Kennedy v. State
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Cite as 2009 Ark. App. 638
ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS
DIVISION IV
No. CACR 09-388
STEPHEN KENNEDY
APPELLANT
V.
STATE OF ARKANSAS
APPELLEE
Opinion Delivered September 30, 2009
APPEAL FROM THE LOGAN
COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT,
[NO. CR-2007-98]
HONORABLE ELIZABETH W.
DANIELSON, JUDGE
AFFIRMED
COURTNEY HUDSON HENRY, Judge
Appellant Stephen Kennedy appeals a Logan County Circuit Court order convicting
him of leaving the scene of an accident, two counts of first-degree assault, and third-degree
battery. From those convictions, Kennedy received concurrent sentences totaling three-andone-half-years’ imprisonment. For reversal, Kennedy argues that the circuit court erred by
failing to grant his mistrial motion. We affirm.
On December 7, 2007, Kennedy and his wife, Lori, became involved in an altercation
at their home. According to Lori, she and Kennedy often argued about James Luttrell, her
eighteen-year-old son from a previous relationship. After she and Kennedy drank alcoholic
beverages that particular afternoon, they began to argue about Luttrell and a vehicle that he
had wrecked. Luttrell was present in the home, and upon hearing loud voices, he went into
the living room and witnessed Kennedy slap and kick his mother. Luttrell then tackled
Cite as 2009 Ark. App. 638
Kennedy and began hitting him. Lori and her younger son, Clifford Kennedy, escaped to a
pickup truck, where they were later joined by Luttrell. Lori drove her sons from the
premises, and when they reached the bottom of a hill, she stopped and allowed Luttrell to
drive because she had been drinking.
Meanwhile, Kennedy decided to drive himself to the Booneville Police Department
to file a report. According to Kennedy, he drove forty-five miles per hour to catch up with
his family, trailed the Ford truck, and struck the truck from behind with his vehicle. Kennedy
hit the pickup two more times, and Luttrell lost control of the vehicle, which hit a utility pole
and overturned. As a result of the accident, Clifford sustained multiple injuries.
At trial, Kennedy admitted that he did not stop after the accident but instead drove
home and parked in a place that was not visible from the driveway. Kennedy testified that
he was angry that evening and intended to stop the pickup truck so he could attack his
stepson.
During closing arguments, the prosecutor stated his personal opinion regarding
Kennedy’s intent in striking the vehicle. As a result, Kennedy moved for a mistrial, which
the circuit court denied. For his sole point on appeal, Kennedy argues that the circuit court
erred in denying his motion. Specifically, he asserts that the prosecutor’s statement of personal
opinion in his closing argument was highly prejudicial and warranted a mistrial.
Appellant’s argument on appeal is based on the following events that transpired during
closing argument in the guilt phase of the trial. The prosecutor stated, “There has been ample
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Cite as 2009 Ark. App. 638
testimony over the aggravated assault and the battery one. There’s no doubt in [my] mind
that Mr. Kennedy intended to harm those individuals seriously.” Defense counsel objected,
requested a mistrial, and the trial court denied the motion. Defense counsel asked the court
to admonish the jury, and the trial court did. The prosecutor then remarked that he did not
intend to convey his personal opinion but rather that the evidence indicated what Kennedy’s
intentions were.
It is well settled that a mistrial is an extreme remedy that should be granted only when
the error is beyond repair and cannot be corrected by curative relief. Brown v. State, 74 Ark.
App. 281, 47 S.W.3d 314 (2001). An admonition to the jury usually cures a prejudicial
statement unless the statement is so patently inflammatory that justice cannot be served by
continuing the trial. Walker v. State, 91 Ark. App. 300, 210 S.W.3d 157 (2005). A trial court
has wide discretion in granting or denying a motion for a mistrial, and the appellate court will
not disturb the court’s decision absent an abuse of discretion or manifest prejudice to the
movant. Id.
Furthermore, the trial court is in the best position to evaluate the potential for
prejudice based on the prosecutor’s remarks. Bullock v. State, 317 Ark. 204, 876 S.W.2d 579
(1994). The trial court gives some leeway to counsel in closing argument, and counsel is free
to argue every plausible inference that can be drawn from the testimony. Newman v. State,
353 Ark. 258, 106 S.W.3d 438 (2003). Therefore, a trial court is given broad discretion in
controlling the arguments of counsel, such that, absent an abuse of that discretion, the trial
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court’s decision will not be disturbed on appeal. Cox v. State, 345 Ark. 391, 47 S.W.3d 244
(2001); Cook v. State, 283 Ark. 246, 675 S.W.2d 366 (1984).
Here, we do not find error in the trial court’s denial of Kennedy’s motion for a
mistrial. The trial court admonished the jury to disregard the prosecutor’s statement
concerning his thoughts on Kennedy’s intent. The prosecutor then reaffirmed the court’s
admonition as he continued his closing remarks. Therefore, we hold that any potential
prejudice from the prosecutor’s statement was properly remedied by the trial court. We also
agree with the State that the evidence of guilt is so overwhelming that there is no possibility
that Kennedy suffered any prejudice as a result of the prosecutor’s statement. Moore v. State,
87 Ark. App. 385, 192 S.W.3d 271 (2004) (declaring that error is harmless when the evidence
of guilt is overwhelming). Accordingly, we affirm the circuit court’s denial of Kennedy’s
motion for mistrial.
Affirmed.
GLADWIN and GLOVER, JJ., agree.
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