Arlene Legrand v. Arkansas Department of Health and Human Services
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ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS
NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION
LARRY D. VAUGHT, JUDGE
DIVISION IV
CA08-295
June 4, 2008
ARLENE LEGRAND
APPELLANT
v.
AN APPEAL FROM CRAIGHEAD
COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT
[No. JV 2005-186]
ARKANSAS DEPARTMENT OF
HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES
APPELLEE
HONORABLE LARRY BOLING
JUDGE
AFFIRMED
Appellant Arlene Legrand brings this appeal of an order of the Craighead County
Circuit Court terminating her parental rights to her children, T.L., born April 29, 1997; D.L.,
born April 23, 1999; and M.L., born April 28, 2003. She argues that there was insufficient
evidence to support the circuit court’s finding that termination was in the children’s best
interests or that grounds for termination had been proven. We affirm.
The Arkansas Department of Human Services (“DHS”) sought emergency custody of
the children on April 7, 2005. The affidavit filed in support of the petition stated that two of
the children had been left unattended at a store. The affidavit continued that the oven was
being used to heat the house, that the house was filthy with a sticky brown substance on the
kitchen floor, that a feces-covered sheet was being used as a door, and that roaches were
present in every room. Legrand was arrested on two counts of child endangerment. The court
granted the emergency petition on April 7, 2005. The court later found probable cause for
issuance of the emergency order.
On May 23, 2005, the court adjudicated the children dependent-neglected and ordered
that they remain in DHS’s custody. The court ordered Legrand to comply with the case plan
and cooperate with DHS, to submit to random drug screens and a drug and alcohol assessment,
and to obtain and maintain stable and appropriate housing and employment.
At a permanency-planning hearing on April 6, 2006, the court found that return of the
children to Legrand’s custody was not in their best interests and approved DHS’s plan for
termination of parental rights and adoption, with a concurrent plan for permanent relative
placement. The court also found that Legrand had not complied with the case plan in that she
had not maintained contact with DHS and had tested positive on her last drug screen.
At a review hearing on September 21, 2006, DHS informed the court that a home
study had been completed on Angela Legrand, the children’s aunt who lived in Arizona. The
court approved the placement at a review hearing held December 21, 2006. The court found
that Legrand had completed parenting classes, submitted to a psychological evaluation, and
submitted to drug testing; however, she had not visited with the children or obtained stable
housing, and some of her drug screens were positive.
At a subsequent permanency-planning hearing on March 8, 2007, the court found it
to be in the children’s best interests to be in permanent placement with their aunt and that
termination of parental rights was not in their best interests because of this placement. The
court found that Legrand had completed parenting classes, submitted to a psychological
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evaluation, and submitted to drug testing. However, she had not visited with the children or
obtained stable housing, and some of her drug screens were positive. The court also noted that
Legrand had not attended any hearings since April 2006. The placement continued following
an August 16, 2007 review hearing.
On October 8, 2007, DHS filed a petition seeking the termination of Legrand’s parental
rights. DHS alleged four grounds for termination, including that the children had been out of
Legrand’s custody for over twelve months and the conditions that caused the removal had not
been remedied and that the children had been abandoned.
The termination hearing was held in December 2007. Brenda Morton, the DHS
caseworker, testified that the department was recommending termination because the children
had been in foster care for over two years and needed stability. She related that the children
had been placed with their maternal aunt in Arizona but that placement had been disrupted
after about six months, and the children had been returned to Arkansas and placed in a foster
home. Morton expressed her belief that, despite one child having unspecified issues, the
children were adoptable. She further testified that Legrand had not visited the children since
before they went to Arizona in December 2006 and that she had sporadic telephone contact
with Legrand just prior to the termination hearing. She recounted the parts of the case plan
that Legrand had or had not complied with, adding that Legrand did not explain why she did
not attend any hearings after the April 2006 permanency-planning hearing. She indicated that
some of Legrand’s drug screens were positive for marijuana.
On cross-examination, Morton said that she did not notify Legrand or the secondary
case worker in Newport when the children were returned to foster care in Arkansas. She did
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not do so, in part, because notification would have been detrimental to the children. Morton
also acknowledged that the department did not entertain the prospect of reunification when
the children returned to foster care in the summer of 2007 because they had already been in
care for two years at that time.
Legrand testified that she was living in Newport, Arkansas, and that she was employed.
She said that the last hearing she attended was the April 2006 hearing where the decision was
made to attempt to place the children with her sister in Arizona. She did not dispute the
testimony of the worker but told the court that she loved her children, and that she had done
what was asked of her but had been unable to arrange for transportation to visit her children.
The circuit court announced from the bench that it would grant the petition. The court
found that termination was in the children’s best interests, that DHS had proven by clear and
convincing evidence that the children had been out of appellant’s home since April 5, 2005,
that she had had no contact with the children or the court since April 6, 2006 and no
significant contact with the children since October 2005. In addition, the court found there
to be a high degree of likelihood that the children would be adopted and that the mother had
abandoned the children because she knew that the children were back in Arkansas. This appeal
followed.
We review termination of parental rights cases de novo. Yarborough v. Ark. Dep’t of
Human Servs., 96 Ark. App. 247, 240 S.W.3d 626 (2006). The grounds for termination of
parental rights must be proven by clear and convincing evidence. Id. When the burden of
proving a disputed fact is by clear and convincing evidence, the question on appeal is whether
the circuit court’s finding that the disputed fact was proven by clear and convincing evidence
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is clearly erroneous, giving due regard to the opportunity of the circuit court to judge the
credibility of the witnesses. Id.
In her sole point for reversal, Legrand argues that the circuit court erred in finding that
there was sufficient evidence to support the termination of her parental rights. Her argument
is divided into two parts: that there is insufficient evidence that termination of her parental
rights is in the children’s best interests and that there is insufficient evidence of grounds for
termination.
In the first part of her argument, Legrand asserts that the circuit court made no finding
that return of the children to her custody would be harmful to the children, and, therefore,
there was insufficient proof that termination would be in the children’s best interests. The plain
language of section 9-27-341 provides that the court must find by clear and convincing
evidence that termination is in the children’s best interests, giving consideration to the risk of
potential harm. Carroll v. Ark. Dep’t of Human Servs., 85 Ark. App. 255, 148 S.W.3d 780
(2004). The risk of potential harm is but a factor for the court to consider in its analysis. Id.
There is no requirement that every factor considered be established by clear and convincing
evidence; rather, after consideration of all factors, the evidence must be clear and convincing
that the termination is in the best interest of the child. McFarland v. Ark. Dep’t of Human Servs.,
91 Ark. App. 323, 210 S.W.3d 143 (2005). Furthermore, the supreme court has directed that
the harm analysis be conducted in broad terms, including the harm the child suffers from the
lack of stability in a permanent home. See Bearden v. Ark. Dep’t of Human Servs., 344 Ark. 317,
42 S.W.3d 397 (2001). The DHS case worker testified that the children needed permanency.
This lack of permanency is demonstrated by the fact that the children had been out of
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Legrand’s custody for more than two years. It is also shown by the fact that Legrand failed to
see her children for that period or to remain in contact with DHS.1
This leads to the second part of Legrand’s argument, where she asserts that DHS failed
to prove grounds to terminate her parental rights. DHS alleged multiple grounds for the
termination of Legrand’s parental rights. The circuit court found that four grounds had been
established. Only one ground is necessary to terminate parental rights. Albright v. Ark. Dep’t
of Human Servs., 97 Ark. App. 277, 248 S.W.3d 498 (2007). Under the juvenile code,
abandonment is defined in Ark. Code Ann. § 9-27-303(2) (Repl. 2008) as,
the failure of the parent to provide reasonable support and to maintain regular contact
with the juvenile through statement or contact when the failure is accompanied by an
intention on the part of the parent to permit the condition to continue for an indefinite
period in the future and failure to support or maintain regular contact with the juvenile
without just cause or an articulated intent to forego parental responsibility[.]
Here, Legrand has abandoned her children. First, she testified that she had not seen the
children since October 2005. She also indicated that she was willing to let her sister raise the
children if she could not have them. This indicates that Legrand wanted the placement with
her sister to continue for an indefinite period of time, another of the statutory elements of
abandonment. There was no testimony that Legrand was in any way prevented from visiting
the children.
We cannot say that the circuit court was clearly erronrous.
Affirmed.
1
To the extent that Legrand is arguing that DHS never informed her that the children
had returned from Arizona, she bears some responsibility for that failure. She could have
contacted the DHS case worker to inquire about the children. She also could have contacted
her sister with the same inquiry.
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PITTMAN, C.J., and BIRD, J., agree.
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