Jeffrey Vorster v. Charles Maxwell Post, Personal Representative of the Estate of Mary Elizabeth Post, Deceased
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS
NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION
SARAH J. HEFFLEY, JUDGE
DIVISION IV
CA 07-663
April 9, 2008
JEFFREY VORSTER
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM THE PULASKI COUNTY
CIRCUIT COURT
[NO. CV 05-16080]
V.
HONORABLE JAMES MOODY, JR.,
JUDGE
CHARLES MAXWELL POST,
PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE OF
THE ESTATE OF MARY ELIZABETH
POST, DECEASED
APPELLEE
AFFIRMED
Appellant Jeffrey Vorster appeals from an order finding that he take nothing on his complaint
grounded in negligence against the estate of Mary Elizabeth Post, appellee. For reversal, appellant
contends that the trial court erred by granting the estate’s motion for summary judgment on the
theory of res ipsa loquitur, and that the trial court erred in granting the estate’s motion for a directed
verdict on the claim of specific negligence. We affirm.
Mary Elizabeth Post and appellant were next door neighbors in the Capitol View area of
Little Rock. At around 7:30 a.m. on March 1, 2004, Post’s home exploded and was completely
blown apart. Fire from the blast immediately engulfed appellant’s home in flames. It, too, was a
total loss. Ms. Post survived the explosion, but she suffered first, second, and third-degree burns
over most of her body. She died three days later.
Appellant filed suit against Post’s estate, claiming that Post’s negligence caused the explosion.
Appellant also pled res ipsa loquitur in order to establish negligence. The estate moved for summary
judgment. The trial court granted that motion as to res ipsa loquitur but denied it as to general
negligence. However, at trial the court granted the estate’s motion for a directed verdict at the
conclusion of appellant’s case.
Res Ipsa Loquitur
Summary judgment was granted on this issue, which calls to mind the familiar standards upon
which we conduct our review. Summary judgment is to be granted by a trial court only when it
is clear that there are no genuine issues of material fact to be litigated, and the moving party is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Stolze v. Arkansas Valley Electric Cooperative Corp., 354 Ark.
601, 127 S.W.3d 466 (2003). The moving party is entitled to summary judgment if the pleadings,
depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with affidavits, if any, show
that there is no genuine issue of material fact. Gafford v. Cox, 84 Ark. App. 57, 129 S.W.3d 296
(2003). The burden of sustaining a motion for summary judgment is always the responsibility of the
moving party. Flentje v. First Nat’l Bank of Wynne, 340 Ark. 563, 11 S.W.3d 531 (2000). All proof
submitted must be viewed in the light most favorable to the party resisting the motion, and any
doubts and inferences must be resolved against the moving party. Nelms v. Martin, ___ Ark. App.
___, ___ S.W.3d ___ (Sept. 26, 2007). On appeal, the reviewing court need only decide if the grant
of summary judgment was appropriate based on whether the evidentiary items presented by the
moving party left a material question of fact unanswered. Id.
Supporting the summary-judgment motion were the affidavits and deposition testimony of
Steve Johnson and William Ford, both experts in the field of fire and explosion investigation. The
trial court also considered the reports generated by the fire department inspector and Mr. Johnson.
The following facts emerge from these sources of information.
-2-
CA 07-663
Johnson and Ford were tasked with determining the cause of the explosion. However, their
investigation was hampered by the sheer destructiveness of the blast, as well as the efforts of the fire
department in extinguishing the fire. For instance, they could not distinguish between the pipes that
were used to carry natural gas and those used to supply water. Given the force of the explosion,
both experts opined that there was a substantial accumulation of natural gas caused by a leak of
unknown origin. It was thought likely that most of the gas had accumulated in the crawlspace
underneath the house for several reasons, including the fact that Post had not been asphyxiated.
Post had four gas appliances in her home: a floor furnace, a bathroom space heater, a stove,
and a hot water heater located in the crawlspace. Each of these appliances was inspected and no
obvious defects were detected. However, the inspection of the floor furnace was incomplete because
the gas valve was not found in the debris. Additionally, the controls on the stove were in the “off”
position, as was the valve to the space heater in the bathroom. The gas company had pressure-tested
the line between the main and Post’s meter and found no leak.
In his deposition, Johnson identified a number of possible sources of the leak, none of which
were more likely than any other. He stated that he could not eliminate the possibilities that there
was a failure at the gas range or the tubing routed to the range; that there was a failure at the space
heater in the bathroom or the tubing routed to the space heater; that there was a failure at the floor
furnace or the tubing that supplied the floor furnace; that there was a failure of the water heater or
the tubing leading to the water heater; that there was a failure of the natural gas pipe routed inside
the wall or attic; that there was a failure of the natural gas piping below the home; that there was a
failure of the natural gas regulator because it had been removed by the gas company; that there was
a failure of the gas pipe routed between the main and the meter; that natural gas had leaked into the
ground and had leached and accumulated underneath the home; that the gas may have come from
-3-
CA 07-663
a neighbor’s home; that the gas piping may have been improperly secured or secured in such a
manner that allowed for vibration, such as that caused by a washing machine; that there was damage
to the piping or appliances under the home caused by repair work done one month before the
explosion; that the termite company may have damaged the piping in an inspection two weeks
before the explosion; or that cats or dogs may have gotten underneath the home and caused damage
to the pipes.
Johnson and Ford were also of the opinion that the most probable source of ignition was a
match struck by Post to light the heater in the bathroom. They arrived at this conclusion based on
an anecdotal account of a neighbor who had spoken to Post when she was pulled from the fire.
According to the neighbor, Post told her that she had gotten out of bed and tried to turn up the
thermostat on the floor furnace but that it did not light. Reportedly, Post then went to the
bathroom to light the space heater, and the explosion occurred when she lit a match.1 Noting that
the gas valve to the space heater was in the off position, it was said that it was proper technique to
light a match, and then turn on the gas valve. Johnson and Ford also stated that natural gas is
odorless and that a substance called Mercaptan is added to the gas to give it an odor, so that its
presence can be detected by the sense of smell.
The origin and purpose of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur were discussed by our supreme
court in Reece v. Webster, 221 Ark. 826, 256 S.W.2d 345 (1953):
The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur was developed to assist in the proof
of negligence where the cause of an unusual happening connected
with some instrumentality in the exclusive possession and control of
the defendant could not be readily established by the plaintiff. The
theory was that since the instrumentality was in the possession of the
defendant, justice required that the defendant be compelled to offer
an explanation of the event or be burdened with a presumption of
1
As will be discussed, this was not the testimony at trial.
-4-
CA 07-663
negligence.
Id. at 829, 256 S.W.2d at 347. This presumption is limited to situations where the defendant’s
negligence has been substantially proven. Barker v. Clark, 343 Ark. 8, 33 S.W.3d 476 (2000). The
doctrine, when applicable, allows the jury to infer negligence from the plaintiff’s evidence of
circumstances surrounding the occurrence. Phillips v. Elwood Freeman Co., Inc., 294 Ark. 534, 745
S.W.2d 127 (1988).
In order for the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur to apply, four essential elements must be
established: (1) the defendant owes a duty to the plaintiff to use due care; (2) the accident is caused
by the thing or instrumentality under the control of the defendant; (3) the accident that caused the
injury is one that, in the ordinary course of things, would not occur if those having control and
management of the instrumentality used proper care; and (4) there is an absence of evidence to the
contrary. Marx v. Huron Little Rock, 88 Ark. App. 284, 198 S.W.3d 127 (2004). In addition, it must
be shown that the instrumentality causing the injury was in the defendant’s exclusive possession and
control at the time of the injury. Sherwood Forest Mobile Home Park v. Champion Home Builders Co.,
89 Ark. App. 1, 199 S.W.3d 707 (2004).
In his argument on appeal appellant places great stock in the decision of Megee v. Reed, 252
Ark. 1016, 482 S.W.2d 832 (1972). In that case, Reed’s car was damaged in a fire that started at two
o’clock in the morning at Megee’s repair shop. The cause of the fire was not known, but arson and
electrical storms were ruled out as possible causes of the fire. Present in the area of the fire, however,
were flammable liquids, rags, paint, and other vehicles containing gasoline along with a pilot light
that had been left on. On these facts, the supreme court held that res ipsa loquitur applied because
“these were instrumentalities in the exclusive control of the defendant as were the premises
themselves; the accident was not due to the voluntary action on the part of the plaintiff; and the fire
-5-
CA 07-663
was one which ordinarily does not occur in the absence of someone’s negligence, absent some
evidence that it was incendiary in nature.” Id. at 1019, 482 S.W.2d at 835.
Appellant contends in his brief that the application of res ipsa loquitur is more compelling
here than in Magee because in this case “there was uncontroverted evidence before the trial court that
Ms. Post attempted to light her bathroom space heater which in turn ignited the natural gas in her
home.” This assertion, however, detracts from rather than supports applying the doctrine in the
present matter. In Reece v. Webster, supra, a sixteen-year-old boy was fatally burned when he walked
past a tractor that exploded and expelled burning gasoline onto his body. It was alleged that a
sediment bulb in front of the tractor’s motor had a defect that allowed gasoline to drip and that the
dripping gasoline was ignited by the hot motor. Based on this evidence, the trial court refused an
instruction on res ipsa loquitur. In affirming, the supreme court recognized that pleading an act of
specific negligence may not prevent the application of the doctrine, but the court concluded that it
did there because there was no suggestion of any other possible contributing factor to the explosion.
However, in the case of Moon Distributors, Inc. v. White, 245 Ark. 627, 434 S.W.2d 56
(1968), the defendant’s wrecker was towing a dump truck that came unhitched, crossed the median,
and struck the White vehicle, killing its occupants. As proof of negligence, it was alleged that the
coupling mechanism on the wrecker was defective; that the driver of the wrecker was speeding; and
that just before the accident the driver had swerved suddenly, causing the dump truck to fishtail
before it became unhitched. On appeal, the supreme court upheld the submission of the case to the
jury on res ipsa loquitur, even though specific acts of negligence were alleged, because the exact
cause of the accident could not be proved with precision.
Appellant’s argument brings this case more in line with the holding of Reece v. Webster.
-6-
CA 07-663
Appellant faults Post for the single act of lighting a match in the presumed presence of natural gas.
This is a specific act of negligence, and appellant has pointed to no other possible cause of the
explosion. Thus, we conclude that this case is not suited for the application of res ipsa loquitur.
Although this may not have been the basis for the trial court’s grant of summary judgment, we can
affirm a trial court’s decision that is correct, albeit for a different reason. Thomas v. Avant, 370 Ark.
377, ___ S.W.3d ___ (2007) (holding that it is axiomatic that we can affirm a circuit court’s decision
if the right result is reached even if for a different reason).
There are other reasons for not applying res ipsa loquitur in this case. Fundamental to the
application of the doctrine is the necessity that there must have been an inference of negligence on
the part of the defendant as a proximate cause of injury. Dollins v. Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co.,
252 Ark. 13, 477 S.W.2d 179 (1972). The evidence presented for purposes of the summaryjudgment motion indicated that the gas build-up was underneath the house. Thus it is purely
speculative to say that Post had reason to know of any danger posed by striking a match. Conduct
becomes negligent only as it gives rise to appreciable risk of injury to others, and there is no
negligence in not guarding against a danger that there is no reason to anticipate. Id.
We also believe that the element of exclusive control was lacking. Although the gas
company was said to have pressure-tested its line and found no leaks, the experts could not determine
whether or not there was a failure of the gas regulator controlled by the gas company because the
gas company had removed this equipment. There was also evidence that a plumbing company had
recently performed repair work underneath the house. Res ipsa loquitur does not apply unless the
conduct of third persons is sufficiently eliminated. Gann v. Parker, 315 Ark. 107, 865 S.W.2d 282
(1993). Moreover, it does not apply where an unexplained accident may be attributable to one of
several causes, some of which the defendant is not responsible. Williams v. Lauderdale, 209 Ark. 418,
-7-
CA 07-663
191 S.W.2d 455 (1946).
Directed Verdict
As with the issue of summary judgment, our standards of review with regard to the grant
of a directed verdict are well established. A motion for a directed verdict should be granted only if
there is no substantial evidence to support a jury verdict. One Nat’l Bank v. Pope, ___ Ark. ___, ___
S.W.3d ___ (Jan. 24, 2008). Where evidence is such that fairminded persons might reach different
conclusions, then a jury question is presented, and the directed verdict should be reversed. Id. In
determining the correctness of the trial court’s ruling, we view the evidence in the light most
favorable to the party against whom the verdict is sought and give it the highest probative value,
taking into account all reasonable inferences deducible from it. Little Rock v. Cameron, 320 Ark. 444,
897 S.W.2d 562 (1995).
Appellant offered the testimony of two witnesses in an effort to establish Post’s negligence.
Havis Jacks was employed by the Little Rock Fire Department, and he investigated the explosion
that damaged in some form or fashion an estimated twenty houses in the neighborhood.
He said
that the fuel for the explosion was natural gas, but he was not able to determine the source of the
gas nor the reason for its ignition. He testified that “To say it was in the house, that was going to
be kind of hard to say, too, because that is one of the things we couldn’t determine. Gas migrates,
and that’s one of the problems we were having with it.” Jacks explained that natural gas migrates
because it is lighter than air. He also testified that “scrubbing” is a term used for when gas migrates
and that scrubbing can eliminate the odor of Mercaptan, which is added to the natural gas to give
it an odor. He was not able to say whether scrubbing had occurred.
Jacks found no defects in any of Post’s appliances. He noted that the water heater had a
thermocouple that would shut down the gas if the pilot light went out. He said that the stove had
-8-
CA 07-663
pilot lights and that the controls for it were in the “off” position. The space heater in the bathroom
did not have a pilot light but the valve was in the “off” position.
Charlotte Day testified that she and Post were close friends and neighbors. That morning,
she heard the explosion, ran outside, and saw that Post’s house was no longer there. Another
neighbor carried Post out of the rubble, and Day held Post’s hand while waiting for help to arrive.
Post was able to speak to Day, and Post first commented that she “guessed” she would not be having
eye surgery that was planned. Post lamented the loss of her books, but jokingly commented that she
had just finished preparing her tax return. Day testified as follows as to what Post told her about the
explosion, saying that Post said she had “gotten up, gone in, turned the thermostat up, went into the
bathroom, she said, to light the heater. That was it.”
Day further testified that Post had not complained of any problem with her sense of smell
prior to the fire. She also stated that Post was conscientious about her home and its upkeep. Day
recalled that Post had the floor furnace replaced in 2000 and that she had a plumber come out every
spring to turn the heat off and that she would have the plumber return in the fall to inspect and
relight the pilot light. In the weeks before the accident, the floor furnace had not come on and Post
had called a plumber to check it. She said that the plumber found no leaks and offered no reason
for it to have gone out. The plumber relit the pilot lights on the furnace, the stove, and the hot
water heater.
It was on this evidence that the trial court directed a verdict against appellant, and we cannot
disagree with that decision. Negligence is defined as the failure to do something that a reasonably
careful person would do, or the doing of something that a reasonably careful person would not do,
under the circumstances. Ethyl Corp. v. Johnson, 345 Ark. 476, 49 S.W.3d 644 (2001). When
viewed in the appropriate light, the evidence shows that there was an accumulation of natural gas,
-9-
CA 07-663
but the source of the gas and the ignition were undetermined. As ultimately revealed in the
testimony, Post had merely gotten out of bed, turned up the thermostat, and then went into the
bathroom to light the heater when the explosion occurred. There was no evidence that gas had
permeated the living quarters of the home. There was also no evidence that Post actually attempted
to light the space heater, such as by striking a match. The evidence in this case thus falls short of
suggesting, even remotely, that Post did anything or failed to do something that caused the
explosion. Because there was no substantial evidence to take the case to the jury, we affirm the
decision to grant the estate’s motion for a directed verdict.
Affirmed.
MARSHALL and BAKER, JJ., agree.
-10-
CA 07-663
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.