Curtis A. Byram v. Cheryl L. Byram
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS
NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION
DAVID M. GLOVER, JUDGE
DIVISION IV
CA07581
January 30, 2008
APPEAL FROM THE UNION
COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT
[DR20064712]
CURTIS A. BYRAM
APPELLANT
V.
HONORABLE MICHAEL R.
LANDERS, CIRCUIT JUDGE
CHERYL L. BYRAM
APPELLEE
AFFIRMED
Appellant, Curtis Byram, appeals from the trial court’s division of marital property
and debt in the divorce decree ending appellant’s marriage to appellee, Cheryl Byram.
He contends that the trial court erred 1) in concluding that he owned stock in a
corporation and in awarding appellee an interest in that corporation, and 2) in allocating
all of the debt to him. We affirm.
Our supreme court explained the standard of review for propertydivision cases in
Taylor v. Taylor, 369 Ark. 31, ____ , ____S.W.3d ___, ____ (2007) (quoting Farrell v.
Farrell, 365 Ark. at 469, 231 S.W.3d at ___ (2006)):
On appeal, divorce cases are reviewed de novo. With respect to the division
of property, we review the trial court’s findings of fact and affirm them unless they
are clearly erroneous, or against the preponderance of the evidence; the division of
property itself is also reviewed and the same standard applies. A finding is clearly
erroneous when the reviewing court, on the entire evidence, is left with the definite
and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed. In order to demonstrate
that the trial court’s ruling was erroneous, the appellant must show that the trial
court abused its discretion by making a decision that was arbitrary or groundless.
We give due deference to the chancellor’s superior position to determine the
credibility of witnesses and the weight to be given their testimony.
In his first point of appeal, appellant contends that the trial court’s finding that he
had a onethird ownership interest in the Byram Family Corporation was clearly
erroneous and that making that determination without appellant’s father and brother being
parties to the action was an error of law. We do not address the second portion of the
argument because it was not raised below. Shaw v. Shaw, 337 Ark. 530, 989 S.W.2d 919
(1999).
In making the argument that the trial court clearly erred in finding that he had an
ownership interest in the corporation, appellant notes that appellee did not present any
witnesses and did not testify herself, leaving only the testimony of appellant and his
brother to support the trial court’s finding. The argument, however, ignores the fact that
the trial court specifically found that appellant and his brother were not credible and also
that designated exhibits did not necessarily support appellant’s position. In a letter
opinion dated January 24, 2007, the trial court explained:
2
The plaintiff’s brother, Robert Byram, testified that the entity known as Byram
Family Corporation was owned by himself and his father, Curtis V. Byram. This
witness verified the authenticity of Schedule K1s issued to Curtis V. Byram and
the witness for the taxable year 2005. However, the Schedule K1 for taxable year
2004 issued in the plaintiff’s name and the corporation’s Balance Sheet dated
December 31, 2004 confirm that the plaintiff owned an undivided onethird
interest in that corporation at that time. The Balance Sheet (Defendant Ex. 1), at
page 9, lists the plaintiff as holder of onethird of the outstanding Capital Stock
and equity in the corporation along with his brother, Robert, and his father, Curtis
V. Byram. There was no evidence presented showing any subsequent transfer of
this interest. This asset is marital property and the defendant is awarded onehalf
of the plaintiff’s onethird interest in said corporation. The Court finds that Robert
Byram’s and the plaintiff’s testimony denying that plaintiff had any interest in this
corporation is not credible.
(Emphasis added.) And, as noted by appellee in her reply brief, “The trial court was
certainly justified in believing that the 2002, 2003, and 2004 income tax filings rather
than the 2005 filing accurately reflected the ownership of the corporation. The parties
were separated, and divorce was imminent.” Also, appellant argues that no evidence was
presented that he still owned a onethird interest in the corporation at the time of the
divorce. This argument is disingenuous in light of the trial court’s explanation that the
earlier documents showed appellant as an owner, that there was no evidence presented to
show a subsequent transfer of the interest, and that appellant and his brother were not
credible witnesses. As noted previously, the documents purporting to show appellant’s
father and brother as fiftyfifty owners in the corporation were prepared while the divorce
between the parties was imminent — supporting the trial court’s assessment of
3
credibility. Our review of the evidence does not leave us with a definite and firm
conviction that the trial court made a mistake.
For his second point of appeal, appellant contends that the trial court erred in
allocating “all” of the debt to him. We disagree.
As we explained in Boxley v. Boxley, 77 Ark. App. 136, 14142, 73 S.W.3d 19, 23
(2002) (emphasis added):
Although the division of marital debt is not addressed in Arkansas Code
Annotated § 912315 (Repl. 2002), the judge has authority to consider the
allocation of debt in a divorce case. Box v. Box, 312 Ark. 550, 851 S.W.2d 437
(1993); Anderson v. Anderson, 60 Ark. App. 221, 963 S.W.2d 604 (1998). In fact,
this court has stated that an allocation of the parties’ debt is an essential item to be
resolved in a divorce dispute. Ellis v. Ellis, 75 Ark. App. 173, 57 S.W.3d 220
(2001); Warren v. Warren, 33 Ark. App. 63, 800 S.W.2d 730 (1990). A judge’s
decision to allocate debt in a particular manner is a question of fact and will not
be reversed on appeal unless clearly erroneous. Anderson v. Anderson, supra.
Further, the allocation of marital debt must be considered in the context of
the distribution of all of the parties’ property. See Hackett v. Hackett, 278 Ark. 82,
643 S.W.2d 560 (1982). Arkansas Code Annotated section 912315 does not
compel
mathematical precision in the distribution of property; it simply
requires that marital property be distributed equitably. Creson v.
Creson, 53 Ark. App. 41, 917 S.W.2d 553 (1996). The statute vests
the judge with a measure of flexibility and broad powers in
apportioning property, nonmarital as well as marital, in order to
achieve an equitable distribution; the critical inquiry is how the total
assets are divided. Id. The overriding purpose of the property
division statute is to enable the court to make a division that is fair
and equitable under the circumstances. Canady v. Canady, 290 Ark.
551, 721 S.W.2d 650 (1986); Smith v. Smith, 32 Ark. App. 175, 798
S.W.2d 443 (1990). The judge’s findings as to the circumstances
warranting the property division will not be reversed unless they are
clearly erroneous. Dunavant v. Dunavant, 66 Ark. App. 1, 986
S.W.2d 880 (1999). We will not substitute our judgment on appeal
as to what exact interest each party should have; we will decide only
4
whether the order is clearly wrong. Pinkston v. Pinkston, 278 Ark.
233, 644 S.W.2d 930 (1983).
A judge’s determination that debts should be allocated between the parties
in a divorce case on the basis of their relative ability to pay is not a decision that is
clearly erroneous. Richardson v. Richardson, 280 Ark. 498, 659 S.W.2d 510
(1983); Ellis v. Ellis, supra; Anderson v. Anderson, supra.
Here, it is clear that the trial court did not allocate all of the debt to appellant. For
example, during the marriage appellant purchased a house in Tennessee in his name only.
The trial court ordered appellant to execute a warranty deed to appellee, conveying to her
an undivided onehalf interest in the marital real estate. The court also ordered that
payment of the mortgage note was to be shared equally by the parties as of the date of the
transfer of the onehalf interest to appellee. The mortgage debt on this property was the
only debt that was actually listed on appellant’s affidavit of means; even though the
affidavit contained a notation that a spreadsheet was attached, it was not. Appellant’s
Exhibit Number 4 was a list of purported debts totaling $14,842, which he described
during his testimony as “old and outstanding” and “delinquent.” The exhibit itself did not
designate any time frames for the debts, although appellant testified that they were
incurred during the marriage and that he did not think any of the medical bills were older
than two years. He testified that he had no current periodic liabilities. In its letter
opinion, the trial court found that appellant “has failed to prove the existence of valid
unpaid family debts for which the [appellee] should be liable.” We are not convinced that
the trial court clearly erred in that conclusion.
Affirmed.
5
BIRD and VAUGHT, JJ., agree.
6
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.