Janice Mayo v. The Estate of Scipio Wofford
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ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS
NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION
WENDELL L. GRIFFEN, JUDGE
DIVISION III
CA07-998
May 7, 2008
JANICE MAYO
APPELLANT
AN APPEAL FROM ARKANSAS
COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT
[PR2005-91]
V.
HON. DAVID G. HENRY, JUDGE
The Estate of SCIPIO WOFFORD
APPELLEE
AFFIRMED
Janice Mayo appeals from the circuit court’s determination that she is not an heir to
the estate of Scipio Wofford, whom she alleges is her biological father. She asserts that the
estate should be estopped from arguing that she failed to file a timely claim because Wofford’s
heirs deceived her into believing they would not challenge her status as an heir until after the
180-day deadline for filing a claim against the estate pursuant to Ark. Code Ann. § 28-9209(d) (Repl. 2004) expired.1 She also raises two constitutional arguments: 1) that the circuit
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Section 28-9-209(d) provides:
An illegitimate child or his or her descendants may inherit real or personal property
in the same manner as a legitimate child from the child's mother or her blood
kindred. The child may inherit real or personal property from his or her father or
from his or her father's blood kindred, provided that at least one (1) of the following
conditions is satisfied and an action is commenced or claim asserted against the estate
of the father in a court of competent jurisdiction within one hundred eighty (180)
days of the death of the father:
(1) A court of competent jurisdiction has established the paternity of the child or has
determined the legitimacy of the child pursuant to subsection (a), (b), or (c) of this
section;
court erred because the 180-day deadline under § 28-9-209(d) violates the equal protection
clauses of the federal Constitution and the Arkansas Constitution; and 2) that she was denied
due process because she did not receive proper notice of the petition to determine heirship,
as required by Ark. Code Ann. § 28-40-111(a)(4)(A)(Repl. 2004).
We rejected a similar estoppel argument in Rasberry v. Ivory et al., 67 Ark. App. 227,
998 S.W.2d 431 (1999). Further, appellant’s constitutional arguments were not adequately
raised below to preserve them for appellate review. Accordingly, we affirm the circuit court’s
determination that appellant is not an heir to Wofford’s estate but do not reach the merits of
her constitutional arguments.
I. Facts
Appellant purports to be a daughter born out of wedlock to Scipio Wofford, who died
on August 17, 2005. Appellee is Wofford’s estate; the co-administrators of the estate are
Annette Bufford and Ray Wofford, children of the deceased. Appellant attended Wofford’s
funeral and was listed as Wofford’s child in his obituary. She maintains that “she had always
been acknowledged as the child of the deceased and fully expected to continue to do so” and
that “there was little question of [her] identity until the proceedings” in this case.
(2) The man has made a written acknowledgment that he is the father of the child;
(3) The man's name appears with his written consent on the birth certificate as the
father of the child;
(4) The mother and father intermarry prior to the birth of the child;
(5) The mother and putative father attempted to marry each other prior to the birth
of the child by a marriage solemnized in apparent compliance with law, although the
attempted marriage is or could be declared invalid;
(6) The putative father is obligated to support the child under a written voluntary
promise or by court order.
2
On February 13, 2007, the co-administrators of Wofford’s estate filed a petition to
determine heirship. The petition listed appellant as a person claiming an interest in the estate,
but identified her as an “Alleged Daughter,” and further alleged that appellant had not
established paternity by any method prescribed under § 28-40-111(d)(1)-(6). Finally, the
petition stated that no action had been commenced or claim asserted against the estate within
180 days of Wofford’s death.
On March 7, 2007, appellant filed an entry of appearance and petition for inclusion
as an heir, asserting that she was Wofford’s natural child, born out of wedlock; that during
Wofford’s lifetime, he acknowledged in the presence of others that she was his daughter; and
that, prior to the proceeding to determine heirship, Wofford’s known heirs acknowledged
appellant as their sister, visited extensively with her, and presented her to acquaintances as
their sister. The estate responded that appellant’s claims were barred by her failure to file a
claim within 180 days of Wofford’s death, as required by Ark. Code Ann. § 28-9-209(d).
At the hearing, the estate moved for a judgment on the pleadings, pursuant to
appellant’s failure to comply with § 28-9-209(d). Appellant argued that she had no notice
within the 180-day period that the co-administrators of the estate intended to exclude her as
an heir. She relied on the facts that she was included in Wofford’s obituary as his child and
received correspondence from family members acknowledging her as a sibling.
She
maintained that “she should not be held to the standard by letter of [§] 28-9-209” because she
acted as soon as she received notice that the heirs intended to exclude her.
The estate countered that the Rasberry court rejected a similar estoppel argument and
denied the out-of-wedlock child’s claim because he did not file a claim against the estate
within 180 days of the decent’s death. Appellant acknowledged the Rasberry ruling, and also
acknowledged that she was requesting the circuit court to “make new law.”
Based on Rasberry and the “plain language” of § 28-9-209(d), the trial court granted
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the estate’s motion for judgment on the pleadings, and entered a written order denying
appellant’s request to be named as an heir. The court found that all persons legally entitled
to notice had been properly notified of the heirship petition. It relied on the fact that
appellant admitted that she knew that Wofford died on August 17, 2005, and attended his
funeral, yet did not file her petition to be included as an heir until March 5, 2007. Thus, the
court found that appellant’s request was barred as untimely filed for failure to comply with §
28-9-209(d).
Appellant subsequently filed a motion for reconsideration, again relying on her
estoppel argument. The trial court did not rule on this motion, so it was deemed denied. See
Ark. R. App. P. – Civ. 4(b)(1). Appellant appeals from the original order denying her
petition to be named as an heir and from the deemed denial of her motion for
reconsideration.
II. Estoppel
Appellant asserts that, despite the time-bar in § 28-9-209(d), she should be permitted
to assert her claim because her siblings induced her into believing that she would be treated
as an heir during the relevant 180-day period. She maintains that Wofford acknowledged her
as his daughter in front of others, that her siblings introduced her as their sister to
acquaintances, and that she was named as his daughter in his obituary.
Appellant’s estoppel argument is to no avail because we previously rejected a similar
argument in Rasberry, supra. In Rasberry, the out-of-wedlock son claimed that the estate was
estopped from relying on the deadline under § 28-9-209(d) because he had always been
acknowledged to be the decedent’s son, he was named as his son in the obituary, and was
described as an heir in a deed executed by the decedent’s wife and daughter in which they
relinquished any claim to the homestead.
The Rasberry court did not squarely determine that estoppel would serve to circumvent
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the requirement of asserting a claim within the requisite 180-day period. Rather, even
assuming that estoppel did apply, it determined that the 180-day period expired before the
son was described as an heir in the deed, and thus, he could not have relied on the description
to his detriment. Further, it stated that estoppel would not arise due to the mere fact that the son had
been acknowledged as the decedent’s son because nothing in the record indicated that his siblings
ever led him to believe that he was not born out of wedlock or that he could inherit from his
father without filing a claim within the statutory period. In other words, the intent by a
decedent or by a sibling to recognize an out-of-wedlock child as a rightful heir does not
change the statutory requirements imposed on an out-of-wedlock child seeking to be declared
a rightful heir.
The Rasberry court drew a distinction between lineage and legitimacy. The bottom line
after Rasberry is, even if a decedent or siblings acknowledge an out-of-wedlock child’s lineage,
the estate is not thereafter estopped from relying on § 28-9-209(d), and the out-of-wedlock
child must nonetheless file a claim within 180 days of the decedent’s death and must prove
paternity by one of the methods indicated in that statute.
Appellant essentially urges that we overturn our prior precedent in Rasberry, yet
presents no compelling arguments to warrant such action. As such, we follow Rasberry in
holding that Wofford’s estate is not estopped from asserting that appellant’s claim is timebarred.
III. Constitutional Arguments
We also hold that none of appellant’s three constitutional arguments are preserved for
appellate review. First, she essentially challenges the constitutionality of the disparate
treatment in imposing a 180-day deadline on an out-of-wedlock child for filing a claim
against an estate when that deadline is not imposed on known heirs. She argues that the 180day limitation for an out-of-wedlock heir to file a claim against the estate of her father under
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Ark. Code Ann. § 28-9-209(d) violates the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment of the federal Constitution and the equal protection clause of the Arkansas
Constitution, found at Article 2, § 3.
However, appellant did not specifically assert an equal-protection challenge below.
Her constitutional challenge was raised below as follows:
[W]e feel like the result in the Rasberry case is unfair and inequitable. And ... if it were
examined by the highest court that it would be found to be unconstitutional. We,
therefore, believe that the Court ought to – even in the face of the Rasberry decision,
deny the – estate’s petition, as it were, to dismiss [appellant’s] claim. And the Court
ought to proceed with a hearing to allow her to establish the paternity. That’s our
position, Your Honor, that we feel like it’s unconstitutional and inequitable.
Thus, although appellant cursorily challenged § 28-9-209(d) as unconstitutional, she did so
in the context of the Rasberry case, which was an estoppel case. The Rasberry court did not
address whether § 28-9-209(d) violated the Fourteenth Amendment of the federal
Constitution or Article 2, § 3 of the Arkansas Constitution. Our law is well settled that issues
raised for the first time on appeal, even constitutional ones, will not be considered. See Tipton
v. Aaron, 87 Ark. App. 1, 185 S.W.3d 142 (2004).2
Appellant’s final argument, a due-process argument, is that the trial court erred in
granting the estate’s judgment on the pleadings because she had no notice of the petition to
determine heirship, as required by Ark. Code Ann. § 28-40-111(a)(4)(A) (Repl. 2004).3
2
We note that a nearly-identical equal-protection claim that appellant raises has been
rejected by the Arkansas Supreme Court. See Boatman v. Dawkins, 294 Ark. 421, 743
S.W.2d 800 (1988). We further note that classifications based on illegitimacy are permitted
if they are substantially related to permissible State interests, see Lalli v. Lalli, 439 U.S. 259
(1978), and that the State has a substantial interest in the orderly settlement of estates and the
dependability of titles to property passing under intestacy laws, see Trimble v. Gordon, 430
U.S. 762 (1977). Accordingly, the State may impose restrictions on the time and manner in
which an out-of-wedlock child may bring a claim against an estate and is not required to
permit a child born out of wedlock the same amount of time to bring a claim as it does a
legitimate child.
3
Section 28-40-111(a)(4)(A) provides that within one month after the first publication of
the notice of the appointment of the personal representative, a copy of the notice shall be
6
However, this argument, too, is barred because appellant never claimed lack of notice due to
the estate’s failure to comply with § 28-40-111(a)(4)(A). See, e.g., Boatman v. Dawkins, 294
Ark. 421, 743 S.W.2d 800 (1988) (declining to address a lack-of-notice argument under § 2840-111 where the party merely stated that she should have been listed and given notice but
did not secure a ruling on the notice issue).
Here, appellant raised no § 28-40-111(a)(4)(A) argument below, but argued only that
she lacked notice that her siblings intended to exclude her due to their behavior in seemingly
accepting her as a sibling.
Hence, because appellant failed to raise below the same
constitutional arguments that she now raises, we decline to reach the merits of those
arguments.
Affirmed.
GLADWIN and BAKER, JJ., agree.
served upon each heir and devisee whose name and address are known to or reasonably
ascertainable by the personal representative.
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