Maria Delpozo v. Arkansas Department of Human Services
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS
NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION
DAVID M. GLOVER, JUDGE
DIVISION II
CA07-1289
March 19, 2008
MARIA DELPOZO
APPELLANT
AN APPEAL FROM SEBASTIAN COUNTY
CIRCUIT COURT
[NO. JV2005-322]
v.
ARKANSAS DEPARTMENT OF
HUMAN SERVICES
APPELLEE
HONORABLE MARK HEWETT,
JUDGE
AFFIRMED
Appellant, Maria Delpozo, consented to the termination of her parental rights in MG
(born August 8, 1993). She now argues that the trial court should have inquired into whether
her consent was knowing and voluntary and that there was insufficient evidence that
termination was in MG’s best interest. We hold that the first issue was not preserved for our
review and that the trial court did not err in finding termination to be in MG’s best interest.
We therefore affirm the termination order.
The circuit court granted emergency custody of MG to DHS on May 3, 2005, based
on an allegation by DHS that MG had been sexually abused by her stepfather. A probablecause order was entered on May 26, 2005, and MG was found dependent and in need of
services on July 29, 2005. The goal of the case was reunification. MG remained in DHS
custody for over a year, and a mid-2006 trial placement failed due to appellant’s use of
cocaine. On January 19, 2007, the court changed the goal of the case to termination of
parental rights.
On February 16, 2007, appellant consented to termination of her parental rights. The
consent document, which was signed by appellant and notarized, stated that her consent was
freely and voluntarily given; that she believed termination to be in the best interest of her
child; that she understood that her parental relationship with the child would be forever
terminated; that she was not acting under duress; that she was represented by counsel
throughout the proceeding; that she waived her right to notice of and participation in further
hearings related to termination; and that she understood that her consent could be withdrawn
within ten days.1 DHS filed a petition to terminate parental rights approximately two months
later. Appellant answered and admitted all of the petition’s material allegations, including that
termination was in MG’s best interest. Appellant also stated in her answer that she consented
to termination, had not changed her mind, and had no objection to the petition being
granted.
Appellant did not attend the termination hearing. However, her counsel appeared and
stated that appellant had not contacted her to change her mind about consenting to
termination. Kathie Taber, a DHS caseworker, testified that appellant filed a consent to
termination because MG did not want to return home. Taber also said that the goal of the
case was adoption but that she was not aware if MG was currently in a home that expressed
1
A consent to terminate parental rights may be withdrawn within ten days. Ark.
Code Ann. § 9-27-341(g)(1)(A) (Repl. 2008).
2
an interest in adopting her. But, she said, MG had no health or behavioral problems that
would make it difficult for her to be adopted. A colloquy between appellant’s counsel and
Taber, and between the ad litem and Taber, indicated that a couple living near MG had
expressed an interest in adopting her. Taber testified that she would contact the couple.
The court ruled that termination was in MG’s best interest; that appellant had
consented to termination; that the consent had not been withdrawn; and that MG was readily
adoptable. The order terminating appellant’s parental rights was entered on September 20,
2007. Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal.
It is a ground for termination that the parent “has executed consent to termination of
parental rights or adoption of the juvenile, subject to the court’s approval.” Ark. Code Ann.
§ 9-27-341(b)(3)(B)(v) (Repl. 2008). Appellant contends that the phrase “subject to the
court’s approval” means that the court must conduct an inquiry into whether the parent’s
consent was knowingly and voluntarily given, much like the inquiry a criminal court must
conduct when accepting a guilty plea. See, e.g., Ark. R. Crim. P. 24.4 and 24.5 (2007). We
cannot address this argument because it is being raised for the first time on appeal. See Myers
v. Ark. Dep’t of Human Servs., 91 Ark. App. 53, 208 S.W.3d 241 (2005); Walters v. Ark. Dep’t
of Human Servs., 77 Ark. App. 191, 72 S.W.3d 533 (2002). At no time during the proceedings
below, including in a post-trial motion, did appellant ask the court to inquire into the validity
of her consent or object that the court had not done so. Further, she did not claim that her
consent was invalid or that she wished to withdraw it in any respect. In fact, she stood by her
consent, despite having the opportunity to repudiate it in her answer to the termination
3
petition and at the termination hearing. On both occasions, her consent was reaffirmed by
appellant or her counsel.
Appellant also has not borne her burden of demonstrating reversible error. See Arrow
Int’l v. Sparks, 81 Ark. App. 42, 98 S.W.3d 48 (2003). She does not argue on appeal that her
consent was involuntary or ill-considered, that she misunderstood the consent document, that
the document was improperly drafted, or even that she wishes to withdraw her consent. She
therefore has not shown that the outcome of this case could be affected if we did order the
trial court to inquire into the validity of her consent.
We likewise reject appellant’s argument that there was insufficient evidence that
termination was in MG’s best interest. The trial court considered whether MG was adoptable,
and appellant admitted in her consent form and in her answer to the termination petition that
termination was in MG’s best interest. See Culpepper v. Smith, 302 Ark. 558, 792 S.W.2d 293
(1990) (stating that a party is bound by his own pleadings and cannot maintain a position
inconsistent therewith); J.M. Prod. v. Ark. Cap. Corp., 51 Ark. App. 85, 95, 910 S.W.2d 702,
707 (1995) (characterizing an admission in an answer as “undisputed evidence” of the fact
admitted).
Affirmed.
G LADWIN and V AUGHT, JJ., agree.
4
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.