termination cases involving Indian children. Appellants also argue that the circuit court failed
to make an express finding of the ICWA’s applicability. We affirm.
On June 1, 2007, James Heard appeared at a DHS office with K.H. seeking legal
advice. James told DHS workers that he had no place to live and that he was afraid of K.H.’s
mother, Dawn Masterson-Heard. James also said that Dawn had hit K.H. and thrown her
Cite as 2009 Ark. App. 623
against a wall, and that Dawn spoke of suicide. According to a DHS affidavit, James exhibited
an “impaired” thought process, and his conversation was rambling and disjointed. DHS placed
a seventy-two-hour hold on K.H., and the circuit court granted emergency custody to DHS
on June 5, 2007. K.H. remained in DHS custody for approximately twenty months while
DHS provided services to appellants. In February 2009, the circuit court terminated
appellants’ parental rights after finding that James had engaged in violent and aggressive
behavior in the home while K.H. was present; that Dawn could not maintain steady
employment and was fired for stealing from her last job; and that the couple did not obtain
appropriate housing or follow recommendations regarding counseling and medications.
At the outset of the case in 2007, James claimed that he was eligible for membership
in several Indian tribes. During the termination hearing in January 2009, he invoked the
ICWA and produced a membership card from the Western Cherokee Nation of Arkansas and
Missouri. The circuit court heard evidence on the termination issue but postponed its ruling
for ten days to allow briefs on the question of whether the Western Cherokee Nation of
Arkansas and Missouri was federally recognized for purposes of the ICWA. The court
received no additional evidence or briefs on the matter and entered the termination order
approximately thirty days later. Appellants now argue that the court failed to comply with the
ICWA.
The ICWA, 25 U.S.C. §§ 1901-1963 (1995), was enacted by Congress in 1978. The
Act establishes minimum federal standards for the removal of Indian children from their
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families and the placement of Indian children into foster or adoptive homes. Congress found
that an alarmingly high percentage of Indian families were torn apart through the removal of
Indian children by the non-tribal public and private agencies, and that an alarmingly high
percentage of such children were placed in non-Indian foster and adoptive homes. 25 U.S.C.
§ 1901(4). Congress further determined that the states often failed to recognize the essential
tribal relations of Indian people and the cultural and social standards prevailing in Indian
communities. 25 U.S.C. § 1901(5). Consequently, the Act provides that, in any state
proceeding for the termination of parental rights to an Indian child, the state court shall
transfer the case to the Indian child’s tribe or, if the tribe declines the transfer, permit the tribe
to intervene in state court. See 25 U.S.C. § 1911. The Act also provides that a court cannot
terminate parental rights to an Indian child unless there is evidence beyond a reasonable
doubt, including the testimony of qualified expert witnesses, that continued custody of the
child by the parent is likely to result in serious emotional or physical damage to the child. See
25 U.S.C. § 1912(f).
In order to serve these interests, the ICWA requires the party seeking termination of
parental rights to an Indian child to notify the child’s tribe of the proceeding. The pertinent
part of the Act reads as follows:
In any involuntary proceeding in a State court, where the court knows or has reason to
know that an Indian child is involved, the party seeking the foster care placement of, or
termination of parental rights to, an Indian child shall notify ... the Indian child’s tribe, by
registered mail with return receipt requested, of the pending proceedings and of their
right to intervention. If the identity or location of ... the tribe cannot be determined,
such notice shall be given to the [Secretary of the Interior] in like manner, who shall
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have fifteen days after receipt to provide the requisite notice to ... the tribe. No ...
termination of parental rights proceeding shall be held until at least ten days after receipt of notice
by the ... tribe or the Secretary.
25 U.S.C. § 1912(a) (emphasis added).
Appellants argue that the circuit court violated section 1912(a) because the court knew
or had reason to know that K.H. was an Indian child and terminated appellants’ parental rights
without notice to the child’s tribe. We conclude that the ICWA did not govern these
proceedings.
The ICWA applies only in cases involving an “Indian child.” An Indian child is an
unmarried person under age eighteen who is either 1) a member of an Indian tribe, or 2)
eligible for membership in an Indian tribe and the biological child of a member of an Indian
tribe. 25 U.S.C. § 1903(4). To qualify as an Indian child under this definition, the child or
its parent must be a member of an “Indian tribe.” The Act defines an Indian tribe as
any Indian tribe, band, nation, or other organized group or community of Indians
recognized as eligible for the services provided to Indians by the [Secretary of the Interior] because
of their status as Indians ....
25 U.S.C. § 1903(8) (emphasis added).
At the termination hearing, James, as K.H.’s parent, claimed membership in the
Western Cherokee Nation of Arkansas and Missouri. However, that tribe is not an “Indian
tribe” for purposes of the ICWA.1 The Western Cherokee Nation of Arkansas and Missouri
1
Earlier in the case, James claimed membership eligibility in other tribes, including the
Choctaw. However, at the termination hearing, he asserted membership only in the Western
Cherokee Nation of Arkansas and Missouri, and presented his membership credentials
accordingly. James’s counsel mentioned the Choctaw tribe prior to the hearing, but the court
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does not appear on the federal government’s list of tribes eligible to receive federal services.
See 73 Fed. Reg. 18553-57 (Apr. 4, 2008); 72 Fed. Reg. 13648-52 (Mar. 22, 2007). If a
child’s or a parent’s tribe does not appear on the list of tribes eligible to receive federal
services, the ICWA is not applicable. In re Adoption of A.M.C., 368 Ark. 369, 246 S.W.3d 426
(2007).
Because the ICWA clearly does not apply in light of Mr. Heard’s tribal affiliation, he
can show no prejudice from the court’s failure to give notice to the tribe. An appellant must
show prejudice to obtain reversal. See Wade v. Ark. Dep’t of Human Servs., 337 Ark. 353, 990
S.W.2d 509 (1999). Furthermore, a remand by this court for the purpose of serving ICWA
notice would have no practical effect, given that the tribe is not eligible for notice under the
ICWA. We do not render advisory opinions or answer academic questions. Yu v. Metro. Fire
Extinguisher Co., 94 Ark. App. 317, 230 S.W.3d 299 (2006). Accordingly, we affirm the
termination order.
Appellants also argue that the circuit court should have ruled on the applicability of the
ICWA. The court impliedly did so by asking for briefs on the ICWA’s applicability and,
when no additional evidence or briefs were received, entering the termination order.
Affirmed.
GLOVER AND HENRY, JJ., agree.
stated that it had received a report from the Choctaw Nation and that K.H. had no history with
that tribe.
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