Bagley v. State
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ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS
DIVISION II
No. CACR08-905
Opinion Delivered
CHARLES T. BAGLEY
APPELLANT
V.
STATE OF ARKANSAS
September 9, 2009
APPEAL FROM THE SEBASTIAN
COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT
[NOS. CR-2004-1111; CR-2006-79]
HONORABLE J. MICHAEL
FITZHUGH, JUDGE
APPELLEE
AFFIRMED
JOHN MAUZY PITTMAN, Judge
Charles T. Bagley appeals from the revocation of his prior suspended sentences. He
contends that the decision to revoke is not supported by evidence that he violated the
conditions of the suspension. We affirm.
In April 2005, appellant pled guilty to possession of drug paraphernalia, and imposition
of sentence was suspended for five years conditioned on appellant paying fines, fees, and court
costs. In March 2006, appellant pled guilty to residential burglary and second-degree
domestic battery and was sentenced to a term of imprisonment plus an additional period of
suspended imposition of sentence. The latter suspension was conditioned on appellant
refraining from having any offensive contact with the victim, Angel Richardson. Following
appellant’s release from imprisonment and within the period of these suspensions, the State
filed a petition to revoke alleging that appellant violated the conditions of the suspensions by
failing to pay fines, fees, and costs, and by repeatedly attempting to contact Angel Richardson.
This resulted in an order entered May 9, 2007, modifying the conditions of suspension from
“no offensive contact” with Angel Richardson to “no contact” with her whatsoever.
The State filed a second petition to revoke in December 2007, alleging that appellant
had again violated the conditions of his suspensions by failing to pay fines and by failing to
abide by the no-contact order. After a hearing, the trial court found that appellant had
violated those conditions, revoked his suspensions, and sentenced him to a term of
imprisonment. This appeal followed.
In order to revoke a suspension, the trial court must find by a preponderance of the
evidence that the defendant inexcusably violated a condition of the suspension. Ark. Code
Ann. § 5-4-309(d) (Supp. 2009). The State bears the burden of proof, but it need only prove
that the defendant committed one violation of the conditions. Richardson v. State, 85 Ark.
App. 347, 157 S.W.3d 536 (2004). On appeal from a revocation, the appellant has the
burden of showing that the trial court’s findings are clearly against the preponderance of the
evidence. Id. Evidence that is insufficient for a criminal conviction may be sufficient for the
revocation of a suspended sentence. Palmer v. State, 60 Ark. App. 97, 959 S.W.2d 420 (1998).
In making our review, we defer to the superior position of the trial court to determine
questions of credibility and weight to be given to the evidence. Jones v. State, 52 Ark. App.
179, 916 S.W.2d 766 (1996).
Angel Richardson testified that appellant repeatedly violated the no-contact order by
sending her vulgar, offensive, and vaguely threatening communications. She also testified that
she communicated with appellant’s mother to keep track of his whereabouts because she was
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afraid of him and wanted to know where he was and what sort of mood he was in. Miss
Richardson also testified that she and appellant attend the same church and that she saw him
there on two occasions. On one such occasion, she testified, appellant manipulated her into
driving him to his halfway house by accusing her of causing him to miss his ride. She also
admitted that she had spent a night with appellant in a motel when the no-offensive-contact
order was in effect.
Appellant testified that he had not contacted Miss Richardson since his release. He did
not categorically deny making the communications, but stated that they were made before
the no-contact order went into effect. Appellant’s mother testified that Miss Richardson had
initiated contact with appellant and that she had gone to appellant’s halfway house to do so.
Appellant, however, denied that Miss Richardson had ever visited or communicated with him
at the halfway house.
The record fairly shows that Miss Richardson did have consensual contact with
appellant when the “no offensive contact” order was in effect. The rest of the evidence was
in sharp dispute. The issue turns on an assessment of the credibility of the witnesses and,
giving the trial judge’s credibility assessments the deference to which they are entitled, we
cannot say that the trial court clearly erred in finding that appellant violated the conditions
of his suspensions by making repeated offensive contacts with Miss Richardson while the “no
contact” order was in effect. Because violation of a single condition of suspension is sufficient
to support revocation, we need not address the sufficiency of the evidence to support a
finding that appellant willfully failed to pay his fine and fees.
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Affirmed.
VAUGHT, C.J., and GLADWIN, J., agree.
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CACR08-905
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