Sam N. Johns v. Carole Hoke Johns
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ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS
DIVISION IV
No. CA07-1036
SAM N. JOHNS
Opinion Delivered
June 25, 2008
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM THE MISSISSIPPI
COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT
[NO. E-81-308]
V.
CAROLE HOKE JOHNS
APPELLEE
HONORABLE LARRY B. BOLING,
JUDGE
AFFIRMED
KAREN R. BAKER, Judge
1.
JUDGMENTS –
COLLECTION OF CHILD -SUPPORT ARREARAGES
–
LIMITATIONS RELIED UPON BY APPELLANT WAS NOT APPLICABLE.–
STATUTE OF
The statute of
limitations relied upon by the appellant was misplaced where the appellee was not
bringing an action to recover accrued child-support arrearages from an initial support
order, but rather was seeking enforcement of a judgment; therefore, Ark. Code Ann.
§ 9-14-235 applied; the section governing the collection of judgments was
applicable, and not the section relied upon by the appellant, which governs actions
for child-support arrearages from an initial support order; accordingly, appellee was
permitted to seek enforcement of the judgment without regard to the statute of
limitations relied upon by appellant.
2.
STATUTES – INTERPRETATION – APPELLATE COURT DOES NOT INTERPRET STATUTES
SO AS TO REACH AN ABSURD CONCLUSION CONTRARY TO LEGISLATIVE INTENT.– To
interpret Ark. Code Ann. § 9-14-236 to encompass enforcement of judgments would
lead to absurd results; if the appellate court were to interpret the statute of limitations
so as to preclude enforcement of judgments after the child has turned twenty-three
years old, then ceratin persons may be inclined to not satisfy the judgment and wait
until the child’s twenty-third birthday to avoid paying the judgment; moreover, this
would conflict with Ark. Code Ann. § 9-14-235.
3.
CONTEMPT – CHILD-SUPPORT ORDERS WERE NOT INDEFINITE – DETERMINATION OF
CONTEMPT WAS NOT AGAINST THE PREPONDERANCE OF THE EVIDENCE.–
The trial
court’s determination that appellant was in contempt was not against the
preponderance of the evidence; there was nothing indefinite about appellant’s
monthly child-support obligation, and this was not a case where appellant
misunderstood his obligation due to an indefinite order; it was simply a case of his
failure to fulfill his obligation to cure the arrearage on past-due child support; the trial
court provided appellant with repeated opportunities to purge himself of the
contempt; however, appellant did not take advantage of the court’s offering.
Appeal from Mississippi Circuit Court; Larry B. Boling, Judge; affirmed.
Woodruff Law Firm, P.A., by: Jennifer E. Woodruff, for appellant.
Reid, Burge, Prevallet & Coleman, by: Richard A. Reid and Jeremy M. Thomas, for
appellee.
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Appellant, Sam N. Johns, appeals from an order of the Mississippi County Circuit
Court finding that he willfully and contemptuously failed to pay the child-support arrearage
and a second order sentencing him to 180 days in the Mississippi County Jail. Mr. Johns has
two arguments on appeal. First, Mr. Johns argues that the trial court erred in finding him in
contempt for failing to pay child support when the action was barred by the statute of
limitations because the youngest child was more than twenty-three years of age when the
motion for contempt was filed. Second, Mr. Johns argues that the trial court erred in finding
him in contempt for not making payments on a child-support arrearage when the order from
which Ms. Johns sought contempt did not direct or require him to pay a certain amount. We
disagree with Mr. Johns’s arguments and affirm.
The parties were divorced on July 24, 1981. Mr. Johns was ordered at that time to pay
child support. As of June 29, 1982—less than one year after the child-support order was
entered—Mr. Johns was in arrears on his child support. In November 1986, another order
was entered granting judgment against Mr. Johns in the sum of $14,340 plus interest at the
rate of ten percent per annum. On July 6, 1995, an order was entered directing Mr. Johns to
pay $200 per month in child support and an additional $100 per month toward his arrearage.
On May 6, 1999, an order was entered determining Mr. Johns’s arrearage, as of March 4,
1999, to be $40,337.81. This order also denied Mr. Johns’s statute-of-limitations defense and
denied Mr. Johns’s request for a reduction in the monthly amount of $300.
On June 7, 1999, the trial court entered an order acknowledging the court’s previous
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order of May 6, 1999, where Mr. Johns was found to be in contempt and was given until May
28, 1999 to pay $5,000 or be incarcerated for 180 days; denying Mr. Johns’s motion for
reconsideration; finding that Mr. Johns remained in willful violation of a prior court order
despite his ability to pay; and granting Mr. Johns’s motion to stay only upon the condition
that he post a cash bond in the amount of $5,000.
On April 7, 2006, Ms. Johns filed a motion for contempt. In that motion, Ms. Johns
alleged that Mr. Johns ceased making payments on the child-support arrearage in March 2005
and that he should be held in contempt for his willful refusal to comply with court orders
regarding payment on the arrearage. Mr. Johns filed a response to Ms. Johns’s motion for
contempt on June 15, 2006, alleging specifically that the action to collect the prior judgment
was barred by the statute of limitations.
On June 4, 2007, the court entered an order finding that Mr. Johns willfully and
contemptuously failed to pay the child-support arrearage; that Mr. Johns’s explanation for
refuting the amount of child support was not credible; and that sentencing was delayed in
order to allow Mr. Johns to purge himself of contempt by payment of $15,000 by June 8,
2007, and the payments of the balance of the arrearage in installments of not less than $500
per month until the arrearage, principal and interest was paid in full. Mr. Johns filed a notice
of appeal from the June 4 order.
On July 13, 2007, the trial court entered an order finding that Mr. Johns did not appear
for sentencing; finding the testimony to be that Mr. Johns had not purged himself of the
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arrearage and debt; and sentencing Mr. Johns to 180 days in the Mississippi County Jail. Mr.
Johns also filed a notice of appeal from the July 13 order.
The May 6, 1999 judgment provided that Mr. Johns owed an arrearage of $40,337.81
and directed him to continue to pay as previously ordered by the court the sum of $300 each
month to cure the arrearage. Mr. Johns argues that the contempt action filed April 7, 2006,
seeking enforcement of the 1999 judgment, was barred by the statute of limitations, because
the parties’ youngest child was older than twenty-three years of age when the 2006 contempt
action was filed.
The statute relied upon by Mr. Johns states in pertinent part that “[i]n any action
involving the support of any minor child or children, the moving party shall be entitled to
recover the full amount of accrued child support arrearages from the date of the initial
support order until the filing of the action.” Ark. Code Ann. § 9-14-236(b) (Repl. 2008).
The “initial support order” is “the earliest order, judgment, or decree entered in the case by
the court or by administrative process that contains a provision for the payment of money for
the support and care of any child or children.” Ark. Code Ann. § 9-14-236(a)(3). The statute
defines “accrued child support arrearages” as “a delinquency owed under a court order or an
order of an administrative process established under state law for support of any child or
children that is past due and owing.” Ark. Code Ann. § 9-14-236(a)(1). An “action” is
defined as “any complaint, petition, motion, or other pleading seeking recovery of accrued
child-support arrearages.” Ark. Code Ann. § 9-14-236(a)(2). The action for collection of
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child-support arrearages, however, may only be brought “at any time up to and including five
(5) years beyond the date the child for whose benefit the initial child support order was
entered reaches eighteen (18) years of age.” Ark. Code Ann. § 9-14-236(c).
[1] Mr. Johns’s reliance on this statute of limitations, however, is misplaced. Here,
Ms. Johns was not bringing an action to recover accrued child-support arrearages from an
initial support order. Rather, she was seeking enforcement of a judgment, and therefore, a
separate statutory provision applied. See Ark. Code Ann. § 9-14-235 (Repl. 2008). That
provision provides that “[i]f a child support arrearage or judgment exists at the time when all
children entitled to support reach majority ... the obligor shall continue to pay an amount
equal to the court-ordered child support ... until such time as the child support arrearage or
judgment has been satisfied.”
Ark. Code Ann. § 9-14-235(a) (emphasis added).
A
“judgment” is defined as “unpaid child support and medical bills, interest, attorney’s fees,
or costs associated with a child support case when such has been reduced to judgment by the
court or become a judgment by operation of law.” Ark. Code Ann. § 9-14-235(e). Thus, it
is this section governing the collection of judgments that is applicable, and not the section
relied upon by Mr. Johns, which governs actions for child-support arrearages from an initial
support order. Accordingly, Ms. Johns may seek enforcement of the judgment without
regard to the statute of limitations relied upon by Mr. Johns. Further, our interpretation is
born out by Malone v. Malone, 338 Ark. 20, 991 S.W.2d 546 (1999). There, the Arkansas
Supreme Court held that Ark. Code Ann. § 9-14-235 “imposes no limitations on the
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enforcement” of child-support judgments. Id. at 26, 991 S.W.2d at 550.
[2] Moreover, to interpret Ark. Code Ann. § 9-14-236 to encompass enforcement of
judgments would lead to absurd results. If we were to interpret the statute so as to preclude
enforcement of judgments after the child has turned twenty-three years old, then certain
persons may be inclined to not satisfy the judgment and wait until the child’s twenty-third
birthday to avoid paying the judgment. Moreover, as previously discussed, this would
conflict with Ark. Code Ann. § 9-14-235. We do not interpret statutes so as to reach an
absurd conclusion that is contrary to legislative intent. See, e.g., Harness v. State, 352 Ark.
335, 101 S.W.3d 235 (2003).
Mr. Johns also asserts that the trial court erred in finding him in contempt for not
making payments on a child-support arrearage when the order from which Ms. Johns sought
contempt did not direct or require him to pay a certain amount. The disobedience of any
valid judgment, order, or decree of a court having jurisdiction to enter it may constitute
contempt. Gatlin v. Gatlin, 306 Ark. 146, 811 S.W.2d 761 (1991). The general rule is that
before a person may be held in contempt for violating a court order, that order must be in
definite terms as to the duties thereby imposed and the command must be expressed rather
than implied. Id. We will not reverse a trial court’s finding of civil contempt unless that
finding is against the preponderance of the evidence. Rogers v. Rogers, 80 Ark. App. 430,
97 S.W.3d 429 (2003).
[3] There is nothing indefinite about Mr. Johns’s monthly child-support obligation.
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As of May 6, 1999, there was an outstanding arrearage of child support in the amount of
$40,337.81 and the court had previously issued an order directing Mr. Johns to pay the sum
of $300 per month, thereby denying his request that the $300 per month payment be reduced.
In a June 4, 2007 order, the court found that Mr. Johns had ceased his monthly payments in
March 2005, although he acknowledged to the court that he was aware of the May 6, 1999
order. The court found that he willfully and contemptuously failed to pay the child-support
arrearage, which as of the June 4 order totaled $46,714.52, with Mr. Johns having paid only
$24,300 on the arrearage. Mr. Johns offered no explanation except that he thought he did not
owe anything. This is not a case where Mr. Johns misunderstood his obligation due to an
indefinite order; it is simply a case of his failure to fulfill his obligation to cure the arrearage
on past-due child support. The trial court provided Mr. Johns with repeated opportunities to
purge himself of the contempt; however, Mr. Johns did not take advantage of the court’s
offering. Therefore, the trial court’s determination that Mr. Johns was in contempt was not
against the preponderance of the evidence.
Affirmed.
H ART and H EFFLEY, JJ., agree.
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