Moses Mullins v. Abernathy Motor Co.
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION
ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS
DIVISION III
CA 08-541
No.
Opinion Delivered
MOSES MULLINS
APPELLANT
NOVEMBER 5, 2008
APPEAL FROM THE MISSISSIPPI
COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT,
[NO. CV-07-142]
V.
HONORABLE DAVID N. LASER,
JUDGE
ABERNATHY MOTOR CO.
APPELLEE
AFFIRMED
JOHN B. ROBBINS, Judge
Appellant Moses Mullins appeals the jury verdict entered in his favor that awarded him
$1000 in compensatory damages from appellee Abernathy Motor Company. Appellant
purchased a used car from appellee but was never provided a title document. Appellant
ultimately returned the vehicle to appellee and gave notice that he was rescinding the contract
by rejecting or revoking his acceptance of the vehicle. He then sued appellee seeking
recovery of the down-payment and monthly payments he had made, plus punitive,
consequential, and incidental damages. Appellee defended itself from the complaint, was
allowed to put on evidence of offsetting benefit to appellant to reduce any damage award and
to have the jury instructed to consider offset, and was granted a directed verdict on punitive
damages. After the jury determined that due to the breach, appellant was entitled to $1000
in compensatory damages, appellant filed this appeal.
On appeal, appellant contends that he is entitled to a new trial, alleging the following
trial-court errors: (1) the grant of directed verdict to appellee on the issue of punitive damages;
(2) the evidentiary ruling that allowed appellee to present evidence of an offset; (3) the giving
of a jury instruction for it to consider reducing appellant’s damages by the benefit appellant
received under the contract; and (4) the exclusion of appellant’s evidence of incidental and
consequential damages resulting from appellee’s breach of contract.
The following evidence was presented at this jury trial conducted in Mississippi
County Circuit Court. Many of the facts were undisputed, as relative to the purchase and use
of the vehicle. The parties differed on the manner in which the title document was handled.
Appellant bought a 2001 Lincoln Towncar with approximately 85,000 miles on it at
appellee’s Blytheville, Arkansas, location on November 2, 2005, for a price of $12,995.
Appellant paid $1000 as a down payment and contracted to pay the balance in semi-monthly
installments. Appellee’s primary business location was in Jonesboro, and its business practice
was to keep titles and other paperwork at the Jonesboro location.
At the time of purchase, appellant agreed in writing to appellee’s procedure for
acquiring title and registering the vehicle with the state governmental authorities. That
agreement ensured the understanding that appellee would hold the title until the purchaser
was prepared to register the vehicle, that there were five critical documents necessary for
registration, and that appellee would mail the document by certified mail or allow the
purchaser to pick it up at any time when ready to register. The agreement also noted that
-2-
there would be costs assessed to the purchaser if, due to the fault of the purchaser, appellee
provided additional copies or duplicates of any of the necessary registration documents.
Appellee, via its owner and employees, testified that attempts were made to send the
title to appellant via certified mail, but it was returned, although there were no postal receipts
to corroborate that testimony. Appellee also attempted to send the title from the Jonesboro
location to the Blytheville location via courier. When it became evident that the title was lost
in the shuffle between the business locations, appellee initiated the process of acquiring a
replacement title. Thereafter, the lost title resurfaced within the business entities.
Appellee’s owner testified that it was in his business’s best interest to have its customers
register the vehicles with the State so that their banking business would be uninterrupted and
so that their liens would be perfected. Another employee of appellee testified that after the
purchase, appellant did not ask for the title but rather requested extended temporary tags from
appellee, because appellant said he could not afford the sales tax due.
Appellant testified that he wanted appellee to refund his down payment plus all
monthly installments he had paid for a total of $6,347.32. Appellant agreed that the dealership
gave him a few extensions on temporary tags, but contended that it did so because it could
not give him his title, which appellant wanted and asked for on several occasions. Appellant
denied that appellee mailed him the certificate because his address, where he lived with his
parents, had never changed. Appellant said he was employed and was able to pay sales tax,
but he could not register without the title document. Appellant complained that once the
temporary tags ran out for the last time, he had to resort to borrowing a family member’s car,
-3-
but he also drove the Lincoln for some of the months he possessed it. Appellant stated that
he was afraid to drive without proper registration and tags. Appellant said he became
dissatisfied with the run-around, engaged counsel, and the lawsuit was initiated. Appellant
returned the vehicle to appellee in April 2007 with 110,000 miles on it.
Appellee successfully argued to the judge to direct a verdict on punitive damages.
Appellant unsuccessfully argued to the judge to give an instruction on incidental or
consequential damages. The jury was instructed on the elements of a contract for the sale of
goods; the duty of the seller to deliver title; the duty of good faith and fair dealing; the burden
of proof on appellant to prove a rejection of the goods or revocation of acceptance; and
compensatory damages to include the contract price “reduced by any expense saved in the
consequence of the breach by Abernathy Motor Company.” After the jury considered the
evidence, it rendered a plaintiff’s verdict for $1000 in compensation for appellant’s loss. This
appeal followed.
First, we consider the directed verdict on punitive damages. Appellant rested his
contention on the assertion that the car dealer wrongly deprived him of title to the vehicle
for more than a year, which was inconvenient and ultimately led to his lessened use of the
vehicle. The trial judge agreed that there was an issue of fact on compensatory damages but
not on punitive damages because there was a lack of evidence of bad faith, or willful or
wanton conduct. We agree with the trial court’s assessment.
Appellant correctly states that our supreme court has held punitive damages to be
recoverable in a breach-of-contract case pursued under the Uniform Commercial Code. See
-4-
Gordon v. Planters & Merchants Bancshares, Inc., 326 Ark. 1046, 935 S.W.2d 544 (1996). The
level of wrongdoing must meet with a wantonness or conscious indifference to the
consequences such that malice may be inferred. See id. Appellant argues that he presented
evidence of such conduct that should have been considered by the jury, not taken from it by
the trial judge by granting a directed verdict. We disagree.
A claim for punitive damages must be submitted to the jury if there is any substantial
evidence to support a punitive damages instruction. See Stein v. Lukas, 308 Ark. 74, 823
S.W.2d 832 (1992). The trial court must apply an objective standard, focusing on whether
the defendant knew or should have known that in light of the surrounding circumstances its
conduct would naturally or probably result in injury and that it continued such conduct in
reckless disregard of the circumstances from which malice may be inferred. HCA Health
Services v. Nat’l Bank of Commerce, 294 Ark. 525, 745 S.W.2d 120 (1988). On appeal of the
grant of a directed verdict, we determine whether appellant presented substantial evidence of
such malicious behavior. See Schmidt v. Stearman, 98 Ark. App. 167, 253 S.W.3d 35 (2007).
There was no substantial evidence, and we hold that the trial court did not err in finding such
substantial evidence lacking. The trial court agreed, as do we, that the evidence viewed most
favorably to appellant shows inefficiency and poor business practices. However, the evidence
simply did not rise to the level required to meet the threshold for punishing the defendant in
this instance. Compare Carpenter v. Automobile Club Interinsurance Exchange, 58 F.3d 1296 (8th
Cir. 1995) (applying Arkansas law and its strict standards for giving of punitive-damage
-5-
instruction, and affirming district court’s refusal to give punitive-damage instruction); City
Nat’l Bank of Fort Smith v. Goodwin, 301 Ark. 182, 783 S.W.2d 335 (1990).
Appellant next contends that the trial court abused its discretion by permitting appellee
to present evidence of offset, i.e., evidence of the benefit of the use of the Lincoln for over
a year or the saving of a necessary expense, to reduce any amount of appellant’s damages. The
trial court is afforded considerable discretion in evidentiary rulings, which will not be
overturned on appeal absent an abuse of discretion. Dodson v. Allstate Ins. Co., 345 Ark. 430,
47 S.W.3d 866 (2001). Appellant’s attorney did object to appellee’s cross examination of
appellant, but after a long discussion among the attorneys and the judge, the judge
admonished appellee’s attorney to move on with his cross examination of appellant and avoid
asking questions about other damages that appellant might want. The case proceeded without
incident on this point. We cannot discern any abuse of discretion when the trial court limited
appellee’s attorney at the point of objection. When a party receives the relief he requests, he
has no basis to seek reversal.
The preceding point leads to the next, which is appellant’s allegation that the trial court
erred in giving the jury an instruction on offset, by giving a version of Arkansas Model Jury
Instruction 2519: “Any damages recoverable by Moses Mullins are to be reduced by any
expenses saved in consequence of the breach by Abernathy Motor Company.”
We will not reverse a trial court’s decision to give an instruction unless the trial court
abused its discretion. Marx v. Huron Little Rock, 88 Ark. App. 284, 198 S.W.3d 127 (2004).
Appellant agrees that the instruction itself is proper but contends that the provision on offset
-6-
was inapplicable to the buyer’s remedy under the U.C.C. that he was pursuing. Appellant
contends that he did not sue for damages for non-delivery, which would permit reduction of
damages by offset. Ark. Code Ann. § 4-2-713. Rather, appellant contends he sued because
of non-conforming goods, which permits full reimbursement of the contract price. In
response, appellee notes that Ark. Code Ann. § 16-63-206 allows for setoff to be pleaded in
any action for recovery of money, and further, that such setoff claims have been allowed in
suits based upon the U.C.C. and the return of vehicles. Appellee further notes that the
objection at trial, and the only aspect preserved for review here, is that there was no evidence
of expenses saved.
We need not decide whether the setoff provision was applicable to the remedy
appellant was seeking because appellant failed to preserve any objection on that issue. The
attorneys discussed the jury instructions with the judge, and the judge noted that appellant was
objecting to the offset instruction. Appellant’s attorney clarified his objection by stating that
he did not think there was any evidence of expenses saved by appellant. Parties are bound by
the scope and nature of their objections at trial.
Thus, the question on appeal is limited to whether there was any evidence to support
appellee’s contention that appellant was saved expenses as a consequence of this transaction.
If there was such evidence, then there was no abuse of discretion in giving the instruction.
There was evidence that appellant was in possession of the vehicle for almost a year and a half,
that he drove 25,000 more miles on it, and that it was a good vehicle but that he could not
-7-
get it registered. A party is entitled to an instruction if there is any evidence to support giving
it, and here, there was.
Appellant’s last point on appeal is that the trial court abused its discretion in excluding
appellant’s evidence of two-weeks of lost wages resulting from the breach of contract.
Appellant asserts that this was proper evidence of incidental damages. We disagree that
appellant has shown an abuse of discretion.
Appellant testified that he had driven the Lincoln but that he was fearful of doing so
without proper tags and registration. Appellant also stated that he parked the car in the yard
during some periods of time and borrowed another vehicle for his transportation needs.
Appellant also admitted that he had driven the car some without proper tags and registration.
Then, appellant began testifying about having missed an opportunity for a night job because
of not being able to drive the Lincoln at night. Appellee objected, which was sustained “at
this time.” Appellant proffered that he lost $370 in wages for each of those two weeks.
Incidental damages are those proximately caused by the breach. See Ozark Kenworth
Inc. v. Neidecker, 283 Ark. 196, 672 S.W.2d 899 (1984). Causation is generally a question of
fact, but in this instance, evidence of causation is wholly lacking. While appellant showed
some hesitance to drive the Lincoln unregistered, he did so for months, and when he decided
not to drive it, he acquired transportation from other sources. We believe that the trial court’s
discretion was not abused in this instance.
After our appellate review, we affirm the judgment entered in favor of appellant at trial.
-8-
G LOVER and H EFFLEY, JJ., agree.
-9-
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.