Hamilton v. State
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ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS
DIVISION II
No. CACR08-1040
Opinion Delivered
CHRISTOPHER TODD HAMILTON
APPELLANT
V.
STATE OF ARKANSAS
September 2, 2009
APPEAL FROM THE OUACHITA
COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT
[NO. CR-07-304-3]
HONORABLE EDWIN A. KEATON,
JUDGE
APPELLEE
AFFIRMED
JOHN MAUZY PITTMAN, Judge
Appellant was charged with violation of a protective order and battery in the second
degree. After a jury trial, he was found guilty of violating the protective order and not guilty
of battery in the second degree. On appeal, he argues that the evidence is insufficient to
support his conviction for violating a protective order. We affirm.
Violating a protective order is a criminal offense pursuant to Ark. Code Ann. §
5-53-134 (Repl. 2005). In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence to support a criminal
conviction, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the appellee and affirm the
judgment if the verdict is supported by substantial evidence. Lair v. State, 19 Ark. App. 172,
718 S.W.2d 467 (1986). Substantial evidence is evidence of sufficient certainty and precision
to compel a conclusion one way or another and pass beyond mere suspicion or conjecture.
Renderos v. State, 92 Ark. App. 293, 213 S.W.3d 43 (2005).
At trial, Garland Hamilton testified that he was eighty-two years of age and was
appellant’s father. He obtained an order of protection after appellant threw a glass at him,
followed him into the bedroom, and hit him. The order of protection, filed September 14,
2007, prohibited appellant from having any further contact with his father and from
committing further acts of abuse. Appellant’s father testified that appellant had previously
lived in his home and that appellant asked for and received permission to pick up his
belongings at his father’s home on October 28, 2007. Appellant’s father testified that, while
appellant was at the father’s home, appellant without provocation struck him in the face with
sufficient force to cause prolonged bleeding. Appellant testified and denied having gone to
his father’s home on the night in question.
Appellant argues that the evidence does not support a finding that he violated the
protective order because (1) the jury’s verdict acquitting him of battery in the second degree
established that he did not strike his father as charged, and (2) he did not violate the order’s
prohibition against further contact because his father admitted that he gave appellant
permission to come to his home to pick up his belongings that night. We do not agree.
First, appellant is mistaken in his assertion that the jury’s verdict of not guilty for
battery means that no battery occurred as a matter of law:
The law is clear that a defendant may not attack his conviction on one
count because it is inconsistent with an acquittal on another count. Res
judicata concepts are not applicable to inconsistent verdicts; the jury is free to
exercise its historic power of lenity if it believes that a conviction on one count
would provide sufficient punishment.
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CACR08-1040
McVay v. State, 312 Ark. 73, 77, 847 S.W.2d 28, 31 (1993) (quoting United States v. Romano,
879 F.2d 1056 (2d Cir. 1989)). Furthermore, although it was established that appellant’s
father did permit appellant to come to the father’s house to pick up appellant’s belongings,
appellant’s father clearly did not in any way induce appellant to believe that he was permitted
to violate that portion of the order of protection that prohibited him from engaging in
conduct that would put his father “in reasonable fear of bodily injury.” We hold that the
evidence is sufficient to support appellant’s conviction.
Affirmed.
VAUGHT, C.J., and GLADWIN, J., agree.
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CACR08-1040
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