Max Caldwell v. Tommy Dale Keeling and Becky Keeling

 Annotate this Case
Download PDF
ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS  NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION  ROBERT J. GLADWIN, JUDGE  DIVISION I  CA07­603  FEBRUARY 13, 2008  MAX CALDWELL  APPELLANT  APPEAL  FROM THE CROSS COUNTY  CIRCUIT COURT  [NO. CV­2005­162­3]  V. TOMMY  DALE  KEELING  and  BECKY  KEELING  APPELLEES  HON. BENTLEY E. STORY,  CIRCUIT JUDGE  AFFIRMED  Appellant Max Caldwell appeals the February 8, 2007 decree of the Cross County  Circuit Court, wherein the trial court determined that the gates erected by appellees, Tommy  and  Becky  Keeling,  were  an  unreasonable  obstruction  to  appellant’s  easement,  but  that  electric gates across the easement would not be unreasonable.  Further, the trial court ruled  that the recorded easement should be reformed to reflect the legal description of the existing  road.  Appellant contends that the trial court erred in allowing appellees to erect electric  gates  across  his  easement  and  in  extinguishing  the  easement  as  originally  recorded.  Appellees argue on cross­appeal that the trial court erred in finding that the erection of gates  across the easement was an unreasonable restriction.  We affirm. Facts  The easement at issue herein was first conveyed on February 9, 1987.  At that time,  appellees’ land was owned by Jimmy South and Sandra South (now Lamb), who conveyed  the easement to Sandra’s parents, Dick and Juanita Lindley, previous owners of appellant’s  land.  The Souths gave the Lindleys an easement for ingress and egress to the Lindleys’  property.  At that time, the Lindleys raised peaches on their land for Gerber and others, and  the easement was necessary for the farm equipment to have access from the highway to the  peach  orchard.    The  testimony  at  trial  revealed  that  the  Souths  intended  to  convey  an  easement running along a gravel road that had been in existence for about fifty years.  It was  discovered after the conveyance that the recorded easement did not convey an easement  along the existing gravel road but rather along a path somewhere to the south of the road.  However, no documents were ever executed or recorded to amend the recorded easement to  reflect the parties’ intent.  Juanita Lindley, who became widowed, conveyed her land to her daughter, Sandra  Lamb, who in turn conveyed the land to appellant in two parcels.  The northernmost parcel  consisting of forty­five acres was conveyed to appellant on January 30, 2004. The remaining  forty­five acres was conveyed to appellant on January 13, 2006.  The easement rights of  ingress and egress were conveyed with the land.  Appellees acquired their land, which had  been previously owned by the Souths, through a chain of conveyances.  Their immediate  predecessor in title, Bobbie Garner, executed a deed in appellees’ favor on February 11, ­2­  CA07­603  2005, “subject to all existing easements of record or by other agreements for ingress/egress,  roadways, and utilities.”  Appellees tore down the existing fence along the north side of the existing road and  expanded the pasture to the south side of the existing road.  Appellees then erected a barn  on the south side of the road either on or very close to the recorded easement.  Appellees  then erected two gates on the existing road after they discovered that the cattle guards they  had installed did not prevent their horses from escaping the pasture.  Because of the gates,  and in order to utilize the easement, appellant must arrive at the first gate, get out of his  vehicle, open the gate, get back into his vehicle, drive through the gate, get out of his vehicle,  close the gate, and return to his vehicle.  He must repeat this process for the second gate, and  again for both gates when leaving the property.  Further, appellant must be on guard for  appellees’ horses and take appropriate  measures to ensure that the horses do not escape  during the gate­opening­and­closing process.  The  gates  were  erected  after  appellant  acquired  the  first  forty­five  acre  tract,  but  before appellant acquired the second forty­five acre tract.  Appellant has used the property  for hunting purposes only, but testified that he would like to employ someone to farm and  harvest peaches from the peach orchard.  However, he claimed that the existence of the gates  has dissuaded local peach farmers from farming his orchard.  Further, appellant’s ninety  acres is situated directly across from a twenty­seven hole golf course under construction at  Village Creek State Park.  Appellant wants to develop part of his property into residential  tracts, and he believes his property would be attractive to investors because of its proximity ­3­  CA07­603  to the golf course. He testified that developers would not be interested in property obstructed  by gates.  The trial court found that the issue between the parties was the degree of reasonable  and  free use of the existing easement that appellant, as the  dominant  estate owner, can  demand  and  the  degree  of  reasonable  restrictions  on  the  use  of  the  existing  easement  appellees, as the servient estate owners, can assert.  The trial court determined that the gates  as erected were an unreasonable obstruction of appellant’s easement.  However, the trial  court found that the erection of electric gates would not be an unreasonable obstruction.  Further, the trial court ruled that the recorded easement should be reformed to reflect the  intention of the previous owners, which corrected the legal description to that of the existing  gravel road.  This appeal followed.  Statement of law  Arkansas  law  regarding  obstruction  of  easements  is  well­settled,  and  has  been  summarized as follows:  The  general  rule  regarding  the  obstruction  by  fences  or  gates  of  such  private  easements by the owner of the servient estate is that a fence may not be erected so as  to entirely obstruct the way, but that unless it is expressly stipulated or it appears from  the terms of the grant or the surrounding circumstances that the way shall be an open  one, without gates, the owner of the servient estate may erect gates across the way if  they are so located, constructed or maintained as not unreasonably to interfere with  the right of passage, when they are necessary for the preservation and proper and  efficient use of the lands constituting the servient estate. 28 C.J.S. Easements s 98(b),  p. 781; 25 Am.Jur.2d 497, s 91. See Hockersmith v. Glidewell, (Ark. unreported) 153  S.W. 252; Restatement of the Law of Property, Servitudes, s 486.  Jordan v. Guinn and Etheridge, 253 Ark. 315, 321, 485 S.W.2d 715, 719 (1972). ­4­  CA07­603  “Pertinent factors to be considered include the terms of the grant, the intention of the  parties as reflected by the circumstances, the nature and situation of the property and the  manner in which it has been used and occupied before and after the gant, and the location  of gates.”  Id., 253 Ark. at 322, 485 S.W.2d at 720.  The question of reasonableness is a fact  question.  Id.  The trial court’s findings in this regard will not be reversed unless they are  clearly erroneous.  Wallner v. Johnson, 21 Ark. App. 124, 730 S.W.2d 253 (1987).  Reformation of easement  Appellant contends that the trial court erred in extinguishing the recorded easement  by ruling that the existing road should be the proper easement.  Appellant asserts that the  original  recorded  easement  is  still  valid,  and  argues  that  even  though  the  proof  at  trial  indicated  that  the  original  grantors  of  the  easement  intended  for  it  to  coincide  with  the  existing road, no documents have been executed to terminate  or extinguish the recorded  easement.  He also argues that the deed recorded herein put the parties on notice that there  may be two easements, one recorded and one by prescription.  He claims that he has two  easements, one recorded in the land records and one by prescription across the existing road.  He asks that the trial court’s ruling extinguishing his recorded easement be reversed.  Appellees maintain that the trial court was correct in ruling that appellant’s recorded  easement was extinguished upon reformation of the easement.  They assert that at the trial­  court level, appellant argued that the original easement should be reformed due to mutual  mistake of the predecessors in title.  We agree, and therefore affirm the trial court’s ruling.  Even as to constitutional claims, a party is bound on appeal by the scope and nature of the ­5­  CA07­603  arguments and objections made at trial; a party cannot change the grounds of an objection  on appeal.  Holland v. State, 71 Ark. App. 84, 27 S.W.3d 753 (2000).  Accordingly, the trial  court’s ruling extinguishing the recorded easement and reforming it to reflect the description  of the existing gravel road is affirmed.  Reasonableness of erecting gates  Appellant claims that the trial court was correct in determining that placing gates  across the easement constitutes an unreasonable restriction. However, he contends on appeal  that the trial court erred in ordering appellees to erect electric gates, arguing that the erection  of any type of gate is unreasonable.  On cross appeal, appellees claim that the trial court’s  finding of unreasonableness should be reversed, thus eliminating the requirement of electrical  gates.  Combining these points, this court addresses the question of reasonableness raised in  both claims.  Appellant  maintains  that  the  trial  court’s  analysis  under  Jordan,  supra,  was  well  reasoned.  The trial court noted that an obstruction across the existing road would have been  very cumbersome for the intended use and purpose of the easement, which was to allow the  free travel of large farm equipment and transport trucks across the appellees’ land.  The trial  court opined that opening and closing a gate once a day is not unusual or unreasonable for  hunters, and we agree.  However, the trial court further found that for farmers using the ­6­  CA07­603  easement,  opening  and  closing  a  gate  many  times  a  day  would  be  cumbersome  and  unreasonable, and therefore, a mechanical gate is required to achieve reasonableness.  Appellant further argues that the intention of all previous owners favors removal of  the  gates.  He  claims  that  all  previous  owners  intended  for  the  easement  to  remain  unobstructed, and points out that the trial court noted in its opinion that at no time in the past  has  the  property  owned  by  appellees  been  used  in  such  a  way  as  to  interfere  with  the  easement.  Appellant argues that the small benefit of adding about one­and­a­half acres to  appellees’  pasture  does  not  outweigh  the  burden  to  appellant  of  having  his  easement  obstructed.  Further, appellant argues that the erection of gates hinders his future use of the  property.  He contends that local peach farmers refuse to farm his orchards because of the  gates and that the gates prevent him from developing his property.  Therefore, appellant argues that the trial court correctly applied the Jordan balancing  test to the gates as they existed at the time of trial, finding that they were an unreasonable  restriction on appellant’s easement. However, appellant argues that the trial court erred in  holding that electric gates not yet erected would be reasonable. We decline to find appellees’  placement  of  gates  across  the  easement  an  unreasonable  restriction  on  the  easement.  Appellees contend, and we agree, that the evidence showed that they enlarged their  pasture by moving the fence to the south side of the roadway.  The evidence demonstrated  that appellees needed the pasture for their three horses and children.  The gates proved to be  necessary to keep the horses from escaping, as the cattle guards were not working.  Further,  appellees argue that they offered to install electrical gates after appellant filed the lawsuit, ­7­  CA07­603  but appellant declined.  Appellees claim that appellant did not offer any proof, other than his  inconvenience in stopping and opening the gates, that the unlocked gates interfered with his  use and enjoyment of the property.  We agree.  Appellees  rely  upon  Wallner  v.  Johnson,  supra,  where  this  court  held  that  the  maintenance of an unlocked gate across a roadway did not materially interfere with the use  of the roadway.  Appellees argue that the easement granted herein was limited to ingress and  egress.  They claim that appellant wanted the court to grant a much broader easement that  would unreasonably interfere with their right to use and enjoy their property by limiting the  pasture for their horse and separating the pasture from the barn.  They ask that the ruling  regarding removal of the unlocked gates be reversed.  A fact­question is to be determined by the trial court, and we will not disturb the  finding  unless  it  is  clearly  erroneous.  Jordan,  supra.  Noting  the  trial  court’s  findings  regarding the cumbersome nature of the gates and the intended use of the easement, as well  as the trial court’s consideration of the effect of the gates on both parties, we cannot say that  its  determination  that  a  mechanical  gate  is  a  reasonable  restriction  is  clearly  erroneous.  Relying on the particular facts herein, we hold that the trial court’s error was in finding gates  across  the  easement  to  be  unreasonable.  The  trial  court  equated  an  inconvenience  with  unreasonableness.  These are not identical.  Appellees’ gates did not interfere with the right  of passage, only the ease of passage.  Further, logic does not allow the trial court to find that  a gate is an unreasonable restriction and then order that a gate be erected.  Therefore, in light ­8­  CA07­603  of the foregoing, we uphold the trial court’s finding on cross appeal that a mechanical gate  is a reasonable restriction on the easement.  Affirmed.  BAKER, J., agrees.  PITTMAN, C.J., concurs.  PITTMAN, C.J., concurring.  I respectfully concur with the decision to affirm the trial  court’s judgment in this case.  The trial court issued an extensive letter opinion that was  incorporated into its decree.  In addition to summarizing the evidence and pertinent law, the  opinion included the following:  19.5.  The gates have not been padlocked by the [appellees/cross­appellants].  However,  the  gates  require  the  [appellant/cross­appellee],  when  he  crosses  the  existing road, to (1) stop his vehicle and get out, (2) open the gate, (3) get in his  vehicle and pull forward, (4) stop his vehicle and get out, (5) close the gate, and (6)  get back in his vehicle.  He has to do this on the other end of the existing road.  When  he returns from the peach orchard, he has to repeat this process.  . . . .  20.  Based on the above, it is this court’s opinion that the erection of gates on  the existing road is an unreasonable restriction placed on the domina[nt] estate by the  servient estate. Therefore, the [appellees/cross­appellants] may not place gates across  the existing road.  The [appellees/cross­appellants] may, however, erect gates across  the  existing road  which  require  the  [appellant/cross­appellee],  and  his  assigns,  to  activate the gates in some manner and method. ­9­  CA07­603  1  Reading the entire letter opinion and decree in context,  it is clear to me, as it is to the  parties  to  this  case,  that  the  trial  court  was  finding  only  the  then­existing,  manual  or  conventional  gates  to  be  an  unreasonable  restriction  on  use  of  the  easement  under  the  circumstances of this case.  The court found, on the other hand, that erection of electrical or  mechanical  gates,  which  could  be  activated  by  users  without  the  unduly  cumbersome  requirements imposed by manual gates, would not be an unreasonable restriction.  On this  record,  I  cannot  conclude  that  these  findings  are  clearly  erroneous,  and  I  concur  in  the  affirmance of the judgment on both appeal and cross­appeal. 1  See, e.g., Gibson v. Gibson, 87 Ark. App. 62, 185 S.W.3d 122 (2004) (judgments  are construed like any other instrument as a general rule; the determinative factor is the  intention of the court as gathered from the judgment itself and the record).  ­10­  CA07­603 

Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.

This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.