Jerry Plumley v. William Plumley
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NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION
ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS
DIVISION III
No. CA 08-3
Opinion Delivered
JERRY PLUMLEY
APPELLANT
V.
WILLIAM PLUMLEY
JUNE 18, 2008
APPEAL FROM THE POLK COUNTY
CIRCUIT COURT, [NO. CV-04-166]
HONORABLE JERRY WAYNE
LOONEY, JUDGE
APPELLEE
AFFIRMED
JOHN B. ROBBINS, Judge
The subject matter of this appeal is a 50-acre tract of land in Polk County, where
Dorothy Marek resided prior to her death from lung cancer on July 13, 2004. The parties,
appellant Jerry Plumley and appellee William Plumley, are Ms. Marek’s only children. The
trial court found each of the wills and deeds executed by Ms. Marek prior to her death to be
valid, and upon that basis held that the property was owned by the parties in equal shares as
tenants in common. Jerry Plumley now appeals that decision, arguing that all of the property
should have been awarded to him based on his mother’s deed dated January 5, 2000, and that
the deed dated April 19, 2002, in favor of William Plumley, was invalid due to Ms. Marek’s
mental incompetence. Jerry further argues that the April 19, 2002, deed was met with
inadequate consideration, and that William was not a bona fide purchaser of the property.
We affirm.
The standard of review of a circuit court’s findings of fact after a bench trial is whether
those findings are clearly erroneous. See First Nat’l Bank v. Garner, 86 Ark. App. 213, 167
S.W.3d 664 (2004). A finding is clearly erroneous when, although there is evidence to
support it, the reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with a definite and firm
conviction that a mistake has been made. See id. In reviewing a trial court’s findings of fact,
we give due deference to the trial judge’s superior position to determine the credibility of
witnesses and the weight to be accorded their testimony. See Holaday v. Fraker, 323 Ark. 522,
920 S.W.2d 4 (1996).
The background facts of this case are as follows. Ms. Marek moved from Illinois
to Arkansas in 1990, and both of her sons continued to reside in Illinois. Before her death,
Ms. Marek executed five instruments. On October 18, 1999, she executed a will that gave
the balance remaining in her checking account equally to her three stepchildren, and left the
remainder of her estate to Jerry. By deed dated January 5, 2000, Ms. Marek granted the Polk
County property to herself and Jerry as joint tenants with right of survivorship. Both of these
instruments were prepared by attorney Orvin Foster.
In April 2002 William traveled to Arkansas to visit Ms. Marek, and during his stay a
deed and a will were both executed on April 19, 2002. These documents were prepared by
attorney John Maddox. The deed signed by Ms. Marek purported to convey the Polk
County property to William, with a reservation of a life estate to Ms. Marek. The will
provided that other than the Polk County property, the remainder of Ms. Marek’s estate
would be divided equally between Jerry and William. After Jerry learned of the subsequent
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deed and will, he took Ms. Marek back to Mr. Foster’s office, where another will was
executed on April 23, 2002. This final will contained the same provisions as the initial will
dated October 18, 1999.
Orvin Foster testified that he first met Ms. Marek when she came to him in late 1999
about a will and planning her estate. By that time Ms. Marek was not driving, and Jerry’s
girlfriend drove her to Mr. Foster’s office. According to Mr. Foster, Ms. Marek was alert and
her mental state appeared normal, and she told him what she wanted in the will. On January
5, 2000, Ms. Marek advised Mr. Foster that she wanted Jerry to have an interest in her real
property, and Mr. Foster prepared a deed to that effect.
Mr. Foster saw Ms. Marek again in late April 2002, when she arrived at his office
with Jerry and Jerry’s girlfriend. At that time Ms. Marek informed him that she was upset
because she discovered that another will and deed had been made, allegedly signed by her.
Mr. Foster thought it bizarre that Ms. Marek did not remember a new will or deed, so he
wrote down her statement and had her sign it. This handwritten statement, signed by
Ms. Marek, reads:
I, Dorothy Marek, have met with attorney Orvin Foster this date 4-22-02. I
have reviewed with him the documents signed 4-19-01 [sic] in the office of Maddox
and Maddox, including a new will, a revocation of power of attorney, and a warranty
deed. I do not fully remember the signing of these documents, especially the warranty
deed.
I have instructed Orvin Foster to reinstate my 1999 will by making a new one
with the same provisions. I have further instructed Orvin Foster to have the warranty
deed set aside, and to have Jerry Plumley appointed as my power of attorney and as
the guardian over my person and estate.
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Pursuant to her wishes, Mr. Foster prepared a new will signed by Ms. Marek on April 23,
2002. Although Ms. Marek also wanted Mr. Foster to file suit to cancel the April 19, 2002,
deed, he never filed the suit because money was not provided for that service. According to
Mr. Foster, during the April 2002 discussion with Ms. Marek, “she was agitated a great deal
and my assessment was not as good as in 1999, but she seemed aware of her surroundings and
circumstances.” He further stated, “she was angry about the new deed and will and reiterated
that it was not what she wanted to happen.”
Dr. Robert J. Manis testified that Ms. Marek was one of his patients beginning in
1998. In April 1999 he diagnosed her with altered mental status with auditory and visual
hallucinations, and acute and chronic alcohol toxicity. Ms. Marek also suffered from ovarian
cancer, pulmonary disease, heart problems, kidney problems, and a fractured hip. In addition
to chronic alcohol abuse, Ms. Marek was afflicted with major depression and generalized
anxiety disorder. The last time Dr. Manis saw Ms. Marek was on March 21, 2002, when he
discharged her from the hospital at her insistence against medical advice.
Dr. Manis indicated that Ms. Marek had been drinking heavily for a long time, and
stated that chronic inebriation can cause deterioration in mental function. However, he also
stated that each time she left the hospital she was generally well-functioning and capable of
caring for herself, other than when she left against medical advice. Dr. Manis testified:
At times she was obviously inebriated and during those times she was not functional,
but when she was not drunk she was fine. If the records reflect that I did not see her
on the date that she signed the will or the deed, I have no way of knowing and cannot
give any testimony of what her mental status was on that day.
....
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Because of the length of time and on any given date she would have been fine, I can
give no testimony as to how she was the day she signed the will. She might have been
perfectly fine, able to dispose of her property and make all the decisions for herself.
She could have been drunk or sober. From my experience, it depended on what was
going on in her life and who was around. She tended to drink less if she had family
around and more when she was alone.
Dr. James W. Rogers was also among Ms. Marek’s treating physicians, and he saw her
from January 2002 until her death on July 13, 2004. Dr. Rogers testified that in January
2002, Ms. Marek seemed reasonably within her senses. However, he had concerns about her
ability to make good decisions or fully participate in executing a will or deed on April 19,
2002.
On that date, in response to questions from family members worried about
Mr. Marek’s well being, Dr. Rogers wrote the following letter:
Dorothy M. Marek is under my care. I now believe she is unable to manage her
affairs due to progression of her chronic intoxication. While in the hospital she
continued with alcohol use and has left the hospital against medical advice. I believe
this constitutes sufficient error in judgment jeopardizing her health. Dorothy has been
under my care since January 2002. She had also seen Dr. Manis and Dr. Meaney. I
do feel this is a progressive disorder and Dorothy has shown little initiative for
recovery.
Based on this letter of April 19, 2002, Dr. Rogers also doubted that Ms. Marek had the
mental capacity to execute her final will a few days later.
Patricia Ann Krieger was friends with Ms. Marek since childhood and still lives in
Illinois. Ms. Krieger testified that Ms. Marek had expressed the desire to divide her assets
between her two sons. Ms. Krieger came to visit Ms. Marek on April 6, 2002, after
discovering that Ms. Marek was sick in the hospital. Sometime after that, Ms. Marek asked
to see a lawyer and she was taken to Mr. Maddox’s office, accompanied by Ms. Krieger,
Ms. Krieger’s daughter, and William. Mr. Maddox prepared a deed and will, which
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Ms. Marek signed. According to Ms. Krieger, Ms. Marek deeded her Polk County property
to William because she had previously entered into an agreement entitling Jerry to her real
property in Illinois. Ms. Krieger maintained that Ms. Marek was very happy upon executing
the April 19, 2002, will and deed, and that she never doubted Ms. Marek’s mental condition.
Ms. Krieger’s daughter corroborated much of Ms. Krieger’s testimony. She said that
Ms. Marek “seemed competent to me the day she signed it.”
William Plumley testified that he came to visit his mother in late March or early April
2002. He further testified:
When I got here in 2002, I went to the hospital to see my mom. She did not
look well and was somewhat incoherent and did not recognize me. I believe the
doctors were telling me it was something like dementia. I had an airport bottle of
alcohol and gave her most of it in orange juice. Ten minutes later, she recognized me.
That was the only alcohol I gave her. She did not recognize me the first two days.
I stayed here when she was discharged two or three days later. I was surprised she was
discharged; she was always trying to get out of the hospital before the doctors
recommended.
I started asking my mom about her finances and assets. I saw the lock box. I
had gone with my mother and discovered there was a will and a deed. I brought it to
her attention. I think Patsy showed up the next day. My mom did not know these
papers were signed and had no recollection of them. We went to Mr. Maddox’s
office on the 17th and talked about the wills. I believe the 19th, my brother showed
up unexpectedly. Mr. Maddox called on the 19th and we signed the papers and
recorded them.
William testified that Ms. Marek was alert and normal, and was able to answer questions
about her children and property when she signed the will and deed on April 19, 2002. He
further thought that there was a “very strong chance” that she was not competent in 1999 or
2000.
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Benji Ferguson is a legal secretary for the Maddox Law Firm and prepared the will and
deed that were signed by Ms. Marek on April 19, 2002. According to Ms. Ferguson,
Ms. Marek seemed very alert and wanted to leave her Arkansas property to William because
she had left some Illinois property to her other son. As for the will, Ms. Marek wanted to
leave everything else to William, but William “insisted she leave it fifty-fifty.” Ms. Ferguson
notarized the document. Ms. Ferguson stated, “Ms. Marek appeared to be in a competent
mind and know what she was doing on the day the documents were signed, or we wouldn’t
have signed them.” Although not available to testify, it was accepted that John Maddox
would corroborate Ms. Ferguson’s testimony that Ms. Marek appeared competent.
Jerry Plumley testified that Ms. Marek “knew exactly what she had signed” when
executing the January 5, 2000, deed. However, he thought that when the April 2002 deed
was executed in favor of William, his brother had been serving her alcohol for many days and
she had become incoherent. Jerry stated that when his mother sobered up and found out
what she had done, she wanted to have it reversed. Jerry acknowledged that he had also
served her alcohol, but only in small quantities. He described his relationship with his mother
as “very good,” and testified that he lived with her and took care of her from April 2002 until
she died.
Gwen King helped take care of Ms. Marek from May 2001 until August 2003. She
testified that William took Ms. Marek out of the hospital against medical advice on April 19,
2002. Ms. King stated, “I always went to town with Dorothy, and that day Bill wouldn’t let
me go with them to town.” She further asserted that William offered to give her some of his
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mother’s property upon acquisition, an assertion that William denied. Ms. King stated that
when William was there Ms. Marek was intoxicated nearly every day, but that when Jerry
was there she drank at a minimum. Ms. King also testified that William badgered his mother
into buying him a van against her wishes. Ms. King said that during the entire time she
worked there, Ms. Marek told her that she wanted Jerry to have the property.
Jerry’s girlfriend, Debra Hubbard, also testified. She stated that on the days Ms. Marek
executed the October 1999 will and January 2000 deed, Ms. Marek had not been drinking
and her mental condition was good.
This case was before the trial court pursuant to William’s petition for ejectment filed
against Jerry after their mother’s death, and Jerry’s counter-petition asking to set aside the
April 19, 2002, warranty deed in favor of William. Upon consideration of the evidence, the
trial court issued the following letter opinion, which was incorporated into its order now on
appeal:
The issue before the Court involves the validity of five documents: Will dated
October 18, 1999; Deed dated January 5, 2000; Will dated April 19, 2002; Deed dated
April 19, 2002 and Will dated April 22, 2002. The mental competency of Ms. Marek
on each of these dates is of consequence.
The medical records indicate that in 1999 Ms. Marek suffered from multiple
medical problems and significant problems with intoxication. In April, 1999, she
suffered from hallucinations; in August, 1999, she refused treatment for serious medical
conditions. In early October, 1999, she was admitted to the Geropsychiatry Unit with
depression, mental impairment and a number of related problems all exacerbated by
alcoholism. However, in spite of these medical records, all indications are that she had
her lucid moments and, at those times, was quite capable of meeting the test for
competency. As to each date on which she signed the instruments, there is evidence
that she was in one of her lucid intervals. If so, all instruments must be considered
valid.
The result is that the will of April 22, 2002 would revoke all prior wills and
would dispose of Ms. Marek’s property. However, the deed of April 19, 2002 would
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terminate the right of survivorship and the joint tenancy created in the deed of January
5, 2000 (converting it into a tenancy in common). Thus, the property transferred by
the April 19, 2002 deed would be a one-half interest in the described property. The
remaining one-half would pass by the will of April 22, 2002.1
On appeal, Jerry Plumley argues that the deed of April 19, 2002, was invalid, and
therefore the trial court erred in failing to award him all of the Polk County property
pursuant to his mother’s previous deed executed on January 5, 2000. Jerry argues that
Ms. Marek was unduly influenced and incompetent when she executed the deed to William
on April 19, 2002. He further contends that Ms. Marek’s mental impairment, coupled with
inadequate consideration, provides equitable relief from the trial court’s error. Alternatively,
Jerry asserts that William has no claim to the property because he was not a bona fide
purchaser.
As an initial matter, we address the burden of proof regarding Ms. Marek’s
competence when she executed the April 19, 2002, deed. When a deed is part of a
testamentary plan, as here, one who procures the deed bears the burden of proving that the
grantor had the necessary mental capacity and freedom from undue influence. See Stanley v.
Burchett, 93 Ark. App. 54, 216 S.W.3d 615 (2005). However, in the present case Jerry failed
to argue such a burden shift to the trial court, and the issue was not addressed in the trial
court’s ruling. Nor did he raise the argument in his appellate brief. For the first time in his
reply brief, citing Pyle v. Sayers, 344 Ark. 354, 39 S.W.3d 774 (2001), Jerry offers the legal
standard that where a person benefitting from a will also procures the will, a rebuttable
1
It is evident that the will of April 22, 2002, referenced by the trial court was
actually the will of April 23, 2002.
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presumption of undue influence arises and creates a burden for the proponent of the will to
prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the testator had the requisite mental capacity and
freedom from undue influence.
It is well settled that an appellant must raise an argument below and obtain a ruling to
preserve the issue for appellate review. See Beverly Enterprises – Ark. Inc. v. Thomas, 370 Ark.
310,
S.W.3d
(2007). Moreover, we do not address arguments raised for the first time
in a reply brief. See Abdin v. Abdin, 94 Ark. App. 12, 223 S.W.3d 60 (2006). In this case
there may have been evidence that William procured the deed. But there was also evidence
to the contrary, given William’s testimony that he was not involved in the decision to execute
the will or deed, and merely provided the transportation to the attorney’s office. See Rose v.
Dunn, 284 Ark. 42, 679 S.W.2d 180 (1984)(driving testator to the lawyer’s office and
participating in initial discussions concerning the will did not constitute procurement). At
any rate, this issue was not presented to the trial court and as such the trial court made no
finding on the issue of procurement. Therefore, the burden of proof in this case remained
with Jerry, as the party challenging the deed, to prove by a preponderance of the evidence
that the testator lacked the requisite mental capacity or was the victim of undue influence.
See Looney v. Estate of Wade, 310 Ark. 708, 839 S.W.2d 531 (1992)(reciting the rule in a
typical will contest).
The questions of undue influence and mental capacity are so closely interwoven that
they are sometimes considered together. In Re Conservatorship of Kuetman, 309 Ark. 546, 832
S.W.2d 234 (1992). Testamentary capacity means that the testator must be able to retain in
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his mind, without prompting, the extent and condition of her property, to comprehend to
whom she is giving it, and relations of those entitled to her bounty. Daley v. Boroughs, 310
Ark. 274, 835 S.W.2d 858 (1992). In Noland v. Noland, 330 Ark. 660, 956 S.W.2d 173
(1997), our supreme court wrote:
Complete sanity in the medical sense is not required if the power to think
rationally existed at the time the will was made. Furthermore, our own law is clear
that despite any mental impairment, the testator may execute a will if he is
experiencing a lucid interval. The time to look at a testator’s mental capacity is at the
time the will is executed. However, proof may be taken as to the testator’s condition
both before and after the will’s execution as being relevant to his condition at the time
the will was executed. This court has upheld mental competency at the time of the
execution of a will even in the wake of evidence of some mental deterioration.
Id. at 665-66, 956 S.W.2d at 176 (citations omitted).
In the case at bar, Jerry argues that while Ms. Marek was suffering from illness and
hospitalization, William unduly influenced her into executing the April 19, 2002 deed under
circumstances showing that Ms. Marek was incompetent. In support of appellant’s claim of
incompetency, he notes that on the same day the deed was signed Dr. Rogers issued a letter
expressing his belief that Ms. Marek was unable to manage her affairs due to progression of
her chronic intoxication. Jerry asserts that after William arrived in Arkansas in April 2002,
William accomplished the following: he gave his mother alcohol while in the hospital; his
mother checked out of the hospital without medical approval; he inspected his mother’s lock
box and found the prior deed; he badgered his mother into buying him a van against her
wishes; he transported his mother to the attorney’s office to prepare the new deed without
disclosing the prior deed; and he offered a share of the property to Ms. King in the event his
efforts were successful. As further substantiation of her incompetency, Jerry directs us to the
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letter Ms. Marek signed three days later in Mr. Foster’s office, wherein she indicated she did
not fully remember signing the deed. Because Ms. Marek could not pass any reasonable test
of competency on April 19, 2002, Jerry argues that the second deed is invalid, and that the
first deed of January 5, 2000, vested full title of the property in him upon Ms. Marek’s death.
We do not agree that the trial court committed error in upholding the deed of April
19, 2002.
While there was evidence tending to demonstrate Ms. Marek’s lack of
competence, there was also evidence that she was at least having a lucid interval wherein she
executed the deed of her own willful and competent volition. Dr. Manis testified that when
Ms. Marek was sober, she was able to dispose of her property and make her own decisions.
William testified that while he gave his mother alcohol in the hospital, it was only a relatively
small amount on one occasion. There were five witnesses to the execution of the deed who
indicated that Ms. Marek appeared mentally capable of conducting the transaction. In
particular, Ms. Ferguson testified that Ms. Marek was very alert and seemed mentally fine, and
that Ms. Marek explained that she wanted to leave the Polk County property to William
because property in Illinois had already been transferred to Jerry. There was conflicting
testimony on Ms. Marek’s mental capacity, and it was the trial court’s duty to weigh the
testimony and resolve the conflicts. Upon our de novo review, we hold that the trial court
did not clearly err finding that Ms. Marek was mentally competent and free of undue
influence at the time she signed the deed.
Jerry next argues that Ms. Marek’s mental impairment, when coupled with inadequate
consideration for the deed, provides equitable grounds for relief from the trial court’s error.
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He acknowledges that insufficiency of consideration, alone, is not grounds for setting aside
a deed. See Bryant v. Bryant, 239 Ark. 61, 387 S.W.2d (1965). Nonetheless, he relies on
Barner v. Handy, 207 Ark. 833, 183 S.W.2d 149 (1944), where the supreme court held that
insufficiency of consideration, when coupled with mental impairment, may provide equitable
grounds for relief, even if the mental impairment does not rise to the level of incompetency.
Jerry maintains that the record is saturated with evidence of Ms. Marek’s mental impairment,
and asserts that when coupled with the mere ten dollars William paid in exchange for the
property, the deed was invalid.
Jerry’s second argument is without merit. In Barner v. Handy, supra, the appellee was
a woman who rendered herself penniless by conveying property from which she might have
received $7500 in bauxite royalties for the sum of ten dollars. The chancellor had found that
the appellee did not have the capacity to comprehend the nature of her transaction, that
undue influence had been exerted, and that no consideration was paid. In affirming the
chancellor’s decision, the supreme court noted that the appellee was “inexperienced, illiterate,
and enfeebled,” and that the circumstances as a whole showed an absence of conscious
volition or understanding. By contrast, there was evidence in the present matter from which
the trial court could reasonably conclude that, despite her ailing health, Ms. Marek
understood and appreciated her decision to convey her property to one of her sons, while
reserving in herself a life estate, and in fact explained her decision for doing so to the notary
who prepared the deed and thought Ms. Marek to be competent. Under the circumstances
of this case, the lack of consideration provides no basis for reversing the trial court’s decision.
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Jerry’s remaining argument is that because William was not a bona fide purchaser, he
has no claim to the property. A bona fide purchaser is one who takes property in good faith,
for valuable consideration, and without notice of a prior interest. Bill’s Printing, Inc. v. Carder,
357 Ark. 242, 161 S.W.3d 803 (2004). Jerry submits that because his deed predates William’s
deed, and because William had actual notice of the prior deed when he checked the lock
box, Jerry has superior title and should be declared owner of the property. Jerry further
contends that William was not a bona fide purchaser because he paid no consideration.
This argument is misplaced. William was not claiming status as a bona fide purchaser
below, as to defeat a prior interest in property conveyed to Jerry. At the time the April 19,
2002, deed was executed, Ms. Marek still owned the property as joint tenants with Jerry, and
retained an interest in the property that she had a right to convey. When Ms. Marek
conveyed her interest in the property to William, William became a tenant in common with
Jerry. See Jackson v. O’Connell, 1777 N.E.2d 194 (Ill. 1961); In Re Estate of Thomann, 649
N.W.2d 1 (Iowa 2002); Boissonnault v. Savage, 625 A.2d 454 (N.H. 1993). Because William
made no challenge to the share of the property conveyed to Jerry through execution of the
January 5, 2000, deed, there is no issue pertaining to William’s status as a bona fide purchaser.
The trial court correctly concluded that each party has a one-half interest in the property as
tenants in common.
We recognize that the trial court’s order recites that Jerry’s one-half interest was
acquired by virtue of the April 23, 2002 will, when in fact his one-half interest arose from the
January 5, 2000 deed. Nonetheless, the trial court reached the right result even though it
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announced the wrong reason, and in such cases we may affirm. See Alphin v. Alphin, 364
Ark. 332, 219 S.W.3d 160 (2005).
Affirmed.
VAUGHT, J., agrees.
GRIFFEN, J., concurs.
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