Ricky D. Billingsley v. Hillcrest Care & Rehab
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NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION
ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS
DIVISION II
No. CA08-196
Opinion Delivered
RICKY D. BILLINGSLEY
September 17, 2008
V.
APPEAL FROM THE ARKANSAS
WORKERS’ COMPENSATION
COMMISSION
[NOS. F402205; F502968]
HILLCREST CARE & REHAB
APPELLEE
AFFIRMED
APPELLANT
JOHN MAUZY PITTMAN, Chief Judge
The Arkansas Workers’ Compensation Commission affirmed and adopted an opinion
of the administrative law judge denying benefits to appellant. The Commission found that
appellant failed to prove by medical evidence supported by objective findings that he sustained
compensable thoracic and cervical injuries and that he failed to prove entitlement to benefits
for partial disability, temporary total disability, and additional medical treatment. We affirm.
When a workers’ compensation claim is denied, the substantial evidence standard of
review requires us to affirm the Commission if its opinion displays a substantial basis for denial
of the relief sought by the worker. Whitten v. Edward Trucking/Corporate Solutions, 87 Ark.
App. 112, 189 S.W.3d 82 (2004). In determining the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain
the findings of the Commission, we review the evidence in the light most favorable to the
Commission’s findings and affirm if they are supported by substantial evidence.
Id.
Substantial evidence is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate
to support a conclusion. Id. We will not reverse the Commission unless we are convinced
that fair-minded persons with the same facts before them could not have reached the
conclusions of the Commission. Id. The question is not whether the evidence would have
supported findings contrary to the ones made by the Commission; there may be substantial
evidence to support the Commission's decision even though we might have reached a
different conclusion if we sat as the trier of fact or heard the case de novo. Id. In making our
review, we recognize that it is the Commission's function to determine the credibility of
witnesses and the weight to be given their testimony. Id. Moreover, the Commission has the
duty of weighing medical evidence; if the evidence is conflicting, its resolution is a question
of fact for the Commission. Id.
Appellant filed a claim for workers’ compensation benefits alleging that he suffered
compensable injuries to his lumbar, thoracic, and cervical spine resulting from two workrelated accidents. His employer, appellee Hillcrest Care & Rehab, accepted appellant’s lumbar
back injury as a compensable result of the initial accident, but denied that appellant had
sustained compensable injuries to his thoracic and cervical spine, or any other injuries resulting
from the second accident. After a hearing, the administrative law judge, in an opinion
adopted by the Commission, found that appellant failed to prove by medical evidence
supported by objective findings that he sustained compensable injuries to his thoracic or
cervical spine and denied appellant’s request for additional benefits.
Any determination of the existence or extent of physical impairment must be supported
by objective and measurable physical findings. Ark. Code Ann. § 11-9-704(c)(1)(B) (Repl.
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CA08-196
2002). The Commission is authorized to decide which portions of the medical evidence to
credit and to translate this medical evidence into a finding of permanent impairment using the
AMA Guides. Avaya v. Bryant, 82 Ark. App. 273, 105 S.W.3d 811 (2003). Although there
was evidence to the contrary, the Commission cited interpretations of appellant’s cervical and
thoracic MRIs and EKGs as “unremarkable” by Drs. Bigongiari and Smith in finding that
appellant had failed to prove he sustained compensable injuries in those areas. Although
contrary medical opinions were offered, the Commission was entitled to weigh their
credibility, see id., and there is therefore sufficient evidence to support its finding that objective
findings were lacking.
Appellant also sought partial disability benefits for the period from February 2004 to
February 2005. The Commission rejected this claim on the grounds that appellant failed to
show what portion of his reduced earnings were attributable to his admittedly compensable
injury to the lumbar spine. This is borne out by the record and constitutes a substantial basis
for the denial of the requested relief. Likewise, appellant’s claim for temporary-total disability
benefits was denied on the strength of the Commission’s finding that appellant’s healing
period ended before he stopped working in February 2005. This finding is amply supported
by Dr. Smith’s opinion that appellant had recovered from his lumbar injury by March 31,
2004. Again, although there was evidence to the contrary, the Commission was not required
to believe it. This evidence that appellant’s compensable injury had healed also supports the
denial of additional medical treatment.
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CA08-196
Affirmed.
M ARSHALL and H EFFLEY, JJ., agree.
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CA08-196
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