Angela Mayo v. Arkansas Department of Human Services, minor child

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ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS  NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION  JOHN B. ROBBINS, JUDGE  DIVISION IV  CA 07­854  JANUARY 9, 2008  ANGELA MAYO  APPELLANT  V. ARKANSAS DEPARTMENT OF  HUMAN SERVICES, minor child  APPELLEE  APPEAL FROM THE CRAIGHEAD  COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT,  WESTERN DISTRICT, [NO. JV­06­61]  HONORABLE LARRY BARNETT  BOLING, JUDGE  AFFIRMED  Appellant Angela Mayo appeals the termination of her parental rights to her son LRB,  as found by the Craighead County Circuit Court.  LRB was born in December 2005, when  appellant was on the run from law enforcement authorities.  Appellant placed her infant son  in a relative’s custody within days of his birth.  Appellee Arkansas Department of Human  Services (DHS) took emergency custody of the child within two months due to one caretaker  being  a  sex  offender,  in  addition  to  environmental  issues  in  the  home.    Appellant  was  incarcerated for the next year while the child was in DHS custody.  Appellant was released  on  parole  in  the  early  months  of  2007.    After  a  termination  hearing  in  May  2007,  a  termination­of­parental­rights order was entered on June 6, 2007, from which this appeal is  taken. Appellant  contends  that  (1)  the  trial  court  erred  by  considering  testimony  and  evidence from prior hearings in the course of the termination hearing, and (2) the trial court  erred in terminating her parental rights because DHS failed to present clear and convincing  evidence to support doing so.  DHS and the child’s attorney ad litem have filed briefs in  opposition to appellant’s arguments on appeal, asserting that there is no reversible error.  We  affirm.  First, appellant contends that the trial court violated Ark. Sup.  Ct. R. 6­9 (2007),  which was adopted to streamline the process for appeals in dependency­neglect proceedings,  applicable from and after July 1, 2006.  The Rule mandates that the record on appeal shall  be limited to the transcript of the hearing being appealed and any materials relevant to that  hearing.  However, pursuant to statute, Ark. Code Ann. § 9­27­341 (Supp. 2005), the trial  court  must  rely  on  the  entire  record  to  decide  whether  termination  is  in  the  child’s  best  interest.  Appellant argues on appeal that while the trial court acted  correctly within the  parameters of our Juvenile Code by considering prior testimony, evidence, and hearings in  this case, it violated Rule 6­9, mandating reversal.  We disagree.  At the outset, we reject appellant’s complaint because she did not make this argument  to the trial court.  A party must first bring an objection before the trial court in order to  preserve the issue for appeal.  See Madden v. Aldrich, 346 Ark. 405, 58 S.W.3d 342 (2001)  (holding  that  the  failure  to  obtain  a  ruling  from  the  trial  court  is  a  procedural  bar  to  consideration of the issue on appeal); see also Moore v. Ark. Dep’t of Human Servs., 95 Ark. ­2­  App. 138, __ S.W.3d __  (2006) (refusing to review due­process argument with regard to  notice where not raised in trial court).  Furthermore, on the merits, we perceive no conflict between Rule 6­9 and the statutes  at issue.  Rule 6­9(c)(1)(2007) states: “The record for appeal shall be limited to the transcript  of the hearing from which the order on appeal arose, any petitions, pleadings, and orders  relevant to that hearing, and all exhibits entered into evidence at that hearing.”  Arkansas  Code Annotated sections 9­27­341(a)(4)(B) & (d)(2) (Supp. 2005) respectively provide:  (a)(4)(B) The court shall rely upon the record of the parent’s compliance in the entire  dependency­neglect case and evidence presented at the termination hearing in making  its decision whether it is in the juvenile’s best interest to terminate parental rights.  . . . .  (d)(2) If the parent was represented by counsel, the court shall take judicial notice and  incorporate  by  reference  into  the  record  all  pleadings  and  testimony  in  the  case  1  incurred before the termination of parental rights hearing.  The limitation of the record on appeal is distinctly a different matter than the evidence upon  which the trial court should and must consider for the ultimate finding.  We so held in Smith  v. Ark. Dep’t of Human Servs., __ Ark. App. __, __ S.W.3d __ (Oct. 3, 2007).  Therefore,  we affirm this point.  The second  point  on  appeal is that the trial court clearly erred in terminating her  parental rights.  The trial court found that the child had been out of the mother’s custody for 1  Subsection (d)(2) was deleted by our legislature in the 2007 legislative session  pursuant to Act 587.  However, the effective date, July 31, 2007, was subsequent to these  proceedings.  Subsection (a)(4)(B) remains.  ­3­  almost the entirety of his life.  The trial court noted that appellant, a woman in her early  twenties, had a long­term history of chemical addiction with periods of sobriety that, to date,  had not been long lasting.  The child was found to have some developmental and health  issues that were being addressed in the foster home, and there was a likelihood of adoption.  Appellant was found to have made some progress toward setting herself on a positive path,  given the services she took advantage of in prison.  Nonetheless, appellant was found not to  be prepared, nor would she be in a reasonable time as viewed from the child’s perspective,  to be ready for reunification.  While appellant proclaimed her love for her son and asked for  more time to work toward reunification, the judge determined that termination of parental  rights was in the child’s best interest.  A formal order was entered commemorating these  findings, which included three bases to terminate:  (1)  That  the  child  had  been  outside  the  home  for  greater  than  a  year  and  despite  efforts  by  DHS to  rehabilitate  the  parent  and  help  correct  the  conditions  causing  removal, those conditions had not been remedied by the parent;  (2) That the child had been outside the home for greater than a year, and the parent  willfully  failed  to  provide  significant  material  support  or  to  maintain  meaningful  contact;  (3) That the parent subjected the child to aggravated circumstances in that there was  little likelihood that provision of services would result in successful reunification  within a time frame consistent with the needs of the child.  Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal.  We review termination of parental rights cases de novo.  Dinkins v. Ark. Dep’t of  Human Servs., 344 Ark. 207, 40 S.W.3d 286 (2001).  Termination of parental rights is an  extreme remedy and in derogation of the natural rights of parents, but parental rights will not  be enforced to the detriment or destruction of the health and well­being of the child.  Id. ­4­  Grounds for termination of parental rights must be proven by clear and convincing evidence.  M.T. v. Ark. Dep’t of Human Servs., 58 Ark. App. 302, 952 S.W.2d 177 (1997).  Clear and  convincing  evidence  is  that  degree  of  proof  that  will  produce  in  the  fact  finder  a  firm  conviction as to the allegation sought to be established.  Anderson v. Douglas, 310 Ark. 633,  839  S.W.2d  196  (1992).    When  the  burden  of  proving  a  disputed  fact  is  by  clear  and  convincing  evidence,  the  appellate  inquiry  is  whether  the  trial  court's  finding  that  the  disputed fact was proven by clear and convincing evidence is clearly erroneous.  J.T. v. Ark.  Dep’t of Human Servs., 329 Ark. 243, 947 S.W.2d 761 (1997).  We  give due regard to the  opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility of the witnesses.  Id.  Where there are  inconsistences in the testimony presented at a termination hearing, the resolution of those  inconsistencies  is  best  left  to  the  trial  judge,  who  heard  and  observed  these  witnesses  first­hand.  Dinkins, supra.  A finding is clearly erroneous when, although there is evidence  to  support  it,  the  reviewing  court  on  the  entire  evidence  is  left  with  a  definite  and  firm  conviction that a mistake has been made.  Id.  The goal of Arkansas Code Annotated section 9­27­341 (Supp. 2003) is to provide  permanency in a minor child’s life in circumstances in which returning the child to the family  home is contrary to the minor's health, safety, or welfare and the evidence demonstrates that  a return to the home cannot be accomplished in a reasonable period of time as viewed from  the minor child’s perspective.  Ark. Code Ann. § 9­27­341(a)(3).  Parental rights may be  terminated if clear and convincing evidence shows that it is in the child's best interest.  Ark.  Code Ann. § 9­27­341(b)(3).  Additionally, one or more grounds must be shown by clear ­5­  and convincing evidence. Arkansas Code Annotated section 9­27­341(b)(2)(A) provides the  grounds upon which a termination of parental rights may be established.  Appellant asserts that she obtained services on her own while in prison, such as drug­  rehabilitation, parenting, alcoholics anonymous, and GED classes.  In addition, she said that  once she was released from prison, she obtained a full­time job and moved in with her aunt.  Appellant contends that she did all she could while incarcerated to better herself, and once  released, had only three months before the termination hearing was conducted, during which  DHS gave her no services except a couple of visits.  Thus, appellant argues that the finding  of reasonable efforts is not supported by the evidence.  Appellant contends also that the trial  court erred in terminating her rights on failure to provide material support because she was  under no court order to do so, DHS never asked for support, and she was not a wage­earner  in prison. Appellant’s appeal fails because, even were we to agree with her first two arguments,  she  does  not  contest  the  third  basis  for  terminating  her  parental  rights,  which  was  the  “aggravated circumstances” finding.  In a situation where an appellant on appeal does not  attack  all  of  a  trial  court’s  bases  for  its  ruling,  the  appellate  court  will  affirm  without  addressing the argument.  Pugh v. State, 351 Ark. 5, 89 S.W.3d 909 (2002); Pearrow v.  Feagin, 300 Ark. 274, 778 S.W.2d 941 (1989).  Even so, were we to entertain her argument that DHS did not assist her in the months  leading to termination of her rights, we would be duty­bound to support the trial court’s  action that  gives effect to the legislature’s overriding intent, which is to protect the best ­6­  interest of our state’s children in achieving a safe and permanent home.  Ark. Code Ann.  § 9­27­341(a)(3).  Appellant points to no services that DHS could provide that it did not.  Indeed, appellant acquired relevant services in prison on her own, which is commendable.  The difficulty is that appellant’s circumstances of imprisonment and parole left the child in  a precarious position of waiting for those issues to resolve while in foster care.  Appellant  was unable to be the parent that her child needed, at least not for the majority of this young  boy’s life, and stability and permanence had to be viewed from the child’s perspective.  See  Camarillo­Cox v. Ark. Dep’t of Human Servs., __ Ark. __, __ S.W.3d __ (Jan. 5, 2005)  (children out of home for one year and four months, parent complied with case plan for the  last five months); Trout v. Ark. Dep’t of Human Servs., __ Ark. __, __ S.W.3d __ (Nov. 4,  2004); Dinkins, supra.  To hold the child in limbo is contrary to the overriding legislative  directive  to  provide  permanency  for  children  where  return  to  the  home  cannot  be  accomplished within a reasonable time. Evidence that a parent begins to make improvement  as termination becomes more imminent will not outweigh other evidence demonstrating a  failure to comply and to remedy the situation that caused the children to be removed in the  first place.  Compare Camarillo­Cox v. Ark. Dep’t of Human Servs., supra.  Progress that  is made too late to achieve reunification within a reasonable time from the child's perspective  will not suffice.  See Latham v. Ark. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 99 Ark. App. 25, __  S.W.3d __ (2007).  In summary, we affirm the termination of appellant’s parental rights.  PITTMAN, C.J., and BIRD, J., agree. ­7­  ­8­

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