Khevaja Nazimuddin v. Bryan Self and Christy Self
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NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION
ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS
DIVISION I
CA07-1304
No.
Opinion Delivered
KHEVAJA NAZIMUDDIN
December 3, 2008
APPEAL FROM THE SCOTT
COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT,
[NO. PRO-2006-6]
APPELLANT
V.
HONORABLE TERRY SULLIVAN,
JUDGE
BRYAN SELF and
CHRISTY SELF
APPELLEES
AFFIRMED
LARRY D. VAUGHT, Judge
Appellant Khevaja Nazimuddin appeals the trial court’s grant of summary judgment
in favor of appellees Bryan and Christy Self finding that Nazimuddin did not have standing
to object to the adoption of his natural grandchild, R.T.S., under the provisions of the
Uniform Child-Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act, codified at Ark. Code Ann. § 919-101 (Repl. 2008). Nazimuddin argues the question on appeal is not one of standing, but
rather one of jurisdiction. He contends that—in violation of the UCCJEA—the Selfs illegally
pursued an adoption in Arkansas without notice to the Texas court that had granted him
visitation rights in a valid court-custody order. We affirm.
The genesis of this case is an order dated November 15, 2005, wherein a Montgomery
County, Texas, court set out the following provision relating to Nazimuddin’s “possession”
of R.T.S.:
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Prior to the Standard Possession Order beginning, KHEVAJA NAZIMUDDIN and
LINDA NAZIMUDDIN shall have two weekend periods of possession of the
child exercised beginning at 10:00 a.m. and ending at 5:00 p.m. on Saturday
and beginning at 10:00 a.m. and ending at 5:00 p.m. on Sunday . . . .
However, immediately after stating that Nazimuddin was granted the two weekends of
possession “[p]rior to the Standard Possession Order beginning” the order went on to state
that “IT IS ORDERED that each conservator shall comply with all terms and conditions of
the Standard Possession Order.” As such, once the “Standard Possession Order” was in force,
Nazimuddin’s pre-order “possessory” visitation rights were expired. In other words, the
precise order that referenced and created Nazimuddin’s independent interest in his grandchild
also extinguished it. All other rights to visitation with R.T.S. that Nazimuddin received by
virtue of the Texas court order flowed through Eric Nazimuddin, who is R.T.S.’s biological
father and Nazimuddin’s son.
Three months later, on February 8, 2006, the Selfs filed a “Complaint for Adoption”
in Arkansas. On the same day, a “Consent to Adoption” was entered, wherein Eric
Nazimuddin relinquished all of his rights to R.T.S. Then, on February 24, 2006, a final
adoption decree was entered. In the order, the trial court specifically acknowledged that the
child’s natural father, Eric Nazimuddin, consented to the adoption and that his consent had
not been withdrawn prior to the entry of the final decree.
After a careful de novo review of both the Texas and Arkansas proceedings and the
UCCJEA, we too are convinced that Nazimuddin lacks standing to challenge the Arkansas
adoption. Once Eric Nazimuddin consented to the adoption of R.T.S. and relinquished all
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of his rights to the child, there was no longer a fountainhead from which Nazimuddin’s
possessory rights could flow. As such, we affirm the trial court’s grant of summary judgment
finding that Nazimuddin did not have standing to lodge a UCCJEA objection to the adoption
of R.T.S.
Affirmed.
G LADWIN and H UNT, JJ., agree.
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