Jason Forrester, Administrator of the Estate of Tawnya Lynn Forrester v. Jacquelyn White, M.D.

 Annotate this Case
Download PDF
ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS  NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION  JOHN B. ROBBINS, JUDGE  DIVISION III  CA 07­13  FEBRUARY 6, 2008  JASON  FORRESTER,  Administrator  of  the Estate of Tawnya Lynn Forrester  APPELLANT  APPEAL FROM THE FAULKNER  COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT  [NO. CV­04­190]  V. HONORABLE DAVID LEE  REYNOLDS, JUDGE  JACQUELYN WHITE, M.D.  APPELLEE  REVERSED AND REMANDED  This is a medical malpractice case.  Appellant Jason Forrester, as administrator of the  estate of Tawnya Lynn Forrester, appeals from an order dismissing his complaint against  appellee Jacquelyn White, M.D.  We reverse and remand.  Mrs. Forrester died on March 23, 2001.  On October 10, 2002, Mr. Forrester, the  husband of the deceased, filed a petition for appointment as administrator of her estate.  On  October 23, 2002, the trial court entered an order appointing Mr. Forrester, which recites in  pertinent part:  It is therefore by the Court CONSIDERED and ORDERED that Jason Forrester is  hereby appointed as the Administrator of the Estate of Tawyna [sic] Forrester and he  shall be allowed to serve without bond; that Letters Testamentary shall be issued to  said Administrator upon filing of his Acceptance of Appointment; and that any notice  required by Law may be made through the ordinary mail to the last known address of  the person to whom notice is required. On  March  5,  2003,  Mr.  Forrester  filed  his  original  complaint  against  Dr.  White,  alleging that Dr. White failed to properly diagnose, treat, and admit Mrs. Forrester to the  hospital  for  pneumonia  ultimately  resulting  in  her  death.  On  July  9,  2003,  appellant’s  original  complaint  was  nonsuited  and  dismissed  without  prejudice.    On  March  1,  2004,  Mr. Forrester filed his second complaint, continuing to allege medical negligence against  Dr. White.  On January 26, 2005, Mr. Forrester filed his acceptance of appointment as personal  representative, and on that same day the clerk of court issued letters of administration.  The  letters  of  administration  provide  that  Mr.  Forrester  “is  hereby  authorized  to  act  as  such  personal representative for and in behalf of the estate and to take possession of the estate’s  property as authorized by law.”  Mr. Forrester later amended his second complaint by filing  an amended petition on August 23, 2006.  On  August  29,  2006,  Dr.  White  filed  a  motion  to  dismiss  appellant’s  second  complaint.  In  her  motion,  Dr.  White  asserted  that  both  of  appellant’s  complaints  were  nullities because they were filed prior to the issuance of letters of administration.  Further,  Dr. White asserted that dismissal of appellant’s complaint should be with prejudice because  the applicable two­year statute of limitations had expired, and alternatively because it was  the second dismissal of appellant’s action requiring dismissal with prejudice under Ark. R.  Civ. P. 41(b).  On  September  12,  2006,  Mr.  Forrester  filed  a  response  to  Dr.  White’s  motion  to  dismiss, and Dr. White filed a reply in support of her motion on September 13, 2006.  On ­2­  September 14, 2006, a hearing was held on Dr. White’s motion to dismiss. At the conclusion  of the hearing, the trial court announced that the motion to dismiss would be granted because  “the personal representative in this case, Jason Forrester, did not have authority or capacity  to sue at the time this lawsuit was filed because he had not accepted the letters nor had the  letters been issued.”  The trial court entered an order dismissing Mr. Forrester’s complaint  with prejudice on September 15, 2006, and Mr. Forrester now appeals from that order.  For reversal of the trial court’s order, Mr. Forrester argues that the October 23, 2002,  order appointing him administrator vested him with the authority to act on behalf of the  estate.  He contends that the letters of administration were merely evidence of his authority,  and were not required to grant the authority.  Mr. Forrester asserts that the purpose of letters  of administration is only to provide notice to those dealing with a personal representative of  his capacity to act.  We agree.  The 2007 General Assembly enacted Act 438, which amended the statutory provisions  pertaining to the issuance of letters of administration.  That legislation is codified at Ark.  Code Ann. § 28­48­102(d) (Supp. 2007), and provides:  (d)(1)(A) Letters of administration are not necessary to empower the person  appointed to act for the estate.  (B) Letters of administration are for the purpose of notifying third parties that  the appointment of an administrator has been made.  (2) The order appointing the administrator empowers the administrator to act  for the estate, and any act carried out under the authority of the order is valid.  This  Act  became  effective  on  July  31,  2007,  more  than  ten  months  after  entry  of  the  September 15, 2006, order dismissing Mr. Forrester’s complaint. ­3­  In Steward v. Statler,  Ark.  ,  S.W.3d  (Nov. 1, 2007), our supreme court was  presented with the question of whether Act 438 applies retroactively or only prospectively.  In holding that Act 438 applies retroactively, the supreme court wrote:  Statutes  which  do  not  create,  enlarge,  diminish,  or  destroy  contractual  or  vested  rights, but relate only to remedies or modes of procedure, are not within the general  rule against retrospective operation. In other words, statutes effecting changes in civil  procedure  or  remedy  may  have  valid  retrospective  application,  and  remedial  legislation may, without violating constitutional guarantees, be construed to apply to  suits on causes of action which arose prior to the effective date of the statute.  In this case, it is clear to this court that Act 438 of 2007 does not disturb a  vested right or create a new obligation.  Before Act 438, a personal representative  already had the right to bring a wrongful­death action against a defendant.  Act 438  of 2007 simply provides that the personal representative has the right to bring the  action  at  the  time  the  order  appointing the  personal  representative  is  entered,  not  merely at the time the letters of administration are entered.  Therefore, we conclude  that Act 438 is procedural and was meant to be applied retroactively.  (citations omitted.)  In Steward, supra, the supreme court relied on Act 438 in reversing an  order dismissing appellants’ complaint, where the complaint was filed after appellants were  appointed  as  special  co­administrators  of  the  estate,  but  before  the  letters  of  special  administration were issued by the clerk.  The supreme court held that the appointment as co­  administrators gave the appellants the power to file the complaint.  As in the case at bar, the  dismissal order in Steward was entered before Act 438 became effective.  Subsequent to the supreme court’s decision in Steward, supra, we had occasion to  address this same issue.  See Banks v. Wilkin,  Ark. App.  ,  S.W.3d  (Jan. 23, 2008).  We  held  that  the  order  appointing  the  personal  representative,  not  the  letters  of  administration, empowered the administrator to file the wrongful death action. ­4­  Consequently, in light of Act 438, our supreme court’s holding in Steward, supra, and  our  decision  in  Banks,  supra,  Mr.  Forrester  was  empowered  to  act  when  the  trial  court  entered  the  October  23,  2002,  order  appointing  him  as  administrator.    The  letters  of  administration  were  not  necessary  to  vest  Mr.  Forrester  with  the  authority  to  sue,  and  thus each of his complaints was validly filed.  Therefore, the trial court’s order granting  Dr. White’s motion to dismiss must be reversed.  Reversed and remanded.  GRIFFEN and MARSHALL, JJ., agree. ­5­ 

Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.

This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.