Dale Roslyn Brooks v. State of Arkansas
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NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION
ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS
DIVISION II
No. CACR08-468
Opinion Delivered
O CTOBER 22, 2008
DALE ROSLYN BROOKS,
APPELLANT
V.
APPEAL FROM THE PULASKI
COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT,
[NO. CR2006-1924]
HONORABLE BARRY SIMS, JUDGE
STATE OF ARKANSAS,
APPELLEE
AFFIRMED
SAM BIRD, Judge
Dale Roslyn Brooks was tried by a jury on charges of second-degree murder and theft
of property. She was found guilty and was sentenced to respective terms of thirty years’ and
ten years’ imprisonment, to be served consecutively. She raises two points on appeal from
the circuit court’s judgment and commitment order of November 15, 2007, challenging the
sufficiency of the evidence to support the murder conviction and contending that the court
erred in denying her motion to suppress statements she gave to police. We affirm, holding
that the evidence was sufficient to support the conviction and that the denial of the motion
to suppress was not clearly against the preponderance of the evidence.
Sufficiency of the Evidence
Brooks does not deny that she stabbed Jon Harcourt, whose death resulted from the
stab wounds. She contends that the State failed to provide sufficient proof of second-degree
murder because it did not prove that she knowingly caused the death of Harcourt under
circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to the value of human life. She asserts that
no reasonable jury could find that she knowingly caused the death after considering the
“single shallow wound,” which was fatal; the circumstances; and her diagnosis of mental
disease and psychotic disorder. Her arguments are without merit.
The elements to be proven in a case of second-degree murder are set forth at Ark.
Code Ann. § 5-10-103(a) (Repl. 2006):
(a) A person commits murder in the second degree if:
(1) The person knowingly causes the death of another person under
circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to the value of human life; or
(2) With the purpose of causing serious physical injury to another person, the
person causes the death of any person.
Here, the State alleged in its felony information that Brooks had committed the elements of
subsection 5-10-103(a)(2). The case was tried under this subsection, the jury was instructed
accordingly, and the basis of Brooks’s motions for a directed verdict was the lack of
substantial evidence that, “with the purpose to cause serious physical injury to another
person,” she had caused Harcourt’s death.
When reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, the appellate court does not reweigh
the evidence but determines instead whether the evidence was substantial. Wyles v. State,
368 Ark. 646, 249 S.W.3d 782 (2007).
Substantial evidence is evidence, direct or
circumstantial, that is forceful enough to compel reasonable minds to reach a conclusion one
way or another and that goes beyond mere speculation or conjecture. Id. In determining
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whether there is substantial evidence, the appellate court reviews the evidence in the light
most favorable to the State and considers only evidence supporting the verdict Id.
Serious physical injury is a physical injury “that creates a substantial risk of death or
that causes protracted disfigurement, protracted impairment of health, or loss or protracted
impairment of the function of any bodily member or organ.” Ark. Code Ann. § 5-1-102(21)
(Repl. 2006). A person acts purposefully with respect to her conduct or the result of her
conduct “when it is [her] conscious object to engage in conduct of that nature or to cause the
result.” Ark. Code Ann. § 5-2-202(1) (Repl. 2006).
Although intent or state of mind is seldom apparent at the time an offense is
committed, a person is presumed to intend the natural and probable consequences of his or
her actions. Wyles, supra. Intent can be inferred from the type of weapon used, the manner
of use, and the nature, extent, and location of the trauma suffered by the victim. Id.
The following evidence was presented at trial. Detective Mark Knowles testified
regarding a statement that Brooks made about going to Harcourt’s home to offer her services
as a prostitute on March 21, 2006. Brooks stated that she later cleaned up the house, a
dispute arose over payment, and she stabbed Harcourt with a box cutter and a knife. She said
that she shoved him into the bathroom, shut the door, left him bleeding, and departed in his
van after taking his cell phone, bottles of cologne, and a bag of clothes. A transcript of this
statement was made a part of the evidence.
Jamie Hoffman, the landlord’s son, testified that on March 22 he investigated
neighbors’ complaints of a possible plumbing problem. He discovered Harcourt’s body in
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the bathtub, where water was running and overflowing into the floor. Hoffman turned off
the water, called his father and 911, and waited for police. Officer James Nellis, responding
to the call, found blood on the floor and Harcourt’s body in the empty tub. Neighbors told
Nellis that they had heard noises during the night. Stan Wilhite, who was responsible for the
crime scene, observed blood in the bathroom and the body in wet clothes; a box cutter was
on the bedroom dresser nearby, and knives were collected from the scene.
Forensic pathologist Dr. Frank Peretti, who performed the autopsy, opined that the
cause of death was multiple stab and cutting wounds. He testified that Harcourt had cutting
wounds and bruises consistent with defensive wounds, and that there were four stabbing
marks. The horizontal, inch-and-three-quarters wound on the back of the right thigh was the
fatal wound: it was eight-and-one-half-inches deep, and it completely transected the right
femoral artery. Dr. Peretti stated that the blood on the floor was consistent with the stabbing
and that small splatters under the commode were consistent with the victim’s being on the
floor when he was stabbed.
As for Brooks’s defense that she lacked capacity because of a mental disease or
defect, psychologist Dr. Ed Stafford testified that Brooks knew the difference between right
and wrong, was able to appreciate the wrongfulness of the action at the time of the crime, and
could conform her conduct to the requirements of the law at the time of the homicide. Dr.
Stafford said that he did not know if Brooks had a mental defect or not; he said that Dr. Shea
“basically punted and gave her psychotic disorder, NOS diagnosis, which is basically a sort
of . . . wastebasket diagnosis ” used when diagnosis is uncertain. Dr. Stafford stated that,
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even with a mental defect, Brooks was “still able to conform and be competent and
responsible.”
The State was required to prove that Brooks purposely caused serious physical injury
to Harcourt that resulted in his death. From the evidence summarized above, the jury could
have reasonably inferred that it was Brooks’s conscious object to engage in the stabbing and
that the stab wounds constituted serious physical injury leading to Harcourt’s death. Thus,
there was substantial evidence to support her conviction for second-degree murder.
Motion to Suppress
In her second point on appeal, Brooks contends that the circuit court erred by denying
her motion to suppress statements that violated Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U. S. 436 (1966),
and her Fifth Amendment rights against self-incrimination. She contends that the initial
violation tainted her later statements to police and should have been excluded as well. We
hold that no Miranda or procedural violations occurred in the taking of the first statement;
therefore, the subsequent statements were not tainted.
In reviewing a circuit court’s denial of a motion to suppress evidence, we conduct a
de novo review based on the totality of the circumstances, reviewing findings of historical
facts for clear error and determining whether those facts give rise to reasonable suspicion or
probable cause. Omar v. State, 99 Ark. App. 436, --- S.W.3d ---- (2007). Due weight is
given to inferences drawn by the trial court, whose ruling is reversed only if it is clearly
against the preponderance of the evidence. Id. A statement made in custody is presumptively
involuntary, and the burden is on the State to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that
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a custodial statement was given voluntarily and was knowingly and intelligently made.
Grillot v. State, 353 Ark. 294, 107 S.W.3d 136 (2003). To determine whether a waiver of
Miranda rights is voluntary, the appellate court looks to see if the confession was the product
of free and deliberate choice rather than intimidation, coercion, or deception. Id.
A policeman’s unarticulated plan has no bearing on the question of whether a suspect
was in custody at a particular time; the only relevant inquiry is how a reasonable man in the
suspect’s position would have understood his situation. Shelton v. State, 287 Ark. 322, 329,
699 S.W.2d 728, 731 (1985) (quoting Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420 (1984)).
Moreover, there is no requirement that police give Miranda warnings if the questioning is
simply investigatory in nature. Bohanan v. State, 72 Ark. App. 422, 38 S.W.3d 902 (2001).
Detective John White testified that he and another detective went to Brooks’s home
eights days after the murder because of police information that she had been seen in
Harcourt’s van and was a suspect. They stood on the porch and knocked on the door, which
Brooks opened. She initially told them that she was “Mary Williams,” but she admitted her
true identify after White retrieved a copy of her driver’s license from his car and showed her
the license photo. White asked her when she had last seen Harcourt and told her that the
officers “wanted to talk to her downtown” about his homicide. He further testified:
She started into what exactly happened with Mr. Harcourt, that she was there when
it happened and so-forth. She knew where the van was.... She denied killing him and
we stopped her from talking and advised her of her rights because we knew she was
involved.
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Detective White said that he read the Miranda rights form to Brooks: she indicated
that she understood, she seemed to be coherent, and she signed the form. He said that he
informed her that she could waive her rights, that she indicated that she would do so and
would give the officers a statement, and that she never requested an attorney. White stated
that there were no threats or coercion, and that Brooks was not handcuffed. He said that the
officers talked with her more while still at the house; she told them that she knew the location
of Harcourt’s missing van and said that the keys were at her father’s house.
The officers then transported Brooks in the back of the patrol car to the home of her
father, who consented to a search of his home and curtilage. They found a knife, two sets
of keys, and a piece of cloth; the van was found at a nearby location where she had said it
would be. White testified that Brooks told them two men were involved. She also said that
she went to the residence to clean house, saw Harcourt dead in the bathtub, “got scared and
freaked out,” grabbed his keys and cell phone, and left. After obtaining this statement and
the physical evidence, the officers transported her to the police department and handed her
over to Detective Mark Knowles, the lead investigator on the case.
White testified under cross-examination that there was a previous warrant for Brooks
from district court. He said that the officers were not going to arrest her on the homicide
charge but “she was in custody.”
Under the totality of the circumstances, we hold that the trial court’s denial of the
motion to suppress Brooks’s statements is not clearly against the preponderance of the
evidence. Although Detective White testified that Brooks was in custody, the evidence
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shows that she was unrestrained in her own home and that officers did not indicate to her that
she was not free to leave. Furthermore, the nature of the officer’s questioning was initially
investigatory. Officers told her they wanted to question her about his homicide and asked
when she had last seen him. Brooks began speaking about what she had seen in Harcourt’s
home, as well as the location of his van and keys: White stopped at this point, and she was
given her Miranda rights. Thus, her initial responses did not result from interrogation in a
custodial setting.
Brooks was given the Miranda rights at her home but waived those rights, continued
speaking with officers, and led them to the location of the victim’s van. She then was turned
over to Detective Knowles. He testified that he read her Miranda rights to her again, she
indicated she understood them, she waived them, and she gave another statement without
ever asking for an attorney.
Brooks’s statement to Knowles was tape-recorded and
introduced into evidence at trial. Because no Miranda or Fifth Amendment violations
occurred in the taking of Brooks’s first statement, there was no taint of this subsequent
evidence.
Affirmed.
G RIFFEN and G LOVER, JJ., agree.
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