Claudia Mendoza v. Arkansas Department of Human Services
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ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS
DIVISION II
CA08-643
No.
CLAUDIA MENDOZA
Opinion Delivered
November 19, 2008
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM THE BENTON
COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT,
[NO. J2006-1073-D/N]
V.
ARKANSAS DEPARTMENT OF
HUMAN SERVICES
APPELLEES
HONORABLE JAY T. FINCH, JUDGE
AFFIRMED; MOTION GRANTED
KAREN R. BAKER, Judge
On March 11, 2008, the Benton County Circuit Court entered an order terminating Claudia
Mendoza’s parental rights to her two children: J.V.M., born November 8, 2003, and J.M.M., born
January 23, 2006. Her attorney has filed a motion to withdraw and a no-merit brief pursuant to
Linker-Flores v. Arkansas Department of Human Services, 359 Ark. 131, 194 S.W.3d 739 (2004),
and Ark. Sup. Ct. R. 4-3(j)(1). Counsel’s brief discussed the sufficiency of the evidence to support
the termination order and asserted that there were no adverse rulings made at trial.
Mendoza filed a pro se response to counsel’s brief, questioning whether the circuit court
could terminate her parental rights because she is a citizen of Mexico. She also questions whether
the termination was in her children’s best interests. Neither point has merit. In Johnson v.
Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763 (1950), the Court stated that it was the alien’s presence within a state’s
territorial jurisdiction that gave the state court the power to act over the alien. Here, Mendoza was
unquestionably within the territorial confines of Benton County and subject to the jurisdiction of the
Benton County Circuit Court.
Mendoza next argues that the termination is not in the children’s best interests. Here, there
was undisputed testimony that the children were adoptable. This indicated that DHS had a proper
placement plan for the children. See M.T. v. Arkansas Dep’t of Human Servs., 58 Ark. App. 302,
952 S.W.2d 177 (1997). The next factor to consider is whether there was proof that the children
would face potential harm if they were returned to their parents’ custody. Our supreme court has
directed that the harm analysis be conducted in broad terms, including the harm the child suffers
from the lack of stability in a permanent home. See Bearden v. Arkansas Dep’t of Human Servs., 344
Ark. 317, 42 S.W.3d 397 (2001). By being incarcerated, Mendoza cannot provide her sons with a
proper home. She admits that she is under a ten-year sentence but asserts that she will be released
in November 2009. However, even accepting Mendoza’s calculation as to her release, she would not
immediately be reunited with her children. That would take additional time, possible in excess of
one year, before the children are able to achieve a stable home. That cannot be said to be a
reasonable time when viewed from the perspective of a two-year-old and a four-year-old.
After carefully examining the record, we find that counsel has complied with the
requirements established by the Arkansas Supreme Court for no-merit termination cases, and we
hold that the appeal is wholly without merit. We hold that the circuit court’s decision to terminate
Mendoza’s parental rights was not clearly erroneous. Accordingly, we grant counsel’s motion to
withdraw and affirm the order terminating Mendoza’s parental rights.
Affirmed.
BIRD and MARSHALL, JJ., agree.
-2-
CA08-643
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