Keith Hamaker v. Martin Hamaker, Lester V. Hamaker, Lester V. Hamaker and Murphy A. Hamaker Revocable Trust

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ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS  NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION  SAM BIRD, JUDGE  DIVISION IV  CA07­558  JANUARY  23, 2008  KEITH HAMAKER  APPELLANT  V. MARTIN  HAMAKER,  LESTER  V.  HAMAKER,  LESTER  V.  HAMAKER  AND  MURPHY  A.  HAMAKER  REVOCABLE TRUST  APPELLEES  APPEAL  FROM  THE  PULASKI  COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT  [NO. PTR­06­1787]  HON. RICHARD N. MOORE, JR.,  CIRCUIT JUDGE  AFFIRMED IN PART; REVERSED IN  PART  Appellant Keith Hamaker appeals the circuit court’s order dismissing his case without  prejudice for failure to obtain service of process on defendants within the time allowed by  Rule 4 of the Arkansas Rules of Civil Procedure.  He argues four points on appeal: (1) the  circuit court had no authority to dismiss this case for lack of service before 120 days from  the date the petition was filed; (2) the trustee had no authority to file a motion to dismiss for  failure to obtain service prior to the expiration of the 120­day period; (3) the trustee had no  standing  to  represent  the  additional  unserved  parties;  and  (4)  the  circuit  court  had  no  authority to award attorney’s fees.  We reject appellant’s arguments regarding the court’s  order of dismissal and affirm the order of the circuit court; however, we reverse the circuit  court’s award of attorney’s fees. Lester and Murphy Hamaker, husband and wife, created The Lester V. Hamaker and  Murphy A. Hamaker Revocable Trust Agreement on November 4, 2003 (“the Trust”).  The  Hamakers had four children, whom they named as beneficiaries of the Trust in the event that  both settlors died.  Murphy Hamaker died on September 20, 2005.  Upon her death, pursuant  to the Trust, her son Martin Hamaker became the successor trustee.  This  case began on October 16, 2006, when one of the children, Keith Hamaker,  representing himself, filed a petition to appoint an independent trustee, alleging that Martin  Hamaker, the Trustee, had committed various breaches of the Trust and had failed to report  as required by Arkansas law.  The Trustee filed a motion to dismiss the petition on October  31, 2006, alleging, among other things, insufficiency of process, insufficiency of service of  process, and failure to join necessary parties.  Appellant filed a first amended petition to  appoint an independent trustee on December 4, 2006; the Trustee filed an amended motion  to dismiss on December 12, 2006.  On February 2, 2007, appellant filed a second amended  petition to appoint an independent trustee.  On  February  6,  2007,  the  circuit  court  held  a  hearing  on  the  Trustee’s  motion  to  dismiss.  During the hearing, appellant admitted that none of his petitions had been properly  served but claimed that he was in the process of serving all interested parties with the second  amended petition.  At the hearing, the circuit court indicated that there had been no proper  service and that it was going to dismiss the petition.  On February 14, 2007, the court entered  an order dismissing appellant’s petitions for failure to obtain proper service of process as  required by Rule 4 of the Arkansas Rules of Civil Procedure.  The court also awarded fees ­2­  CA07­558  to the Trustee pursuant to Ark. Code Ann. § 16­22­309 (Repl. 1999) in the amount of $1500.  Upon appellant’s request, the circuit court entered findings of fact and conclusions of law on  April 24, 2007, concluding that it had dismissed appellant’s petitions without prejudice for  failure to properly obtain service of process.  Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal.  Dismissal of Petition  Appellant’s first point on appeal is that the circuit court had no authority to dismiss  his petitions on February 6, 2007, because the 120­day period allowed by Rule 4 in which  to serve the complaint had not yet expired.  Rule 4 provides that if service is not made upon  a defendant “within 120 days after the filing of the complaint, the action shall be dismissed  as to that defendant without prejudice upon motion or upon the court’s initiative.”  Ark. R.  Civ. P. 4(i).  Appellant filed his petition on October 16, 2006.  Therefore, he was required  by Rule 4 to serve the petition by February 13, 2007.  The supreme court has consistently held that service requirements under this rule must  be strictly construed and compliance with them must be exact.  Kangas v. Neely, 346 Ark.  334, 336, 57 S.W.3d 694, 696 (2001).  Thus, service of process under this rule must be  accomplished within 120 days after the filing of the complaint unless the plaintiff has timely  filed a motion to extend.  Id.  If service is not obtained within that time and no timely motion  to extend is made, dismissal of the action is mandatory.  Id.  Pursuant to Administrative Order 2(b)(2), an oral order announced from the bench  does not become effective until reduced to writing and filed.  McGhee v. Arkansas Bd. of  Collection Agencies, 368 Ark. 60, ___ S.W.3d ___ (2006).  While the hearing on this matter ­3­  CA07­558  occurred on February 6, the order dismissing this case was not filed until February 14, one  day after the 120­day service period expired.  Therefore, we need not address appellant’s  argument that the circuit court had no authority to dismiss the case before the 120­day period  had expired; it did not.  Appellant’s second point on appeal is that the Trustee had no authority to file a motion  to dismiss for failure to obtain proper service before the 120­day  period  expired.  First,  appellant has cited no authority for this argument, and we will not address arguments that are  unsupported by convincing authority.  See Shotzman v. Berumen, 363 Ark. 215, 233, 213  S.W.3d 13, 23 (2005).  Moreover, a court is required to dismiss a complaint, on its own  initiative,  when  service  has  not  been  accomplished  within  120  days  of  the  filing  of  the  complaint.  Ark. R. Civ. P. 4(i).  Thus, it is of no consequence when the Trustee’s motion  was filed.  Appellant also argues that the Trustee had no standing to represent the remaining  beneficiaries and obtain a dismissal on their behalf.  Once again, when service of process is  not accomplished within 120 days after the complaint is filed and no timely motion to extend  has been made, the court must dismiss the action.  Ark. R. Civ. P. 4(i).  It was not necessary  for the additional parties to file any motions for the court to act.  Id. ­4­  CA07­558  Attorney’s Fees  Appellant also contends that the circuit court erred in awarding attorney’s fees in this  case under Ark. Code Ann. § 16­22­309 (Repl. 1999).  We agree with appellant.  Arkansas  Code Annotated § 16­22­309 provides in pertinent part as follows:  (a)(1) In any civil action in which the court having jurisdiction finds that there  was a complete absence of a justiciable issue of either law or fact raised by the  losing  party  or  his  attorney,  the  court  shall  award  an  attorney’s  fee  in  an  amount not to exceed five thousand dollars ($5,000), or ten percent (10%) of  the amount in controversy, whichever is less, to the prevailing party unless a  voluntary  dismissal  is  filed  or  the  pleadings  are  amended  as  to  any  nonjusticiable issue within a reasonable time after the attorney or party filing  the  dismissal  or  the  amended  pleadings  knew,  or  reasonably  should  have  known, that he would not prevail.  .  .  .  .  (b) In order to find an action, claim, setoff, counterclaim, or defense to be  lacking a justiciable issue of law or fact, the court must find that the action,  claim, setoff, counterclaim, or defense was commenced, used, or continued in  bad faith solely for purposes of harassing or maliciously injuring another or  delaying adjudication without just cause or that the party or the party's attorney  knew, or should have known, that the action, claim, setoff, counterclaim, or  defense was without any reasonable basis in law or equity and could not be  supported by a good faith argument for an extension, modification, or reversal  of existing law.  .  .  .  .  (d) On appeal, the question as to whether there was a complete absence of a  justiciable issue shall be determined de novo on the record of the trial court  alone.  The  circuit  court  dismissed  the  petition  for  failure  to  properly  obtain  service  of  process  as  required  by  Ark.  R.  Civ.  P.  4.  It  did  not  conduct  a  hearing  on  the  merits  of  appellant’s petitions, nor did it make any specific findings of fact or conclusions of law on  the merits of appellant’s claims.  While the court did speak about some of the claims, it  specifically indicated that it could not determine the merits because service had not been ­5­  CA07­558  properly accomplished.  In its findings of fact and conclusions of law, entered on April 24,  2007, in  response to appellant’s request, the court did not mention the merits of any of appellant’s  claims but found only that the petition had not been properly served as required by Ark. R.  Civ. P. 4. Thus, we hold that it was error for the circuit court to award attorney’s fees pursuant  to Ark. Code Ann. § 16­22­309, which requires the circuit court to find that there was a  complete absence of a justiciable issue of either law or fact raised by the losing party or his  attorney.  Without a proper hearing on the merits of appellant’s claims and findings by the  circuit court, an award of fees is not proper under this statutory provision.  Therefore, we  reverse the award of attorney’s fees.  Appellee’s Request for Fees and Costs  Finally, pursuant to Rule 4­2(a)(8) of the Rules of the Supreme Court and Court of  Appeals of the State of Arkansas, the Trustee, the appellee in this case, has requested us to  impose  upon  appellant  the  costs  incurred  by  the  Trustee  in  preparing  the  Supplemental  Addendum. Rule 4­2(a)(8) provides that an appellee may provide a supplemental addendum  if he considers appellant’s addendum to be defective.  The court may then, upon motion,  impose or withhold costs, including attorney’s fees, to compensate either party for the other  party’s noncompliance.  However, the rule requires counsel to submit “a statement showing  the cost of the supplemental abstract or Addendum and a certificate of counsel showing the  amount of time that was devoted” to its preparation in order to recover those costs.  Although ­6­  CA07­558  the Trustee stated in his brief that a statement of costs and certificate of counsel regarding  time expended in preparation of the supplemental addendum was “filed separately herewith,”  no such statement or certificate was provided.  Therefore, we deny the Trustee’s request to  award fees and costs.  Affirmed in part; reversed in part.  VAUGHT, J., agrees.  GLOVER, J., concurs.  GLOVER, J., concurring.  Although I agree with the majority that appellant’s action  must be dismissed for failure to obtain service of process within 120 days, the “gotcha” result  here obtained concerns me. Appellee filed the motion to dismiss, challenging the sufficiency  of service of process.  The hearing on appellee’s motion to dismiss was held on the 112 day  after appellant’s original petition was filed.  At the hearing, appellant did not bring to the trial court’s attention the fact that the  120­day  period  for  service  of  process  had  not  expired.    Ark.  R.  Civ.  P.  4(i).    Though  appearing pro se, appellant is charged with knowledge of the substance of the rule. Appellee,  appearing through counsel, did not bring to the trial court’s attention during the hearing that  appellant had eight days to complete service in compliance with the rule.  On the facts  presented,  the  trial  court  orally  granted  the  dismissal  at  the  hearing  eight  days  before  appellant’s time to get the parties served had expired.  As the majority explains, the trial  court’s order was not entered until the clerk marked it with the date and time and the word  “filed.”  Administrative Order (2)(b)(2).  Of course, the order from the hearing  granting ­7­  CA07­558  appellee’s motion to dismiss was not filed until nine days later, on the 121 day after appellant  had filed his original petition.  Although there is nothing legally incorrect with this approach,  it does leave this judge with the distinct impression  that  the  notion of fair play was not  engaged in this matter because appellant was pro se and did not know that he still had eight  days after the trial court made its oral ruling to perfect service of process on the necessary  parties.  Eight days of attempted service of process by appellant were seemingly lost through  appellant’s  ignorance  of  his  procedural  rights  and  the  delay  in  the  filing  of  the  order.  “Gotcha!” ­8­  CA07­558 

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