Gary Moran and Entropy Systems, Inc. v. C& A/GFSP Joint Venture, Harold Martin, Kathryn B. Hadley and Acts of H&K Enterprises, Inc.
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ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS
NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION
KAREN R. BAKER, JUDGE
DIVISION III
CA07-1062
MAY 21, 2008
GARY MORAN & ENTROPY SYSTEMS,
INC.
APPELLANTS
APPEAL FROM THE PULASKI COUNTY
CIRCUIT COURT
[NO. CV2006-6452)
v.
C&A/GFSP JOINT VENTURE, HAROLD
MARTIN, KATHRYN B. HADLEY and
ACTS’ of H&K ENTERPRISES, INC.
APPELLEES
HONORABLE TIMOTHY DAVIS FOX,
JUDGE
AFFIRMED
Appellants Gary Moran and Entropy Systems, Inc. challenge an order denying their motion
to vacate and set aside an order of foreclosure pursuant to Arkansas Rule of Civil Procedure 60(a)
“to correct errors or mistakes or to prevent the miscarriage of justice.” They assert one point on
appeal: The court erred in not granting appellants’ motion to vacate the foreclosure decree and
reinstate the foreclosure action. For the reasons stated herein, we affirm.
Appellants failed to include a copy of the denied motion in their brief, abstract, or addendum.
Rule 4-2(a)(8) of the Rules of the Supreme Court and Court of Appeals provides that the addendum
shall include copies of the “order, judgment, decree ... from which the appeal is taken, along with any
other relevant pleadings, documents, or exhibits essential to an understanding of the case and the
Court's jurisdiction on appeal ....” See Pyle v. Robertson, 313 Ark. 692, 858 S.W.2d 662 (1993).
Despite the deficiencies of appellants’ brief, we can reach the merits of the case because we may go
to the record to affirm. McGehee v. State, 344 Ark. 602, 43 S.W.3d 125 (2001).
In their motion, appellants asked the trial court to set aside the commissioners deed and to
refund their purchase price because they had no knowledge of the outstanding prior liens on the
property at the time of their purchase, but acquired knowledge of these liens subsequent to the sale
as a result of a title search they requested and obtained from a title company. Appellants argue that
they relied on their review of the trial court’s case file, before the sale, which did not disclose any
liens, encumbrances, or claims of other persons. They assert that the court was required to rescind
the deed to correct errors or mistakes or to prevent the miscarriage of justice. Appellants’ argument
is unavailing because they had constructive notice of the publicly recorded liens.
Our court explained the constructive notice of public records in the context of a fraud case
in Hughes v. McCann, 13 Ark. App. 28, 678 S.W.2d 784 (1984):
Because the Ferguson mortgages were recorded, appellants were on constructive notice of
such mortgages as far back as 1971 and no later than 1976-five years prior to their filing this
action. See Ark.Stat.Ann. § 16-114 (Repl.1979). In Teall v. Schroder, 158 U.S. 172 (1895),
the United States Supreme Court held that in fraud actions, for purposes of determining when
the statute of limitations begins to run, parties alleging fraud are charged with knowledge of
any pertinent real estate conveyances from the time such conveyances are placed in public
records. Appellees urge that filing for public record and concealment are mutually exclusive.
We agree.
Appellants do not argue that appellees committed any affirmative acts that kept them from
examining these public records in Hempstead County before 1980. Had appellants examined
those records, they could have made themselves aware as early as 1971 of appellees' alleged
cover-up of their original fraudulent action. Fraud does suspend the running of the statute of
limitations, and the suspension remains in effect until the party having the cause of action
discovers the fraud or should have discovered it by the exercise of reasonable diligence. City
National Bank v. Sternberg, 195 Ark. 503, 114 S.W.2d 39 (1938). Appellants' failure to
examine such records in Hempstead County must be attributed to their own lack of reasonable
diligence. Because appellants have not shown that appellees committed any affirmative acts
to conceal their cause of action from them, the three-year statute of limitations of Ark. Stat.
Ann. § 37-206 was not tolled, and appellants' action is thereby barred.
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13 Ark. App. at 31-32, 678 S.W.2d at 786-87.
Similarly, had appellants examined the records prior to the sale instead of after the sale, they
would have made themselves aware of the recorded mortgages. The records could and should have
been discovered by the exercise of reasonable diligence. Appellants' failure to examine such records
must be attributed to their own lack of reasonable diligence. Accordingly, the trial court did not err
in refusing to grant appellants’ motion.
Affirmed.
ROBBINS and BIRD, JJ., agree.
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